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Abstract 
The developments in asset markets have influenced researchers to focus on the interaction 
between monetary policy and the financial system. In Chapter I we provide an overview of 
the role of the financial system for the whole economy. We show the importance of this 
sector in transmitting the monetary policy actions. 
The aim of this research is twofold; firstly we want to investigate how important 
the amount of credit for the whole economy is. To accomplish this objective, in Chapter 2 
we make use of the VAR technique to study the monetary transmission mechanism. In 
particular we are interested in explaining why previous empirical research has found that 
prices show an increase after monetary tightening. We investigate how an unanticipated 
movement in the risk free interest rate affects all those variables responsible for the 
transmission of a monetary shock. Our results suggest that the immediate increase in prices 
is not due to some form of econometric misspecification, but rath-, r to the change in the 
composition of firms' source of finance. Prices rise because the need for external funds 
increases, thus firms' costs of production increase. 
Another important issue that we want to tackle is the contribution of external 
finance to the 1990 economic recession. In Chapter 3 we show that the increased level of 
indebtedness was one of the forces at the root of the economic downturn. We argue that the 
crisis could be explained on the basis of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. 
In the remaining part of this research we tackle the second aim of this research: we 
focus our attention on the link between asset prices and monetary policy. Asset prices, in 
fact, can give an indication of future consumers' and firms' decisions on spending and, 
therefore, might be indicators of future economic activity. Wealth deriving from gains in 
these markets tends to increase the level of consumption and investment. At the same time, 
sharp movements in asset prices could signal imbalances in the economy; developments of 
this kind can threaten financial stability. In Chapter 4 we argue there might be a trade-off 
between financial stability and monetary stability when these are the main objectives of the 
monetary authorities. First we explore the possibility that the demand equation is affected 
positively by changes in asset prices, secondly empirical findings suggest that for the 
period 1992: 10-2003: 1 monetary policy in the UK can be better represented by a rule 
which takes into consideration movements in house prices and stock prices. 
The empirical evidence provided in Chapter 4 brings us in Chapter 5 to construct a 
macroeconomic model where the asset prices enter indirectly into the Central Bank's loss 
function. We model the aggregate demand of the econDmy so that output is determined, 
among other variables, by the wealth effect. The optimal interest rate rule is obtained by 
optimising intertemporally a loss function that includes inflation and output variance. We 
find that the optimal policy in the presence of wealth effects not only depends upon 
inflation and output but also it depends on financial imbalances, as represented by asset 
price misalignments from fundamentals. The response to asset price deviations from 
fundamentals becomes more aggressive as wealth effects build up, while the reaction to 
inflation and the output gap becomes less pronounced. 
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Introduction 
For many years macroeconomic researchers looked at the economy as if the financial 
sector was not important. This idea was based on the Miller- Modigliani (MM, 1958) 
irrelevance theory. In a world characterised by perfect capital markets without 
uncertainty and frictions, financial structure is indeterminate and irrelevant for 
investment decisions. The MM proposition and the Neoclassical School that 
developed in the seventies led researchers to the notion that the financial system was 
"merely a veil", Fama (1980) in Hubbard (1994, p. 3) 
By the late 1980s, macroeconomists started to develop an interest in the financial 
system, its key role in the monetary transmission mechanism, and its being a vehicle 
of financial crisis. Although many differences still exist among researchers, there is a 
widespread consensus that the understanding of how the banking system and capital 
markets operate are of fundamental importance in formulating appropriate economic 
policies. We can identify two reasons for this change in interest. First of all, financial 
markets and instruments have had an exponential growth- in the developed economies 
this expansion started during the eighties and saw its full development during the 
nineties with the complete liberalisation of capital markets. The second reason lies in 
the fact that empirical analysis has never fully supported the notion of financial 
irrelevance. 
This new interest, however, was just a revival of theories that many classic authors 
(Smith, 1891 and Bagehot, 1873 among the others) had already pointed out. Indeed 
economists were not new to the idea that fmancial markets are responsible for 
channelling funds from savers to producers and that fully efficient financial 
intermediaries reduce information cost and reduce the risk associated with each 
investment. 
Although the vast majority of researchers seem to agree that financial markets are 
important in a capitalist economy, a consensus does not exist in explaining the role of 
financial markets in determining business cycle fluctuations. We can distinguish four 
different theories of the monetary transmission mechanism. The first is the so-called 
"money view": it refers to Keynes's theory that prices are not fully flexible; this 
implies that a monetary policy tightening increases the long term interest rate and the 
users9 cost of capital; inducing a decrease in investment and consumption. This 
channel is conventionally incorporated in he traditional IS curve. Some authors 
(Benanke and Gertler, 1999 and Clarida and Gertler, 1995) have pointed out that 
macroeconomic fluctuations are much larger than those implied by this channel. This 
suggests that an alternative channel might be in operation along with the traditional 
interest rate. 
One of these channels is the "credit view" or the "bank- lending" channel. The idea 
was first developed by Bemanke and Blinder (1988); they argue that banks are the 
main source of external finance for nonfinancial companies. A monetary policy 
tightening contracts the amount of reserves banks have available via a contractionary 
in demand deposits: this, in turn, causes a decrease in the supply of credit; the capital 
available to firrns is, therefore, limited. The result will be contraction in investment 
and consequently output. 
An alternative explanation is proposed by Bernake and Gertler (1999). They develop 
a model where capital markets are characterised by asymmetric information; this 
determines an important distinction between internal and external finance, though no 
distinction is made between different sources of external finance. A central role in 
this theory is covered by asset prices: they determine the value of the collateral 
against which producers and consumers are able to borrow. In an environment which 
departs from MM framework information costs determine a premium which is a 
function of the level of interest rate and the level of indebtedness; in the presence of 
falling collateral value the model predicts an increase in the premium borrowers have 
to pay. In such a model, monetary policy tightening increases the cost of capital more 
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than proportionally: i. e. when monetary policy tightens, the supply curve becomes 
steeper. Thus, policy changes are magnified via a financial accelerator effect. 
A fourth theory which places great importance on the value of asset price is the 
"broad money" channel. This model is built on the Modigliani (1963) life-cycle 
model of consumption and on the Tobin q. They emphasise how an increase in 
interest rate reduces the value of consumers' and firms wealth, inducing a reduction 
in the aggregate demand. An important point to stress is that all these channels do not 
work independently of each other but rather it would be a combination of these that 
determines the final level of output and inflation. 
One important question that arises from the modem theories of the monetary 
transmission mechanism is whether policy makers should take into consideration 
asset price swings. Following Bernanke and Gertler (2001), large movements in asset 
prices are one of the major sources of fluctuations in output and inflation. The reason 
for this is that monetary policy has an immediate effect on the financial markets, and 
consequently, a direct impact on the value of the borrowers' collateral. It is well 
accepted in the literature that positive movements in the risk free interest rate (i. e. 
discount factor) would produce a negative movement in the value of asset prices. 
Thus, considering that the value of the collateral is determined by its price, monetary 
policy affects indirectly both the amount that the financial system is willing to lend, 
and the firms and consumers ability to borrow. Furthermore, if financial institutions 
incur losses because the level of collateral against which they lend declines, this 
could then lead to some degree of financial instability. There is yet another reason 
why Central Banks should take into consideration asset price inflation. Borio and 
Lowe (2002) suggest ihat even if an environment is characterised by monetary 
stability, this does not guarantee that the system is then immune from financial 
instability. They stress that the former is not a necessary and sufficient condition to 
prevent the latter: that what tatters is financial imbalances. Typically, tensions in 
output and inflation first show up in the asset markets. Consequently Borio and Lowe 
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advise central bankers to check the conditions of the financial market before 
formulating their policies. 
Given the recent developments in macroeconomics, the purpose of this work is 
twofold: the first part empirically investigates the importance of the firms' external 
borrowing to output and inflation fluctuations in the presence of an unexpected 
change in the monetary policy instrument (Chapter 21); and to study the impact of the 
credit on the 1990-92 UK recession (Chapter 3 2). Secondly part of the research 
analyses the link between monetary policy setting and asset prices. It tackles the 
problem from two perspectives: first we investigate if UK monetary policy has 
reacted to asset prices movements in the last ten years (Chapter 4 3), secondly, we 
build a structural macroeconomic model to explore how monetary policy should react 
in the presence of the wealth effect (Chapter5 4). 
In order to investigate how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the real 
economy one of the most common econometric techniques is the Vector 
Autoregressive analysis (VAR). The usefulness of this technique relies on the 
possibility of distinguishing between a fundamental and a non- fundamental 
component. In practice, identifying the exogenous component of monetary policy is 
relatively straightforward. We can model the response of any macroeconomic 
variable to the identified shock by adding thrm to a VAR containing a set of core 
macroeconomic variables and a policy instrument. When VAR methods are 
employed, economic theory is used to choose both the block of non-policy .,, ariables 
1 Part of this chapter has benefited from comments at a seminar organized by the Department of 
Economics and Social Sciences at the University Federico 11 in Naples. 
21 would like to thank Prof Sheila Dow for the most valuable discussion about Minsky economic 
theory. 
3 This chapter has benefited from comments of the participants at the 6 th International Conference on 
Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance- Crete, Greece. Part of this is "Has Monetary 
Policy Reacted to Asset Price Movements? Evidence from the UK" (with A. Kontonikas), May 2002. 
This work is forthcoming in Ekonomia. 
4 Part of this chapter has been presented at lid European Conference in International Economics and 
Finance, Bologna, Italy with the paper entitled "Optimal Monetary Policy with Wealth Effect" (with 
A. Kontonikas) and at the 7 th International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International 
Finance- Crete, Greece with the paper entitled "Optimal Monetary Policy and Asset Prices 
Misalignment" (with A. Kontonikas). The paper is currently under review at The Manchester School I 
would like to thank Prof. Charles Goodhart for his most valuable comments. 
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and the appropriate policy instrument, and to choose the ordering of the variables 5. 
Typically monetary policy shocks are identified as an unexpected change in the risk 
free interest rate. Chapter 2 suggests that many VAR analyses are frequently 
economically misspecified since the vector of non policy variables to which the 
Central Bank reacts is usually not correctly defmed. Using variables in their levels 
rather than as a deviation from their target (when they exist) and from their natural 
levels generates false monetary policy innovations. We will specify our 
macroeconomic model as a Phillips curve, a demand equation and a Taylor rule. 
Usually estimated VAR suggest the presence of a price puzzle: a persistent increase 
in the price level following a monetary policy tightening. Chapter 2 illustrates the 
increase in the price level is not the result of some forin of misspecification: instead, a 
simple economic explanation can be found. The chapter will explore the responses of 
different variables that describe the monetary transmission mechanism to a policy 
shock. The results suggest that the so-called puzzle is the result of a change in a firms 
portfolio composition. This is equivalent to the consideration of monetary policy 
shocks as a source of cost-push inflation. 
Another important issue arising from the modem theorýs which incorporate 
asymmetric information to explain output fluctuations is that they generate business 
cycle dynamics that are intrinsically non linear (Bemake and Gertler, 1999). The 
authors stress that the financial accelerator model propagates monetary shocks to the 
real economy. However, there is a further issue that is not fully addressed: accepting 
the notion that the economy is dominated by asymmetric information should 
conclude that the financial system can be itself a generator of instability of the 
system. This concept was first modelled by Minsky who stressed the pro-cyclicality 
of expectations. Chapter 3 links the new credit view with the notion of Minsky's 
Financial Instability Hypothesis. We test the possibility that the 1990-92 recession 
was the result of speculative dominated investment for the period preceding the crisis. 
5 There is an alternative way to investigate the problem. Romer and Romer (1989) propose a narrative 
approach; unfortunately it has little information, "it delivers few episodes of large policy actions, with 
no indication of their relative intensity" (Christiano, Eichenbaun, Evans, 1994 p. 5). 
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The aim of chapter 4 is to explore if the Bank of England has reacted to price 
movements. We will estimate monetary policy reaction functions augmented by the 
nominal stock return and house price inflation. The evidence presented shows that 
since the introduction of the inflation target, the Central Bank has reacted to asset 
inflation. We find that greater weight has been placed on house prices than stock 
prices. We believe this reflects the British economic condition: a greater portion of 
wealth is locked into housing than stocks. 
Previously highlighted was the point that modem theories of the monetary 
transmission mechanism place a great importance on the role of asset prices. 
Furthermore we observe that these prices are taken into consideration by the Bank of 
England, nevertheless one of the major areas of debate in the recent literature is how 
the Central Bank should react to asset price movements. We recall three different 
positions: 1) Bemake and Gertler (1999) stress that policy makers should ignore asset 
price movements if they do not effect inflation targets. 2) Goodhart (1999) 
emphasises how asset price inflation is as harmful as goods and services inflation, 
which brings him to the conclusion that Central Bank should use a broader measure 
of inflation; 3) Cecchetti et aL (2001) advocate a more systematic response to asset 
prices. They argue that a complex monetary policy rule is always superior, in terms of 
output and inflation volatility, to a simple one. Recently the debate has shifted 
towards a middle common ground: economists argue that monetary policy should not 
aggressively respond to asset prices and it should not try to burst a bubble. Rather, it 
should take account of asset prices fluctuations to the extent that they can provide 
information about the shocks affecting the economy, or have possible implications for 
output and inflation in the medium term, beyond the usual inflation targeting horizon. 
Given the results obtained in Chapter 4 and the recent developments in the literature 
linking asset prices and monetary policy, in Chapter 5 we develop a structural rnacro 
model where asset prices enter directly the Aggregate Demand (AD) equation and 
indirectly the Central Bank loss function. One interesting aspect of this model is that 
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we allow the asset prices to follow a partial adjustment we account for momentum 
trading and revision toward the fundamentals to affect asset prices. Monetary 
authorities preferences are modelled exclusively in terms of inflation and output 
volatility. This allows for a monetary policy impulse to be transmitted to the real 
economy not only via the traditional interest rate channel but also via changes in asset 
prices: thus, monetary policy has a double effect on the level of output. 
The derived result suggests that the monetary policy instrument does not only depend 
on inflation and demand pressures, as standard in the Taylor rule literature, but also 
on financial imbalances, as represented by asset price misalignments, from 
fundamentals. The magnitude of the policy reaction to this misalignment is 
conditional to the importance of the wealth effect on the Aggregate Demand. Thus, 
monetary policy becomes more aggressive towards the deviations from fundamentals 
in the financial markets when the wealth effects build up. It is important to stress, 
however, that our result does not necessarily imply a tighter monetary policy, since 
when asset prices misalignments enter into the optimal interest rate, the weights 
attached to output and inflation decrease. Instead, the result calls for an independent 
assessment of financial instability (i. e. systemic risk) within the interest rate setting 
process. In the end we recognize that monetary authorities face a high level of 
uncertainty about the existence of bubbles and asset prices true fundamental value, so 
the final monetary policy would necessarily be a matter of judgement; in some cases 
activist policies are necessary, and in others, such a response would be counter 
productive. 
In concluding, this thesis intends to provide an in depth understanding of the 
monetary transmission mechanism with particular emphasis on the notion that 
financial factors may cause or reinforce real fluctuations. Furthermore this thesis 
intends to shed some light on monetary policy setting in an environment where 
economic agents' decisions are strongly affected by financial markets behaviour. 
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Chapter I 
Financial markets, the monetary 
transmission mechanism and the real 
economy 
1.1 Introduction 
The importance of bank credit as a central factor in the monetary transmission 
mechanism has always been recognised because monetary policy operates through 
banking sector. However, in the last decades we have observed an increased 
importance of this topic within monetary economics. There are several factors that 
can explain why economic researchers have been focusing on financial markets. fn 
recent economic crises, bank credit appeared as the main reason for economic 
instability. Japan, Latin America, Asia: all have experienced major problems in their 
banking sector that coincided with severe recession. Secondly following the financial 
deregulation and the increased globalization of capital markets since the early 
eighties, all major economies have registered an increase in asset prices and in the 
amount of external finance available to firms and households. 
The problem that we are going to analyse is perfectly described by Walsh (1998, 
p. 314): 
"If the credit channeh are important for the monetary transmission 
process, then evolution in financial markets, whether due to changes in 
regulations or to financial innovations, may change the manner in 
which monetary policy affects the real economy. It also implies that 
the level of real interest rate may not provide a sufficient indicator of 
the stance of the monetary policy. And credit shocks may have played 
an independent role in creating economic fluctuations" 
Further, according to Gray and Stone (1999) there is a close link between 
macroeconomic development -stability- and corporate sector. If corporations are 
highly leveraged an increase in interest rate might raise the risk premium in such a 
way as to magnify economic downturn, rapidly moving the economy into deep 
recession. Moreover, the increasing rate of corporate failure might push the 
government to divert funds toward bank recapitalization. The broad credit channel 
suggests that the higher the level of indebtedness and the higher the level of interest 
rate the greater the risk of asymmetric information, and therefore, the cost of capital 
would be higher, which illustrates the possibility that a tight monetary policy could 
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result in credit rationing. According to the asset price channel what we should look at 
is the relative price of financial and real assets. 
Both, the broad credit channel and the asset prices channel, underline that movements 
in assets prices are likely to have a real effect on the economy since they directly 
affect the capacity of households and firms to borrow. 
This said, monetary policy should be thought of not only as a promoter of monetary 
stability (stability in the general price level), but also as a promoter of financial 
stability, where the latter is refers to stability in the financial system (markets and 
institutions); thus, financial stability is a public good, and monetary authorities should 
consider it as an important goal of their policies (Mishkin, 1996 and Crockett, 1997). 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we present 
the role of the financial system in capitalist economies. In the second part we move to 
a detailed discussion of the monetary transmission mechanism confronting different 
views, namely money view, bank lending channel and broad credit (asset price) 
channel. We highlight how the monetary policy propagates through the financial 
system before affecting real variables. In section 1.5 we will discuss the link between 
monetary policy and asset prices, highlighting the reason why Central Banks might 
wish to respond to asset prices movements. We run some correlation tests and we 
estimate an augmented Phillips curve equation in order to test whether current 
intlation is affected by past asset prices. Section 6 presents the conclusion. 
1.2 The financial system and the economy 
The role of financial intermediaries is to channel funds (savings) from savers to 
investors. The figure below illustrates the flow of funds in an economy with a 
relatively developed financial system. With the term 'financial intermediaries', we 
identify all those institutions which collect savings. They transfer funds from units 
(mainly households, enterprises) which present surplus of funds to those units that 
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require funds for their investments. This inten-nediary position gives them a key role 
in economic growth. Indeed, the more developed this sector, the more efficiently the 
funds are channelled into more productive and less risky projects. Figure I gives a 
representation of the interaction between surplus and deficit units. 
Figure 1.1: Funds in an economy with a relatively developed financial system. 
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Financial intermediaries transform savings into investments by repackaging wealth 
and transferring capital and information. As shall be illustrated, information is the 
central word when we speak about the capital market. Indeed these kinds of markets 
are different from that of commodity because they involve "delivery in the future and 
the future is always uncertain" (Fry, 1995 p. 62). A central point which has to be 
focused on, is that financial intermediaries do not grow in an Arrov. L-Debreu 
environment 6. In fact markets are dominated by two kinds of frictions (i. e. high 
costs): 
(i) Asymmetric Information 
When there is a channelling of funds from savers (lenders) to investors (borrowers), 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems arise. This is because lenders and 
borrowers have different information regarding the nature and the practicability of the 
financed project. This refers to the asymmetric information problem. 
(ii) Transactions friction 
The pooling- mechanism and screening mechanism have a cost. Banks exercise these 
functions and take advantage of the economies of scale. Hence, they grow to reduce 
these two costs. 
Following Levine (1997) the financial system plays five important functions in the 
economy: 
1. To facilitate the trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling of risk. This function 
is associated with two different risks. The first risk is associated with 
uncertainties to which a project is subjected: productivity risks and future demand 
risk. The existence of these creates a necessity for the financial system. Savers 
may diversify their portfDlios either directly (in the stock market) or indirectly 
(through the banking systeM)7. The second type of risk is liquidity. This is due to 
the fact that many profitable investments may require a long-term commitment of 
capital, but agents are often reluctant to lose control of their savings for long 
6 In an Arrow-Debreu environment all the states of nature are covered by the pay-off of the securities 
available. 
7 Obsfeild (1994) points out financial markets can diversify the risk at an international level. 
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periods of time. The existence of financial markets, which allow agents to avoid 
liquidity shocks, can have a positive impact on the level of savings 8. 
2. To allocate resources. This function is linked with the ability of financial 
institutions to gather information among different available projects. This allows 
the channelling of savings into the most profitable investments adjusted for the 
level of risk. 
3. To monitor managers and exert corporate control. This Ibriction suggests to us 
that the financial system can reduce the risk of moral hazard. Banking and other 
intermediary institutions monitor the project during the life of the loan in order to 
prevent a bad utilisation of the funds. This function is also referred to as the 
4 screening- mechanism'. 
4. To mobilise savings. The presence of efficient financial institutions may improve 
the willingness of the savers to transfer their surplus into deficit units. Usually, 
the existence of an insurance mechanism at a govenunent level facilitates this 
function9. 
5. To facilitate the exchange of goods and services. This basic function refers to the 
payment system. In fact, a necessary condition for economic growth is the 
exchange mechanism. Hence, the monetisation of the economies needs an 
efficient financial system. 
These five functions point out how important the role of the financial sector is. 
Uncertainty and instability in this sector of the economy would have a negative 
impact on the productive units and on the level of saving. 
Figure 2 shows how financial markets can be the vehicle to promote economic 
growth. 
8 An example ofhow this institutions work can be found in the stock market crash in the October 1987. 
Investors feared a credit squeeze on broker-dealer in the credit market. Before the stock market opened 
for trading the following day the FED announced that it was ready to provide liquidity in support of 
the economic and financial system. 
9 An example is the Central Banks as Lender of Last Resort to prevent 'bank runs'. 
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Figure 1.2: A Theoretical Approach to Finance and Growth. 
Market Frictions 
- infonnation costs 
- transaction costs 
Financial market 
and intermediaries 
Financial Functions 
- mobilise savings 
- allocate resources 
- exert corporate control 
- facilitate risk management 
- facilitate trading of goods, 
services, contracts 
Channel to growt1i 
- capital accumulation 
4echnological innovation 
I Growth I 
Sou rce: Lev i ne (1997, p. 69 1) 
Again following Levine (1997) we can recognize two channels through which the 
financial system exercises its influence on economic activity: 
a) Capital accumulation. The financial system can modify the level of savings in the 
economy or it can reallocate savings among different users, choosing the more 
profitable investment among the different levels of risk' 0. 
b) Technological change. The intermediary system may alter the stead)"state growth 
by modifying the rate of technological innovation". Capital markets allow the 
reduction of profitability shocks. This facilitates investments fito more productive 
and specialised technologies even if such investments more risky. 
10 In reality, as we will present later in the chapter, under particular circumstances financial institutions 
may ration the credit and prevent a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. 
11 Pagano (1993). 
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1.2.1 A brief historical overview 
The importance of financial intermediation has been recognised since the last century. 
It has its root in the Banking School represented by Thomas Tooke, John Fullarton 
and John Stuart Mill (Cramp, 1962 and Wray, 1990). Nevertheless, other authors 
outside this school of thought have underlined the importance of financial 
intermediation. They are John Looke(1665), Adam Smith (1776, IV bDok of his 
"Wealth of Nations"), Jeremy Bentham (1787), Bhohm-Baweark (1891). What these 
authors think about the financial system can be expressed through Bagehot ([1873] 
1991, p. 6): "Political economists say that capital sets towards the most profitable 
trade, and that it rapidly leaves the less profitable and nonýpaying trades. But in 
ordinary countries this is a slow process ... In England, however, capital runs as surely 
and instantly where it is most wanted, and where there is most to be made of it" 
More recently, John Hicks (1969) and Joseph Schumpeter ([1912] 1936) pointed out 
that the development of the financial system is a necessary condition to boost 
economic growth. Studying the English industrial revolution, the former concludes 
that "the industrial revolution has to wait for the financial revolution" to convert ideas 
into marketable goods. The latter wrote: "The banker ... stands between those who 
wish to form new combinations and the possessors of productive means... He makes 
possible the carrying out of new combinations, authorises people, in the name of 
society as it were, to form them"(p. 74). And then, "the essential function of 
credit ... consists 
in enabling the entrepreneur to withdraw the producers' goods which 
he needs from their previous employment, by exercising a demand for them, and 
thereby to force the economic system into new channels" (p. 106). 
Three other authors who present a deep analysis of the correlation between financial 
and economic development are Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973). These researchers present a different view on how finance effects economic 
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growth. The first found a relationship between financial development and the 
efficiency of investment; the other two authors focus their attention on the credit 
supply process as opposed to the money supply process. Gurley and Shaw (1973) 
argue that what matters is the economy overall financial capacity. This is the 
borrower's ability to absorb debt without having to reduce the level of spending 
commitment; in this framework financial intermediaries are important because they 
extend the borrower's financial capacity. In their view, financial liberalisation plays a 
key role in increasing savings, investment and hence, growth. 
In the same period, Minsky (1975) and Kindleberg (1978) explained how business 
cycles could be driven by financial factors. Minsky's analysis stresses the relationship 
between credit market and finns behaviour at a micro level. In his Financial 
Instability Hypothesis, he suggests that money and finance have a real significance; 
their significance is not limited to determining the price level, as in the monetarist 
account, but they can cause unemployment. 
Despite all these studies for a long time a broad part of the literature has ignored the 
importance of financial systems in the macroeconomic environment 12 . According to 
Gertler (1988) we can identify four different reasons for this: 
1. For a long part of this century, macroeconomic analysis has been represented by 
the Hickesian IS4LM model. This model is indeed constructed by considering a 
world with two assets: money and bonds. Clearly the credit and its market are 
omitted in this framework (Blinder and Stiglitz, 1983, Bemake and Blinder, 1988 
and 1992). The natural consequence is that the model does not capture the force 
of economic intermediaries in fostering the economic activity. In Keynes 's 
"General Theory" the focus is on the link between money and real activity, 
considering the equilibrium in the money market as the result of a fixed money 
supply that could not adjust to changes in money demand. Besides, the 
importance of money was emphasised by Friedman and Shwartz (1963) in their 
12 in Lucas, for example, the importance of the financial system is over-stressed (Lucas, 1988). 
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monetary history of the United States. This work marked an important step for the 
macroeconomists who followed. What distinguishes the Gurley and Shaw 
viewpoint from these interpretations is that they underline the importance of 
"financial capacity" rather than the quantity of money 13 . 
2. During 1958, Miller and Modigliani (MM) proposed a theorem where real 
economic decisions did not depend upon the financial structure 14 . The elegant 
mathematical framework appeared more rigorous than the Gurley and Shaw 
approach. However, the environment in which NIM developed their theorem was 
completely different from that of GS. 
The latter formed their theorem on the assumptions that there are no perfect 
capital markets. Moreover, the irrelevance of the NIM theorem in modem finance 
can be see in the words of Robinson and Wrigthsman (1980) 15: "The main lessons 
learned by the survivors of the 1970s bankruptcy wave are (1) to go easy on debt 
financing when operating earnings are unstable, (2) to go easy on short-tenn 
borrowing when operating assets are illiquid, and (3) to pay more attention to 
expected cash flow and bank balances than to reported earnings and assets". 
3. The introduction of VAR (Vector Autoregressive) moved researchers interests to 
the quantity of money as the central factor of economic activity. These studies 
were supposed to find empirical evidence to support the monetarist propositions. 
First the interest was in finding a causal relationship between money and output a 
la Friedman and Schwartz (1963). They investigated the historical relationship 
between money and output; their investigation focused the attention on the role of 
money, this was found to be highly correlated with output. This work became the 
13 This interpretation of Keynes is misleading and incomplete. According to post-Keynesian school, in 
his articles in the Economic Journal (1937-39) Keynes recognises the credit-money dichotomy as 
central factor to the modem capitalism. Rochon (1999, p. 1 1) states that those articles are "a whole new 
book with insight and approaches for a theory of a capitalist economy of production, and for a money 
theory [ ... 
] the finance motive which Keynes developed in the Economic Journal articles invalidates 
the General Theory in many respects. " 
14 Fama (1980) applied this theorem to bank portfolios. His finding was that "the financial system is 
merely a veil" Hubbard (1994, p. 3). 
15 Quoted in Davies (1992, p. 30). 
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cornerstone of the monetarist analysis. Then, following Barro, (1977,1978), the 
analysis focused on the distinction between anticipated and unanticipated money 
and its causality with output. There are two critiques of this type of investigation: 
i) As suggested in many studies' 6 "interest rate tends to absorb the power of 
money" Bernanke and Blinder (1992). Therefore, studies conducted using 
monetary aggregates as an instrument of monetary policy might be seen as 
inconclusive. 
ii) Analysing monetary aggregates the distinction between credit and money 
f 17 alls . Indeed, broad measures of money include money and credit, but a 
perfect understanding and distinction between the two is essential in order to 
understand a capitalist economy. Money and credit are not equal. "Credit is 
not a component of the demand for money" Rochon (1999, p. 53). As 
emphasised by Palley (1996) money is a medium of transaction, while credit 
must be thought of as a medium of production. Rochon (1999) speaks of 
credit as an ex ante variable that drives the entire economic system. Credit is 
important because it determines the level of production and activitý 8. On the 
other hand money is an expost variable. It exists because credit has been used 
and destroyed during the stages of production. 
4. Following the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) 
mainstream economics became neoclassical macroeconomics. This led economists 
to build a series of real business cycle models where output was entirely driven by 
changes in preferences and supply shocks. Neither the monetary nor the fiscal 
forces were assumed to play a central role in the analysis 19. Of those models which 
modelled explicitly the monetary sector, none was able to obtain real effects from 
monetary forces. King and Plosser (1984) presented a formal treatment of the 
analysis. They reached the conclusion that outside money -the liabilities of the 
16 Sims (1980), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), McCallum (1983), Svenson (1997), Taylor (1999) 
17 This notion follows the Post Keynesian theory, where the distinction between money and credit is 
essential to explain the endogenous money theory. 
18 There is a lively debate among the money supply. For the New Keynesian school the money supply 
is determined by the supply of ciedit while for the Post Keynesian it is determined by the demand for 
credit. 
19 Kydland and Plosser (1982). 
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Federal Reserve Bank, the monetary base- has a high correlation with price level; 
furthermore, inside money -monetary aggregates, such as MI and M2, that 
represent the liabilities of the fmancial systern- where responsible for output 
fluctuation. Their interpretation was that much of economic process fluctuations 
were deten-nining (endogenously) the response of the banking system, and 
therefore of monetary aggregates. 
With new theoretical and empirical development macroeconomists seem to have 
turned their attention towards the financial system and its key role in the monetary 
transmission mechanism, and its being a vehicle of financial crisis. On the theoretical 
side we observe the development in economics of information and incentives where 
the basic insight is that inefficiencies in trade and in the allocation of capital could be 
the result of asymmetry of information between the contractual parts. Moreover, the 
empirical work presented by Sims (1980) start questioning the fact that the business 
cycle was driven entirely by money; other factor appeared to be important. 
Although many differences still exist among researchers, there is a widespread 
consensus that the understanding of how the banking system and capital markets 
operate are of fundamental importance in formulating appropriate economic policies. 
1.3 The monetary transmission mechanism 
In the previous section we gave a general overview of the importance of the financial 
sector on overall economic activity. In this section we will critically present how 
capital markets can have a decisive impact in transmitting monetary policy actions. 
We start by defining the monetary transmission mechanism as the process through 
which monetary policy affects the economy; more specifically, income and inflation. 
Different views have been expressed in the literature. They differ on the emphasis 
they place on money, creditý interest rates, asset prices or the role of commercial 
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banks and other financial institutions 20 . In the last 
decades various models have been 
proposed, but so far none of them has been able to gather all the different channels 
through: which the monetary policy might operate. Three channels emerge from the 
literature: namely, Money channel, Credit channel and Asset Price channel. Further 
empirical evidence does not help in solving this puzzle. As we will show below, the 
results obtained using micro and macroeconomic data are contrasting. 
1.3.1 Money Channel 
The money channel is generally accepted as the channel that operates through the 
interest rate 21 . It asserts that what matters in the monetary transmission mechanism 
are banks liabilities. More specifically, what matters is a decline in money supply, 
through a reduction in banks reserves or issues of bonds which will cause a reduction 
in the real money balances. Since the demand for money is not changed, this will 
cause a rise in interest rate in order to restore the equilibrium in the money market. 
With an increased interest rate (cost of capital) it will follow a decline in 
investments 22 , and consequently of the aggregate 
demand and output. Using a general 
ISALM model a contractionary monetary policy will shift the LM curve up to the left. 
More analytically the equilibrium in the money market can be expressed as: 
L(y, (1.1) 
where y is real income and i is the domestic rate of interest. The left-hand side of the 
equation represent a fully exogenous money supply; while the right-hand side is the 
20 Mishkin (1996) and Cecchetti (1995), 
21 Some authors refer to this as the traditional Keynesian channel. However, this is a misinterpretation 
of Keynes writings. Davidson (1994) presents an extended analysis on this issue. Erturk (2001) 
F, roposes a Keynesian model with asset prices and liquidity preference. 
.2 it is usually assumed, for simplicity, that only the level of firms investments decline; hoAever, this 
increase in the level of interest rate causes a reduction in households consumption, particularly for 
durable goods and housing. 
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demand for money which is positive with respect to output and negative related to the 
level of interest rate. 
The equilibrium in the goods market requires that savings (S) is equal to Investment 
(1). We can write the saving and the investment functions as: 
Saving: S= ao+a, y+a2i ao < 0, O<cý < 1, a2 >0 (12) 
Investment: I= b,, + bi bo>O, bj<O (1.3) 
Equating (1.2) and (1.3) so that I= S, and solving for i, we obtain the level of 
interest rate as required in the goods market. 
i= /ý, 
Where a,, b,, 
b, -a2 
, and a, b, -a2 
(1.4) 
The equilibrium in the whole system is then determined by the interaction of the two 
functions: 
12 
tý + -a 2)1,1 
12 (- a2) 
+ 
(b, 
-a2 
(1.5) 
From Eq. (1.5) it is clear that every change in the money supply affects the level of 
economic activity through the slopes of the IS-LM curves. We can represent the 
money channel is the owing way: 
AM: => Ai => AI => Ay (1.6) 
There are some important assumptions underlying this model. First of all prices are 
assumed to be sticky, i. e. they do not adjust immediately. Secondly, the supply of 
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money is exogenously determined; as expressed in Eq (1.1), monetary authorities are 
in full control of the amount of money in the economy. Thirdly, bank loans and bonds 
are perfect substitutes. Using the Walrasian Law the bond market is in equilibrium, 
implying that the credit is ignored in this standard framework. There are three 
important implications: i) financial intermediaries offer no special services on the 
asset side (credits), ii) it makes no difference which type of assets banks hold, iii) it 
makes no difference whether firms borrow from banks or from an auction market 
(corporate bonds market). This last implication is strictly linked with the third 
assumption of the model: borrowers are treated as homogenous; lenders do not 
distinguish between net-worthy customer and the heavily indebted ones. 
Empirical test for the interest rate channel are usually made regressing the changing 
output gap (y), against the change in the high-employment budget surplus (n) and a 
short tenn interest rate. 
Yl ::::::: 01 + 92YI-i + 03n, + PA-i (1.7) 
where the parameters on n and on i are assumed to be negative. Using quarterly data, 
Perry and Schultze (1992), find that movements of output are significantly explained 
by change in the short term interest rate. However Morgan (1993) highlights how 
output might respond asymmetrically to an increase or a decrease in short term 
interest rate. In fact they obtain large negative errors during recessions. 
One key point of the interest channel is that a movement in short-term interest rate, 
i. e. a change in the monetary policy instrument, is assumed to affect directl Y23 the real 
long-tenn interest rate used for investment and saving decisions. Testing for the 
money view is, therefore, a joint test for the terrn structure of interest rate. Model and 
empirical studies on this part of literature are highly debated. There is no obvious a 
priori explanation of movements in long-terrn interest rates. Estrella and Hardouvelis 
23 The implicit assumption is that monetary policy operates in an environment dominated by rational 
expectation and sticky prices. 
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(1990) find a positive relationship between the Federal Fund Rate and the ten years 
Treasury Bills 24 . 
Another problem with the interest rate channel is the timing between the change in 
monetary policy and its effect on the real activity. According to Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) the effect of a monetary policy shock on interest rate is transitory, while some 
components of GDP do not change until after the interest rate returns to its trend 
value, eight to nine months after the shock occurred. Moreover, they find that 
inventories rise in the first quarter following a monetary contraction, while business 
fixed investment has a pronounced decline between six and twenty four months after 
the monetary tightening. Again, following Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 34), the 
money view has a ftirther problem "in the composition of the spending effect. 
Because monetary policy has its most direct effect on short-term rates, it would seem 
that is should have its most significant impact on spending on assets with shorter lives 
[ ... ] yet the most rapid effect of monetary policy is on residential investment [ ... ] 
(that) are typically very long-lived and thus (according to the conventional view) 
should be more sensitive to long-term rates most directly influenced by the FED". 
Other studies 25 have found that initially inventories seem to increase after an increase 
in interest rates. 
Concluding, this view seems to be incomplete rather than incorrect since it does not 
capture the "distributional, or cross-sectional, responses to policy actions, nor of 
aggregate implications of this heterogeneity" (Hubbard 1994, p. 6) 
1.3.2 Credit View 
This channel of the monetary policy has been developed since the observation that 
persistent and large reductions in aggregate demand follow an increase in the short 
24 loarmidis and Peel (2003) state that the predictive power of interest rate changes accordingly with 
the monetary regime adopted by the monetary authorities 
25 Blinder and Mancini (199 1). 
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'term interest rate. As underlined by Bernarke and Gertler (1995, p. 27) 46empirical 
studies of supposedly 'interest- sensitive' components of aggregate spending have in 
fact had great difficulty in identifying a quantitatively important effect of the 
neoclassical cost-of-capital variable". 
The credit view emphasises how 'frictions', such as asymmetric information and 
costly enforcement of contracts, create agency problems in financial markets. In such 
an economic environment a wedge between the perceived cost of credit for the firm 
and the market interest rate arises, and some projects that would earn the market rate 
of return are not realised. As we will illustrate later, great emphasis is on the role of 
firms' net worth and on the role of the collateral. The credit view thus implies that the 
effect of monetary policy could be inefficient by foregoing valuable investment 
opportunities and moreover, could have distributional consequences by affecting 
predominantly firms that are subject to asymmetric information problems. In this 
framework we can recognise two important assumptions: 
A) Prices do not adjust instantaneously to offset changes in the (nominal) 
quantity of money. In this view prices must be considered as downward 
sticky, otherwise an increase/reduction in nominal banks reserves can be 
entirely compensated by a reduction/increase in prices 26 . 
B) The supply of money is credit-driven. High-powered money and bank 
deposits determine the supply of loanable funds. In other words the supply of 
money is exogenous. 
In the literature 27 the credit channel is split in two sections. For both of them the 
starting Point is an exogenous fall in money supply. From this point the two channels 
diverge. The narrow credit channel focuses on what happen to banks assets (loans), 
and their importance because of the imperfect sustainability between bank credit and 
other form of financing. On the other hand, the analysis carried on by the broad credit 
channel has a wider spectrum. It highlights the firms' costs of external financing. 
26 The New Keynesian view accepts the notion of money neutrality, although in the long run. 
27 This literature is referred as the New Keynesian School. 
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Given imperfect capital markets, fmancial fistitutions sustain a cost in monitoring 
and evaluating the creditor. This raises an external finance premium. 
* Bank lending channel (narrow credit channel) 28 . In most economies, banks are 
essential providers of liquidity and external investment finance for households and 
entrepreneurs: "If the supply of bank loans is disrupted for some reason, bank 
dependent borrowers [ ... ] may not be literally shut off from credit, but they are 
virtually certain to incur costs associated with finding a new lender, establishing a 
new credit relationship, and so on" (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 p. 40). Therefore a 
contractionary monetary policy, which decreases bank reserves causing a drastic 
reduction in the availability of credit, is bound to increase the cost of external finance. 
It will have an impact through its effect on the overall economic activity, but 
especially on small firms. The key point to understand is that the bank-lending 
channel operates given the assumption that there is a lack of close substitutes for 
deposit on the liabilities side of banking sector's balance sheet and the lack of close 
substitutes for bank credit for the productive sector (finns) and for consumers. 
Producers and households are assumed to be financially constrained; they cannot 
substitute bank loans with other form of credit. In such a world of imperfect capital 
market, banks play a special role in the credit intermediation. Traditionally banks 
have specialised in information- gathering activities. Such institutions, over time, have 
developed krr)wledge specific to their own borrowers. Particularly of those borrowers 
that are their own customers, they have been able to observe the borrowers deposit 
flow (Fama, 1980). This allows banks to reduce the asymmetric problem and offer 
lower premia on interest rates. 
There are two key assumptions regarding the bank lending view: 
1. The Central Bank can directly influence the volume of credit by adjusting bank 
reserves. As stated before the money supply is entirely supply determined. 2a) Banks 
cannot shield their loan portfolio from changes in monetary policy; 2b) Borrowers 
28 This strand of literature starts with Bernanke (1983), who analyses the impact of banking on the 
Great Depression. He argues that because banks have the crucial role of gathering information and 
channelling funds, banks failures played a major role in magnifying the output changes in the early 
1930s in the United States. 
25 
cannot fully insulate their real spending from changes in the availability of bank 
credit. 
2. Bank loans and securities are imperfect substitutes both for borrowers and for 
banks. 
The 'stepping stone' macroeconomic model which formally explains the effect of 
bank credit in the economy was presented by Bemanke and Blinder (BB, 1988). The 
base model is an extension of the traditional ISALM model. The main feature is that 
the ecorDmy is composed of three asset: money, bonds and loans; where bond and 
money are not perfect substitutes. The loan demand is determined b Y29 
e( rB ; r.; y), where: rB is the interest rate on bonds; rL is the interest rate on bank 
loans; y is the household income. It will increase when the interest rate on bonds will 
increase and vice versa for the interest rate on loans. The level of income enters this 
function to explain that part of loans that is required for "Working capital or liquidity 
considerations" (BB 1988 p. 435). The bank balance sheet is now composed of three 
assets: Reserves (R), Bonds (Y) and Loans (P); while liabilities are determined by 
the level of Deposit (D) as follows: 
R+B b+e=D (1.8) 
The level of reserves is given by required reserves (pD, where p is the reserve rate), 
plus excess reserves (E). Rearranging Eq. (1.8) we obtain: 
BbAb +E =D(I-p) (1.9) 
With the excess reserves assumed to be zero (they do not affect the portfolio decision 
of the bank), it is easily shown that the supply of loans (E) will be determined by the 
return on bonds and on the return on loans after the reserve requirements are satisfied. 
29 The subscripts + and - refer to the postulated signs of the partial derivatives. 
26 
L' = 77 (rB_; rL. )D (I - 
The equilibrium in the credit market is reached when loan demand is equal to the 
supply of loans, therefore: 
;r ; y., )=i7(rB; r L. L) D(I - p) (I. 11) 
The equilibrium in the money market is given by the traditional ISALM modeff. What 
is modified in the BB model is the IS curve. In an economy with three assets the 
firms have two forms of financing. They can either use the bond market or 
alternatively they can borrow from banks. The investment decision is not taken 
considering only one interest rate, but considering the two interest rates (the prices of 
the two source of financing). Following BB the IS curve is determined by the 
intersection of the following two equations: 
The equilibrium in the good market: Ir 
( 
rB- ; I- S( Y+; rL, 
The equilibrium in the credit market: e (rB.; rL_; y, ) = 17 (r,, 
_; 
r,,, ) D(I - 
Using the signs of the partial derivatives, from the two equilibria it is possible to 
obtain the level of the interest rate on loans as function or rp, y and R: rL = O(r, ', 
R_) 
Thus substituting the defined level of interest rate in the goods market equilibrium, 
we get: 
I (rB; P (r.; R)) =S 
(y; r. ) (1.14) 
which can be solved to obtain the Commodities and Credit curve (CC) described by 
Barnanke and Blinder. 
30 As in Eq. (1.1), money supply is assumed to be exogenous in the system. 
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Y (r8, P (r)8; y; R)) (I. 15) 
As discussed by BB, the CC curve is negatively sloped like the traditional IS curve, 
but it can be shifted by a change in monetary policy (R), by a shock in the credit 
market which affects either the demand or the supply for loans. 
The figure below illustrates an expansion in the supply of reserves. As previously 
stated, not only does this have an impact on the LM curve, as it does in the traditional 
IS/LM model, but it also causes a outward movement in the CC curve. 
Figure 13: The Bank Lending Channel 
rB 
rB" 
rB' 
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This result has some important implications: 
1) Monetary policy matters. The level of the bank reserves enters directly in the 
goods market equilibrium. This means that a less tight monetary policy (low 
level or reserves requirement) increases the credit supply. The LM curve and the 
CC curve shifts to the right, given that more credit is available to the economy. 
This has the effect of increasing the level of output but, at the same time, raises 
the interest rate. This increase in interest rate is the first significant difference 
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from the traditional analysis. 
2) The CC curve captures the credit-market shocks, either on the demand side, 
L do, or in the supply side, L(). A decrease in the risk of loans may represent a 
shock in the supply side. The interest rate on loans will decrease and this effect 
will be reflected entirely on the CC curve. The level of output and interest rate 
will increase. A shock on the demand side will have exactly the opposite effect. 
3) In the credit view, the Central Bank should monitor carefully the level of 
credit in the economy. Money, the rate of interest and credit should be the 
financial variables that the Central Bank must observe in order to predict future 
economic developments. It is on this third point that researchers have differing 
opinions because monitoring credit is not an easy task: in fact there is high 
collinearity between money aggregates and credit. 
King (1986) is one of the first authors to investigate the correlation and causation 
between bank lending and output. He reaches the conclusion that theories based on 
credit hypothesis do not have any support in the data and they do not play any role in 
the propagation of monetary policy. Romer and Romer (1990) propose a narrative 
approach to determine episodes of restrictive monetary policy in the US, but their 
conclusions do not differ from those of King (1986). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
employ a VAR analysis to estimate impulse response functions; they find that 
monetary policy works both through bank loans and bank deposits. Loans seem to 
respond slowly to monetary policy innovations. They argue that over time banks 
respond to a tighter monetary policy, tenninating old loans and restricting new ones; 
the authors carry on saying that since some borrowers are limited to bank credit, this 
reduction in supply of credit has a negative impact on the economy. Ramsey (1993) 
uses a Johansen cointegration test in his analysis; the results do not support the credit 
view. No significant role has been found for bank loan velocity and banks portfolios 
do not have any significant impact on output. In another study, Walsh and Wilcox 
(1995) find support for the credit view. They use a VAR model analysis where the 
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price of bank loans is determined by the prime rate; the results are consistent with the 
credit view: in the US, the supply of bank loans had less effect on bank lending than 
output. Loan shock was a factor in the boom in the late 1980s and the lecession of 
1990-91. For the UK economy, Matthews and loannidis (1997), using a structural 
VAR model with unadjusted data, find that both credit growth and MO growth plays 
an important role in the determination of inflation and output. Moreover, credit 
market shocks affects the variance of inflation, but not its mean. The latter is entirely 
determined by the rate of growth of MO. 
Kayshap, et alL (1993) tackle the problem from a different perspective. Their starting 
argument is that a monetary tightening should force firms to find alternative forms of 
financing, since their desire of investment is unchanged and since bank loans are now 
more expensive. This should induce a change in the composition of firms external 
finance. Using U. S. time series data for Ihe period 1963: 1-1989: 4, they find strong 
support for the lending view theory. After a monetary contraction leads to a shift in 
finns mix of external financing, bank loans fall while commercial papers rise. This 
suggests that contractionary policy reduce loan supply, thus affect investment, 
interest rates and output. This result is questiored by Oliner and Rudebusch (1993), 
and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993); they suggest that the decline in the aggregate bank 
loan to commercial paper ratio is not conclusive evidence of a bank credit channel. 
Using aggregate data for the US economy, they find that bank loans to small 
businesses fall (as well as loans to consumers and loans for real estate), while loans to 
large firms actually increase, so that total bank loans to businesses are left unchanged 
after a monetary contraction. They argue that one possible explanation why the 
overall bank share in external finance declines is that large firms have a wider range 
of financing options, so they rely less heavily on bank debt than do small firms. Once 
firm size is taken into account the mix of financing is left unaffected. So while small 
firms use less credit and large firms use more credit the macroeconomic effect of this 
change in distribution is unclear. 
Morgan (1991,1992a/b) explores the problem from a different perspective. His 
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starting point is that "a bank loan commitment may also relax financial constraints by 
providing information" (Morgan 1991b, p. 41). His results tend to support this 
statement. Financial constraints emerge as the main cause of decline in aggregate 
investment spending when firms do not have a bank loan commitment. He also 
provides an explanation for the dichotomy between small and big firms. In the 
majority of the sample that he investigates, small firms do not have a bank loan 
commitment. 
The empirical evidence does not seem to shed light on the main question: how 
relevant is the role played by the banking system in the monetary transmission 
mechanism? Moreover, some theoretical objections have been presented. Firstly, not 
all the firms are bank dependent. This can be assumed for small countries or for 
economic systems with less developed financial markets. To this critique, the 
advocates of the credit view reply that even in OECD countries (with advanced 
payment and credit system) bank loans are the primary source of financing. Indeed in 
European countries the Commercial Paper market does not exist and the corporate 
bond market is virtually non-existent 31 . Another critique advanced is that banks are 
not the only source of external finance for a firm. However, this argument is valid 
only on a theoretical basis, but lacks of fundament in the 'real world'. Indeed, for a 
firm, the switch from one bank to another or to noný-bank inten-nediaries is very 
costly. To concede a 'line of credit' banks need to gather all the infon-nation about the 
borrower and need to know the credit history of the borrower. Therefore there is an 
advantage for a finn to be in a stable relationship with a bank. This would allow the 
financial institution to monitor the firm closely. Last but not least, real assets are not 
included in the analysis. This makes the analysis incomplete. Indeed, if such assets 
were included, the aggregate demand would have different responses to shocks in the 
loan (and money) demand and supply. As we will see, this point has been emphasised 
by the monetaristic school. 
1 Davis (200 1). 
31 
Balance-sheet channel (broad credit channel). Here the emphasis is on the market 
32 frictions and on the imperfect substitutability between internal and external finance 
This literature can be traced back to Minshkin (1978), who seeks to explain the 
General depression through changes in households balance sheets, due to rising 
liabilities -a consequence of the debt build-up in the 1920s and the price deflation in 
the early 1930s - and falling assets as the stock market crashed. The 'liquidity 
hypothesis' argues that households has their demand of durables and residential 
investment on liquidity of their assts, so that falling households net worth led to lower 
expenditures and aggregate demand. The reason is that high indebtedness or low 
financial assets holding make financial distress more likely, "since the buffer of 
financial assets to tide him over bad times has now diminished" (Minshkin, 1978). 
The starting point of this channel of monetary transmission is the assumption that 
firms have to sustain a risk premium if they want to acquire funds in the capital 
market, and these premia depend decisively upon enterprises balance sheets position. 
The lower the level of the net worth and cash flow, the higher will be the asymmetric 
infori-nation problems (i. e. moral hazard and agency problems). This will make 
external finance more expensive by augmenting the risk premium. In such a 
framework, monetary policy may effect firms balance sheets in several ways: 
a) lower share prices, following a monetary tightening, increase the risk of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, following a reduction on lending; 
b) higher interest rate causes a deterioration of the balance sheet because it increases 
the interest payment for firms, reducing the level of cash flow and the net worth. 
This channel is seen as a broader phenomenon and overcomes the problems 
encountered by the bank-lending channel. It is not restricted to the case where the 
banks lending ability is limited by a contraction in reserves. As underlined by Morgan 
(1991 a), asymmetric information can effect firms in both equity and debt market. In 
the credit channel framework there is no distinction between the difference sources of 
financing. Financial markets are dominated by imperfect information Therefore, 
32 Bernanke and Gertler (1989,1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), 
Kyotaky and Moore (1993), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), present the financial accelerator in 
dynamic general equilibrium models. 
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internal funds are cheaper than external funds. The existence of a narrow credit 
channel is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of the financial 
accelerator. 
To understand this result we have to recall the neo-classical theory of investment. 
According to the literature, in an environment with perfect capital markets, firms 
make investment decisions to maximise the Net Present Value of future cash flow. 
If the interest rate rises, the Net Present Value of profits fall making investment less 
attractive. However, the story changes substantially in a world with imperfect capital 
markets. Here. ) the risk premium on external 
funds will be higher when the risk of 
adverse selection or moral hazard is most severe. Thus the direct effect of monetary 
policy on interest rates is amplified by endogenous changes in the external finance 
premium, which is the difference between the cost of funds raised externally (by 
issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (by retaining earnings). The 
figure below gives an illustration of this effect. 
Figure 1.4: Magnification of the interest rate increase 
r2 
ri 
Source: Oline and Rudebusch (1996) 
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The cost of the internal financing is given by ri and the amount of internal Funds 
available is F. In the presence of a perfect capital market, external funds would be 
available at rl too, where rl is given by the sum of the risk free rate (rf) and the risk 
adjustment appropriate for the firm (0). However, with moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, or more generally, asymmetric information problems, the cost of 
financing exceeds rl. It will incorporate a risk financing premium (Q). The total risk 
will amount to 0+0. Two important points on Q need to be highlighted: 1) the higher 
the level of indebtedness of the firm, the higher Q will be. This is because of the 
increased moral hazard problem and this accounts for the slope of the supply of funds 
S1.2) Q is positively linked with the risk-free rate. With an increase in the risk-free- 
rate the financial system will offer a lower amount of funds. If the new risk-free rate 
is r2 the Supply curve will shift upward to position S2. Investment will decline to 
point 12. The question now is: why does the S schedule move from position S, to S2 
instead of 51. The answer is the core of the broad credit channel. Since the risk- 
financing premium (0) is linked with the risk-free rate, credit market imperfections 
will magnify any monetary shock. In the credit channel literature this is called "the 
financial accelerator" effect. The slopeOf S2will be given by aQ/a rf . In the third 
chapter we will present the results of the financial accelerator model and we will 
propose some macroeconomic implications. 
We have seen that the value of the risk premium can be considered as a function of 
the level of risk- free interest rate and the level of firm leverage: the higher the interest 
rate 1he higher is level of the risk premia. To see that an increase in investments 
financed through borrowing increases the risk premia, consider a rise in demand. If 
firms need to borrow in order to overcome a shortage of cash or to fmance other 
investment, fie demand schedule switches from D to D'. This raise in investment 
spending increases the level of borrowing, reducing the net worth. Credit market 
imperfections amplify this effect. Now lenders require a higher risk premium, since 
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the firm has increased its default risk and it needs to be monitored more carefully 33 - 
This would bring the financial system to "ration the credit". Stigliz and Weiss (198 1) 
presented a theory to explain how the presence of credit market imperfections and the 
consequent asymmetric information problem (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
results in a situation of credit rationing 34 . The authors give the following descriptions 
of credit rationing: "a) among loan applicants who appear to be identical, some 
receive a loan and others do not and the rejected applicants would not receive a loan 
even if they offered to pay a higher interest rate; b) there are identifiable groups of 
individuals in the population who, with a given supply of credit, are unable to obtain 
loans at any interest rate, even though with a larger supply of credit, they would" 
Stigliz and Weiss (1981,249-250). In such a framework, the rate of interest is not 
deten-nined by the interaction of demand and supply but rather by firms (banks) that 
behave in such a way to maximise their expected returns. Stiglitz and Weiss refer to 
this interest rate as the ... bank-optimal rate". Interesting enough, this represents the 
equilibrium level interest rate even in presence of excess demand. Indeed, with the 
presence of credit rationing, an excess demand does not push up the interest rate; in 
fact, for the financial institution, lending at a higher interest rate means increasing the 
investment risk. 
33 We should notice that this can not be the case if the increase in investment spending is due to an 
increase in demand and therefore an increase in future profits. In such a situation, the slope of the 
supply schedule might be reduced. 
34 The underlined concept of this kind of analysis is that the lender (bank, financial institution) cannot 
fully observe the project-specific risk and that a higher level of interest rate induce the borrower to 
undertake projects with a higher level of risk (i. e. with higher probability of default). 
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Figure IS: Credit rationing and Money Market Equilibrium 
Source: Rochon (1999) 
A representation of the credit rationing mechanism is given in Fig. (1.5); on the left 
side of the chart we have the equilibrium in the money market. When demand and 
supply can freely interact the optimal level of money in the economy is given by M*. 
A translation of this position into the banks profits interest rate space, we see that 
such a point does not maximise the level of banks profits. If financial institutions are 
rational agents in the market that try to maximise their profits then their optimal point 
is 0*. At this level the demand of money is not entirely satisfied. The two arrows 
indicate the excess demand of money. Note that credit rationing arises when the level 
of market- determined interest rate is above the rate which maximise banks profits. 
In the model what matters is the balance sheet position of each firm rather than the 
productivity of the entire economy. An interesting consequence emerges from the 
analysis of this model. To show this effect we make use of the demand and supply of 
loanable funds in an interest rate- loan space, Fig. 1.6. If the economy goes into a 
recession the demand for credit, D in Fig. 1.6, shifts to the left, lowering the level of 
the real interest rate. At the same time, lenders face a higher risk and they become 
more unwilling to lend. This determines a sharp decrease of the supply of funds from 
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S to S'. The market clearing rate is now r'. However, Stiglitz (1999) argues that if 
new level of interest rate falls below the level at which banks profits are maximised, 
banks may ration the credit; in Fig. 6 this is reflected by a higher interest rate r* 
Figure 1.6: Demand and Supply Equilibrium and Credit Rationing 
................... ......... .. 777 .. ................. ........... .... . 
.................... ..... ....... .............. ... 
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Another interesting case resulting from the credit rationing literature is given by the 
analysis of market for loanable funds during a monetary loosening. When monetary 
authorities adopt a less tight policy (i. e. a decrease in interest rate or a reserve 
requirement), the supply of loans increase, S moves to S*, and the market equilibrium 
is given by E*. However, paraphrasing Stiglitz (1999), if banks are extremely risk- 
adverse, the supply of loans can remain unchanged or it can be expanded but less then 
the point suggested by the Demand and Supply equilibrium determination. In Fig. 7 
banks lend and amount equal to L. 
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Figure 1.7: Credit rationing and Loose Monetary policy 
r 
s, 
r 
r* 
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One point that needs to be stressed is that, because high levels of net worth reduces 
problems of asymmetric information, internal finance is crucial in many respects. 
First, agents with sufficiently low level of net worth have incentives to select 
themselves adversely in the credit market (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990). This 
implies that agency costs are negatively related to borrowers net worth, and the 
accumulation of internal finance makes debt cheaper and easier to obtain. Second, 
agents with higher level of collateral are less likely to take excessive risks; the 
principal-agent problem is alleviated because they have more on the line, and their 
incentives are aligned with those of the lenders. Third, net worth can be used as 
collateral in the case of bankruptcy, reducing the lenders exposure. Fourth, the 
possibility of future credit market constraints is less threatening for firms with ample 
internal funds and changes in the terms of credits (i. e. a higher interest rate) have less 
impact on the output of stronger firms. In the 'ideal' neoclassical world with perfect 
capital markets, firms would smooth changes in inventories by turning to equity 
markets or borrowing. 
From the New Keynesian perspective, asymmetric information makes equity finance 
more expensive and/or less available; furthermore, because credit availability 
depends on the level of net worth, a temporary shock causes a fall in output and 
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investment that is more persistent than that which neoclassical models predict. The 
conclusion that New Keynesians reach is that business sector profits and banks profits 
are more profitable during expansion and they fall during recessionary period. The 
reason is given by the fact that the business cycles affect aggregate income, via 
aggregate demand, which subsequently affects lenders and borrowers net worth. 
Since the net worth is pro-cyclical, firms and households balance sheets accelerate 
recessions. Financial markets are, therefore, seen as propagators of shocks occurring 
in the economy. This framework brings New Keynesians to define a financial crisis 
as an interruption of flow of funds between deficit units and surplus units caused by 
an interruption of the flow of information. It follows that New Keynesian financial 
crisis are not endogenous to the system, but they are just the result of external events 
(negative shocks) in a world dominated by weak balance sheets positions. Such 
events can be an increase in interest rate, as in Stigliz and Weiss (1981,1983), but 
also unexpected drops in price levels or stock market crashes, and problems arising in 
the banking sector, such as maturity mismatch (assets of longer maturity than 
liabilities). When banks suffer capital shortfalls, their efforts to restore capital 
adequacy often involve credit crunches. Because the non-financial sectors of the 
economy depends on the banking sector for funding, banking crises cause distress to 
the rest of the economy. A crisis is therefore the result of increased uncertainty, 
because the lender no longer knows borrowers real balance sheets position. 
It is a natural consequence of this representation that Central Bank actions can create 
financial instability. Monetary authority, therefore, should control the economy 
financial position before implementing its policies. As we will see later, New 
Keynesians seem to suggest that Central Banks should have a reaction function 
augmented by a metric which captures the degree of financial instability. This 
particular issue will be matter of discussion in the last two chapters; Chapter 4 and 5 
provide respectively an econometric and theoretical prospective. 
Empirical investigatiors, conducted using micro data, seem to support to the broad 
credit channel theory. Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), using quarterly data for the US 
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manufacturing sector investigate the relationship between internal funds and business 
investment. They find evidence that a monetary policy tightening affects small firms 
more than large firms; in contrast after a monetary loosening the relationship is little 
changed for all firms. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) use a panel of 421 US 
manufacturing firms for the period 1970-1984. Their result suggests that new and 
small firms investment is more sensitive to the level of the cash flow than predicted 
by the neoclassical mode 05 . They interpret this result as evidence that investment 
decisions are not independent from financial constraints which firms face. In the 
literature, the interpretation of financial variables like cash flow as indicating 
financial constraints have been discussed by Hubbard (1997). If cash flow is a proxy 
for expected profits, a significant sensitivity of investment to cash flow does not 
necessarily mean that the firm is financially constrained. Though the possibility exists 
that the cash-flow coefficient may capture other effects, it can be assumed that the 
results in fact reflect the existence of financial constraints on investment. 
Using a panel of 16,000 UK firms, Yalcin, Bougheas and Mizen (2002) suggest that 
indeed small and young firms are more affected by a monetary policy tightening than 
large firms; this implies that the former group is more financially constrained than the 
latter. 
All the empirical evidence points in the direction of the existence of a dichotomy 
between small and big firms: financial constraints have a more pronounced impact for 
the former while for the latter the results give strength to the neoclassical theory with 
no financing constraints. In other words the investments of small and young firms 
respond much more to change in monetary policy than investment of large firms, i. e. 
the risk-financing premium is larger for the former. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find 
that large firms are actually able to increase bank lending after a monetary 
contraction. The implication is that in an economy with a mix of small and big firms 
the net effect is not clear. 
35 Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) find similar results. 
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Approaching the issue from the assumption that financial development could proxy 
the degree of asymmetric information, Denizer et aL (2000) provide evidence that 
suggests that the less developed is the financial system, the higher is the volatility of 
real per capita output, investment and consumption growth. Further, they find that the 
banking system "may be particularly important in reducing the volatility of real per 
capita output, investment and consumption growtff'. They also fmd that the banking 
system "may be particularly important in reducing consumption and investment 
volatility, while the simple availability of credit to the private sector helps to smooth 
the consumption and growtlY' (p. 17). This finding seems to give force and support to 
the Bernanke and Gertler (1994, p. 44) view. Indeed, their conclusion was that "credit 
demand appears to contain a significant counter-cyclical component, which rises from 
the desire of households and firms to smooth the impact of cyclical variation in 
income on spending or production". 
1.3.3 Asset Prices Channel 
Both channels presented above have been strongly criticised by monetarist 
economists. This has induced some authors (Brainard, 1995 p. 160) to catalogue a 
third channel: the broad money view. We prefer to identify this, more generally, as 
the assets prices channel, as highlighted by Mishkin (1995, p. 7). This is the main 
difference with the traditional money view: there is a wide spectrum of measures of 
cost of capital (Brunner and Meltzer, 1993). With respect to this, monetarist 
researchers emphasize how the monetary policy changes relative asset prices and real 
wealth. Meltzer (1995, p. 52) specifies: "the key point is to look at the way how the 
monetary policy affects the relative prices of the different assets. A monetary impulse 
change s36 the stock of money relative to the stocks of other and foreign assets, and 
changes the marginal utility of the money relative to the marginal utility of these 
other assets and the marginal utility of consumption. Money holders attempt to 
restore equilibrium by equating the ratios of the marginal utilities to the relative 
36 Typically associated with an unanticipated movement in the monetary policy instrument. 
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prices of all assets and current production and consumption. This involves changes in 
many relative prices, in spending and in asset portfolio. " 
We can distinguish two categories of asset prices through which the monetary policy 
has it effects: stock market prices and house (real estate) prices. Fluctuations in both 
channels can have an important impact on firm and household spending decisions, 
and therefore, on the aggregate demand and ultimately on the level of inflation. 
We start by considering the influence of the stock market on firms. This mechanism 
of transmission of monetary policy is given by the Tobin (1969) q theory of 
investment. In this framework, the variable q is the market value of firms divided by 
the replacement cost of capital. The main idea is that there is a link between stock 
prices and investment. If q is low the investment spending will be low; the reason 
being that firms need a big issue of capital stock to finance the purchase of new 
investment goods. When monetary policy tightens, bonds become more attractive 
compared to shares. This determines a decrease in the demand for shares. The lower 
the value of q, the lower the level of investment, and consequently, output. In 
addition to this when stock prices rise, firms would find it cheaper to issue shares 
rather that bonds; in other words a rise in share prices detennine a lower cost of 
capital. 
As we mentioned earlier, asset prices also have an effect on households. The wealth 
effect, as it has been frequently labelled, is linked to the Modigliani life cycle model. 
Consumers' wealth directly affects their spending, since it is determined by human 
capital, real capital and fmancial wealth. A major part of fmancial wealth is common 
stock; therefore a fall in share prices decreases the amount of wealth available to the 
consumers. Output falls as a consequence of a reduced level in consumption. Thus, 
expansionary monetary policy which raises stock and house prices raises the value of 
household wealth, thereby increasing the lifetime resources of consumers which 
causes consumption, output and inflation to rise. 
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Monetarists doubt that rnDnetary policy shifts the banks supply of loans relative to 
other tTes of credit. According to the monetarist the principal problem for the 
lending view is to show that autonomous shifts in bank offers to lend contribute 
significantly to cyclical changes in bank loans. The alternative view is that changes in 
requests to bDrrow, induced by monetary impulses, best explain cyclical changes in 
lending. The critics note that banks can borrow on the Euro-dollar market issue 
certificates of deposits, sell securities and, in other ways, finance lending if it is 
profitable. Why do they prefer to reduce loans more than proportionally to their loss 
of reserves? Why do other intermediaries fail to satisfy the excess demand? As we 
saw in Section 3.2, in order t) explain why loans decline relative to reserves, the 
lending view suggests that recessions reduce banks net worth and have 
disproportionate effects on small borrowers. The attention to net worth reflects the 
restricted range of substitutions permitted by the lending view. With the combination 
of bonds and real capital in a single composite asset, the lending view buries asset 
price changes within the composite. Following Meltzer, the monetarist hypothesises 
that the composition of the change matters, increases in goverrunent debt and real 
capital have opposite effects on market interest rates. What monetarists firmly oppose 
is the existence of independent credit market effects. The example that they cite in the 
discussion is Bernanke's analysis of the Great Depressiorý 7. According to Bruner and 
Meltzer (1988,1993) and Meltzer (1995) the theories suggested by the credit channel 
fail to explain the U. S. banks crises in the 1929. In fact, if it is true that small firms 
cannot diversify their external financing, but they rely heavily on bank loans, then we 
should have verified a faster &crease in this type of financing than in alternative 
sources such as commercial papers. The data does not support this interpretation. 
What Meltzer fails to capture is that the credit view reserves an implicit, though 
important, role to asset prices. They are essential to the borrowers and the lenders 
because an increase/decrease in the value of real and financial assets 
increase/decrease the value of the collateral that the borrower can offer to secure 
his/her loans. An increase in assets prices, therefore, reduces the asymmetric 
37 Bemanke (1983 
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information problem, increasing the borrowing capacity of firms and households by 
increasing the value of the collateral. We therefore believe that asset price channel 
and credit view, at least in its broadest meaning, are closely related. 38 
1.4. Evidence on the role of asset prices and some implications for 
monetary policy settings 
In the previous section we presented the main different theories of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. In figure 1.8 we schematize the complex process through 
which monetary policy actions can have a direct impact on the real economy. We 
feel it is important to stress some points of the monetary transmission mechanism; 
first, the different channels are not mutually exclusive. They work together to 
determine the final level of aggregate demand and inflation. Second, the existence of 
the broad credit channel in its broadest definition implies that even a small change in 
interest rate can have a powerful impact on the final level of income. 
38 See Minshkin (1999a) for a comprehensive review of how asset prices play a role in the credit 
channel. 
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Figure 1.8: Monetary transmission channels and inflation 
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Source: Adapted from Kuttner and Mosser (2002) 
An important aspect emerging from the above diagram is the important role played by 
asset prices during the monetary transmission mechanism. They, in fact, may contain 
important information regarding the current and future state of the economy. A 
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change in interest rate modifies people's expectations about future economic growth, 
and thus their profit expectations. This may change the set of discount factors 
economic agents apply to their profit expectations or to the future stream of services 
or revenues from the asset they hold (housing for instance). 
However asset prices can have a more direct impact on the level of consumption and 
investment as seen in the following table. 
Table I. I: Composition oh Household Total Assets 
Housing Assets Equity Other Financial 
Assets 
Other Tangible 
Assets 
Unites States 21 20 50 8 
United Kingdom 34 12 47 7 
Japan 10 3 44 43 
Germany 32 3 35 30 
_ France 40 3 47 9 
_ Italy 31 17 39 13 
_ Canada 21 17 39 23 
Note: Values in %. Data refer to 1998 (1 997 tor Fra nce) 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook in Goodhart and Hofinann (2001). 
For all the G7 countries, excluding Japan and Germany, the households lave more 
than 40% of their assets locked in housing and equity. A decline in the asset prices 
means a decline in the value of the assets and consequently households net fmancial 
wealth. 
There is evidence that changes in the value of real estate and stock prices have 
significant effects on private consumption spending in most of the industrialized 
world. However, estimates of the magnitude of this effect vary considerably across 
countries and are highly dependent on the type of asset in question. The effect of 
stock prices on consumption appears to be strongest in the U. S., where most estimates 
point to an elasticity of consumption spending relative to net stock market wealth in 
the range of 0.03 to 0.07. This implies that for instance seven cents on the dollar of an 
increase in stock market wealth is spent on consumer goods with the effect taking one 
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to three years to materialise 39 . Case et al (2003) using survey data 
find that swings in 
house prices have a substantial impact on the households' wealth. The implication for 
the US (and the UK) is that if a substantial fall in house price were to occur, growth 
in private consumption (which accounts for roughly 60 per cent of GDP) would slow 
sharply. In contrast, studies for Italy and France have not found any significant effect 
of stock prices on private consumption, whereas for Canada, Gen-nany, Japan, the 
Netherlands and the U. K. the effects are significant but smaller than in the U. S. 
40 
This appears to reflect the smaller share of stock ownership relative to other financial 
assets in these countries, as well as the more concentrated distribution of stock 
ownership across households in continental Europe when compared with the United 
States. 
Table 1.2: Household equity holdings as a percent of net wealth 
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995 1996 1997 
U. S. A 10.6 11 19.5 24.4 
Japan 4.5 7.6-- 5.4 3.7 
France 1.3 3.1 2.9 2.6 3.2- 
Italy 0.8 2.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 4.7 
U. K 5.5 6.3-- 11.3 12.4 
Canada 13.7 13.9 15.6 16.5 18.3 
Source : Boone et a] (1998) 
The IMF (2000) report states that real estate prices have been closely related to the 
business cycle in the industrialized world. For some countries like Japan the 
correlation is found to be even stronger. Recessions in Japan since the early 1980s 
have been accompanied with falling property prices. Conversely, the strong upswings 
in economic activity in Australia and smaller EU countries since the mid- 1990s have 
been associated with robust growth in property prices. Real estate prices can affect 
aggregate demand through three channels: direct effects on housing expenditure, 
household wealth 
39 See Boone et al. (1998). 
40 See Boone et al (1998), Capel and Houben (1998), Jail let and Sicsic (1999) 
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The effects of changes in real estate prices on consumption appear to be stronger in 
European Union countries. Rising property prices can affect consumption rDt only 
through higher realised home values but also by the household's ability to refinance a 
mortgage or take out (or expand) home equity loans of credit based on higher 
property values. 'Me two latter channels, in particular, have become increasingly 
important in European Union countries in recent years, thus bolstering the sensitivity 
of consumption to property price cycles. Boone et al (1998) estimated that the 
elasticity of consumption to property prices is about 10 percent per year and in the 
Netherlands to be 7 percent over two years. There is also evidence that property price 
cycles have been a major determinant of consumption growth - being far more 
important than stock prices - in Australia and in some other European countries 
operating through the credit channe0l. Goodhart and Hofinann (2001), estimating an 
augmented backward looking IS equation, find that asset prices have a significant 
effect on future excess demand conditions in the G7 countries. In particular their 
results suggest that share prices have a smaller impact on output than property prices. 
Asset prices have a positive link with the level of the future aggregate demand via 
their impact on the private sector wealth and borrowing capacity of households and 
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Filardo (2000) takes a different direction; he argues that asset price inflation should 
enter directly into the estimation of the Phillips Curve. We carry on an experiment to 
explore this hypothesis. We employ monthly data on short-term interest rates, retail 
sales volume, corsumer prices, stock prices and house prices for the United Kingdom 
from October 1992 to August 2001. Our sample period does not include changes in 
the monetary policy regime as from October 8 1992 the UK has adopted explicit 
inflation targeting as a new framework for monetary policy outside the ERM. An 
inflation target of 1-4 % was initially set and on June 1995 the target was reset at 
2.5% or less. All our data was obtained from Datastream. The output gap (yt*) the 
difference between actual and potential output, is calculated as the percentage 
41 Kent and Lowe (1998). 
. 42 In chapter 4 we repeat the experiment for the UK using a forward looking IS curve. 
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deviation of the natural logarithm of the monthly retail sales volume from a Hodrick- 
Prescott trend. The 3-month Treasury Bill rate (]ý), is employed as a measure of the 
stance of the monetary policy. The deviation of the annual inflation rate from the 
target is calculated as: 61- 2.5 where 6t is equal to 100*[In(CPlt/CPlt-12)]. CPI denotes 
the seasonally adjusted consumer price index. The annual change in stock prices 
(6, sp) and house prices (6, H) is proxied by the 12 th difference of the natural logarithm 
of the monthly FTSE All Shares stock index and the Halifax house price index 
respectively. We used annual, rather than monthly, changes for retail prices, stock 
prices and house prices because as Goodhart (2001) argul, -s, year on year changes on 
these variables are much more relevant for monetary policy decisions. The month-to- 
month changes are very noisy indicators; by taking the twelve- month differences we 
are able to filter out a substantial amount of noise in the data. 
In Table 1.3 we present a cross correlation matrix relating asset price inflation with 
concurrent and future consumer price inflation and two things clearly appear. First, 
there is no evidence of a relation between inflation and nominal returns in the stock 
market. Second, the correlation between house price inflation, stock price inflation 
and consumer price inflation seems to have changed over time. For the period 1985: 1 
- 2001: 8 house price inflation and consumer price inflation are positively correlated, 
while during the inflation targeting period this contemporaneous correlation is 
reduced. However for both samples under investigation, current house price inflation 
is positive and has a high correlation with future consumer inflation, while nominal 
stock returns are negatively correlated but not significant with future consumer 
inflation for the period 1985: 1-2001: 8, and almost non-related during the inflation 
targeting period. 
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Table 13: Cross Correlations 
Sample: 1985: 012001: 08 Sample: 1992: 10 2001: 08 
lead 
Current stock 
price inflation 
with leads of 
consumer price 
inflation 
- 
Current house price ' 
inflation with leads of 
consumer price 
inflation 
-C-urrent stock price 
inflation with leads 
of consumer price 
inflation 
Current house prIce 
inflation with leads of 
consumer price inflation 
0 TTUP 0.1716* * 0.0144 -0.0541 
1 -0.1254 0.1615** -0.0542 
2 -O. TM 0.2067*** ýF 
3 
-- 
0.2514*** 0.0289 0.1529 
4 TTT92 0.2945*** 
5 - 0.3319*** 0.0714 0.2722*** 
6 -0.1344 0.3665*** 0.0746 0.2971 
7 0.4003 0.0769 
8 -0.1111 0.4315**" 0.29191'" 
9 0.4629* -U-. 27W 
10 GTM 0.4939*** 
*1 -5 "-- inclicate level ot signiticance ot lo'j/o, )I/Io, ana iv/o respectively. 
The measures presented so far might be biased for two reasons. Gertler (1998) argues 
that, after, other business cycles indicators have been taken into consideration, there 
is little correlation between short-run inflation and asset prices. Furthermore the 
results might be subject to statistical noise. Therefore, in order to test if asset prices 
have a direct effect on inflation, we proceed, following Filardo (2000), to some more 
elaborate regression analysis. Here we examine the possibility that past movements in 
asset prices fiHp to predict future inflation; we estimate a Philips curve equation for 
inflation allowing for inflation persistence and for the effect of lagged asset prices: 
ir, =a+bg, +cy, -, 
+dir, "', Hp+u, 
-1 k 
(1.16) 
Table 3 presents the estimations. There is strong evidence that lagged house prices 
affect current consumer price inflation, but not stock prices. This is in line with 
Alchian and Klein (1973) theory, and similar evidence is provided by Filardo (2000) 
using U. S. data. Furthen-nore this is consistent with the fact that in the context of the 
UK economy a greater part of households' wealth is locked in the house market 
rather than in the stock market. To gain some better insight to the direction of 
50 
causality between the variables of interest, we employed standard Granger causality 
teStS43. 
Table 1.4: OLS estimates of lagged asset price changes on current inflation 
dk Sample: 1985: 01 
2001: 08 
Sample: 1992: 10 
2001: 08 
Coefficient House prices - 
d, 0.0093*** 0.0117* 
d2 0.0092*111, 0.0143*** 
d3 0.0093*** 0.0143*** 
d4 0.0083*** 0.0 112* * 
d6 0.0084*** 0.0084* 
d12 0.0 1 M7759 -0.0003 
Stock prices 
d, 0.0010 0.0002 
d2 033 
- 
0.0055** 
d3 O. OGTT 0.0059* * 
d4 
-0.0002 0.0033 
d6 028 
------ 
0.9054* * 
d12 T0029 0.0012 
*5 **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Table IS: Granger Causality tests 
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic 
1984: 1-2001: 8 1992: 10-2001: 8 
Consurner price inflation does not 
house price inflation 
6ranger Cause 1.18029 2.77159 
House price inflation does not 
consumer price inflation 
Granger Cause 2.65818 2.27957 
Consumer price inflation does not 
stock price inflation 
Granger Cause 1.50337 0.2560 
Stock price inflation does not 
consurner price inflation 
Granger Cause 0.67132 0.56348 
*, **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
What appears from Table 1.5 is a strong bimdirectional link between house price 
inflation and consumer price inflation. Thus, the empirical evidence presented 
suggests that there is a strong connection between house price inflation and consumer 
price inflation, while the relation between stock returns and inflation is much less 
straightforward. These findings present a case for a link between the Central Bank 
43 Eight lags are considered in the estimation. 
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main objective of price stability and the level of asset prices, calling for a tight 
monitoring of the developments in the asset markets. In other words a monetary 
policy reaction function that does not incorporate asset prices inflation as a state 
variable loses important information about future price inflation, and therefore it 
undermines the efficiency of the monetary authority's actions. 
The previous analysis put forward the case for a reaction of monetary authorities to 
asset prices movements. 'Ihere are several reasons why monetary policy might wish 
to respond; a first reason is that asset prices misalignments may endanger the stability 
of the financial system. This case is put forward by Borio and Lowe (2002), they 
observe that since the 1970 asset prices cycles have been growing in amplitude and 
size. They argue that even an environment characterised by sound and credible 
economic policies, financial instability could be a serious threat. According to them, 
"it is the unwinding of financial imbalances that is the major source of finarcial 
instability, not an unanticipated decline in inflation per se". In the third chapter we 
will analyse the 1990 recession and highlight the important role played by the 
accumulation of these imbalances (debt); in the forth chapter we will look at this 
issue in more detail discussing the Borio and Lowe (2002) position. A second 
potential reason why central banks would like to respond to asset prices is that, as 
analysed previously, they play an important role in the transmission of monetary 
policy. Rising asset prices may have direct impact on the aggregate demand and may, 
therefore, be associated with growing inflationary pressures. They also influence 
collateral values and banks' willingness to lend. The final reason is that asset prices 
might contain important information concerning the future state of the economy; they 
incorporate infon-nation about financial market expectation of inflation and 
macroeconomic conditions. 
A strategic question is whether asset prices should represent an independent objective 
of monetary policy or rather should only be part of the information set used by the 
central bank. 
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This issue will be directly addressed in the fourth and in the fifth chapter. In the 
former we provide an empirical estimate of the wealth effect in the UK and we 
proceed in estimating the importance of asset prices (namely house prices and 
nominal stock market prices) in the determination ofthe nominal short term interest 
rate following the Taylor rule. In the last chapter we build a macroeconomic model 
where the wealth effect plays a key role in determining the Aggregate Demand. 
1.6. Conclusions 
In the last twenty years the financial markets have expanded significantly in all 
industrial countries. This growth has revived interest in the role played by financial 
markets in the economy and their role in the monetary transmission mechanism. In 
the first part of this chapter we highlighted the key role played by financial markets; 
they have the role to facilitate the trading of capital between surplus and deficit units, 
they are responsible for the resources allocation (savings) and facilitate the exchange 
of good and services. 
One of the main reasons why researchers have studied the functioning of the financial 
market is because monetary policies have an effect on the real economy via firtancial 
institutions. We saw that many theories have been proposed so far, the first that we 
analysed was the so called "money view". This refers to the Keynesian idea that a 
change in the risk free interest rate will affect the demand of money for investment 
purposes. This theory is based on the assumption that prices have some degree of 
stickiness, it is the conventional specification of the IS curve both in its traditional 
Old-Keynesian specification and in the modem New-Keynesian framework. This 
view does not seem to be able to explain in-depth the large macroeconomic 
fluctuations which follow a policy- induced interest rate change. Other alternatives 
have been proposed along the years. One of these is the credit view: it is 
distinguished in the Bank Lending channel and in the Balance-Sheet channel. The 
first stresses credit market frictions; here banks play the key role since they are the 
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main source of finance, it is via the banks' reserves that monetary policy can haw an 
effect on the aggregate demand. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) proposed a model 
where banks rely heavily on reservable demand deposits as source of finance. A 
contractionary monetary policy will therefore reduce the supply of loans via a 
reduction in the aggregate volume of bank reserves. Because of the significant 
number of firms that rely on bank loans, a reduction in the supply of loans reduces 
households and firms investments and consequently aggregate demand. The balance- 
sheet effect, on the other hand, does not distinguish between bank finance and other 
sources of financing, but the main distinction is between internal and external 
finance. In a market characterised by frictions (asymmetric information) the level of 
external finance is deten-nined by the level of the borrower's collateral. An important 
role is played by asset prices: they determine the value of the collateral. This implies 
that a tightening of monetary policy would reduce collateral value, which in turn 
increases the premium that the borrower has to face if s/he wants to borrow. The final 
result would be a lower level of investment and consumption. The last channel that 
we presented was the monetarist channel or Broad money view. It focuses on the 
direct effect of changes in the relatiw quantities of assets, rather then interest rate. 
This mechanism starts from the assumption that different assets are not perfect 
substitutes, therefore changes in monetary policy would affect the composition of 
outstanding assets which would lead to relative price changes; this, in turn can have 
real effect. 
In the last part of the chapter we pointed out how important asset prices are in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. They are at the centre of the credit view and of 
the broad money view. They contain important infon-nation regarding current and 
future value of output and inflation. Given the recent capital market expansion a new 
strand of research has suggested that monetary authorities should target, or at least 
monitor closely, asset prices movement. This lively debate has not reached an 
unanimous conclusion; many believe that authorities do not have inside infon-nation 
and therefore do not have the ability to fully interpret the market behaviour (i. e. 
Central Banks do not know if a movement in asset prices is due to a change in the 
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fundamentals or just a change in agents optimism). Other authors have pointed out 
that the recent expansion in credit markets has created the necessity for Central Bank 
interventions; they see financial stability as important as price stability. 
To conclude it is important to underline that the monetary transmission channels we 
presented in this chapter are not mutually exclusive: when monetary policy is set, it is 
transmitted to the real economy via a variety of channels. Central banks, therefore, 
would have to consider all these mechanisms in order to better evaluate their effect. 
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Chapter 2 
Monetary Policy Shocks and the Price 
Puzzle 
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2.1. Introduction 
The credit view emphasises how, in an imperfect capital market environment, 
ftictions, such as asymmetric information and costly enforcement of contracts, create 
agency problems in financial markets. In such an economic context, a wedge between 
the perceived cost of credit for the firm and the market interest rate arises, and some 
projects that would earn the market rate of return are not realised. This strand of 
economic literature states that the main source of external funds is mainly composed 
of bank loans. Subsequently it derives that the banking system plays a central role in 
the transmission of monetary policy for the whole economy. It follows that when 
monetary policy tightens, banks are less willing to lend money due to higher 
bankruptcy risks as in Bernake and Gertler (1999). Since some firms and households 
are assumed to be financially constrained, they cannot substitute bank loans with 
other fon-n of credit. The credit view thus implies that the effect of monetary policy 
could be nort-optimal by foregoing valuable investment opportunities and, moreover, 
could have distributional consequences by affecting predominantly firms that are 
subject to asymmetric information problems. Hence, it is important to stress that the 
credit view should not be interpreted as an alternative explanation of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism, but rather as "a set of factors that amplify and 
propagate conventional interest rate effects": Bernanke and Gertler (1995, p. 28). 
In the last twenty years there has been a lively debate on the importance of the credit 
channel. There are two generally accepted conclusions: i) a credit channel, as we have 
defined in the first chapter, exists for small firms; ii) this channel does not exist by 
itself, but operates along with the more traditional money channel. One important 
question however, is still unsolved: how significant are its effects on the overall 
economy? The answer is crucial from the Central Bank's point of view; in fact, if a 
credit channel has a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy, then 
monetary authorities should take it into consideration before setting their policies. 
Other authors emphasise how the credit view is strictly related with stability of the 
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economic system. This creates a necessity for the monetary authorities to consider 
this channel of monetary transmission. Sinclair (2002, p. 13) argues that 
"safeguarding financial stability is a core function of the modem central bank, no less 
than market operations and the conduct of monetary policy [ ... ]. This is particularly 
true in circumstances where bank failure would pose systemic risk. [ ... ] Financial 
stability impinges upon monetary policy and reacts to it. " As pointed out by Minshkin 
(1996) and Borio and Lowe (2000), monetary and fmancial stability are "mutually 
reinforcing goals". Therefore, Central Banks "need to always keep in mind that 
pursuing price stability requires the pursuit of financial stability" Minshkin (1996, p. 
92). 
In order to test the credit view and more generally the monetary transmission 
mechanism, we examine the effects of unanticipated monetary policy tightening on 
different sources of finance. One intriguing reason to analyse the effect of monetary 
policy shocks is that they seem to have played a major role in movements of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The Gerlach and Smets (1994) estimates suggest that 
the "fluctuation in GDP growth and inflation since 1988 are [ ... ] essentially entirely 
due to the monetary policy shocks". Under the traditional, Keynesian money view 
framework, we expect that an increase in interest rate produces a lower total demand 
for credit and a lower aggregate demand. Consequently all the sources of finance are 
expected to decline. On the other, hand following the credit view, a contractionary 
policy would produce a decrease in the amount of bank credit. Firms, therefore, 
would search for new forms of finance. Thus, paraphrasing Kashyap et aL (1993), we 
expect that the composition of the external finances should change if the credit view 
is valid, with bank loans decreasing more than other forms of credit. 
One of the major empirical puzzles of the monetary transmission mechanism is the 
so-called prize puzzle. It is usually referred to as a "price puzzle" when, in a VAR of 
output prices, money, interest rates and perhaps some other variables, contractionary 
shocks to monetary policy lead to a persistent price increase. This is puzzling because 
economic theory predicts that a tighter monetary policy should reduce the price level. 
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This frequently seems a sign of misspecification of the model. 
In this chapter we build a VAR model of the economy, in order to recover monetary 
policy shocks. Our aim is twofold: first we want to investigate which financial 
aggregates are impacted by these policy innovations; second we aim to provide an 
explanation for 1he prize puzzle. In other words we want to isolate the effect of 
monetary policy shocks on the availability of finance, and more specifically on the 
availability of bank credit. In doing so we use data from the UK flow of funds to 
Industrial and Commercial Companies (ICCs) and other variables that we regard as 
important during the monetary policy transmission process. Our results suggest that 
the portfolio composition of a firms financing source changes after a monetary policy 
shock. We argue that the price puzzle can be solved if we concede the possibility that 
monetary policy has a cost push; innovation in the short ten-n interest rates increase 
firms' short-run marginal costs which in turn are translated in an increase in inflation. 
This chapter is orgarised as follows: in the next section, we present a critical 
overview of the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis and its application on 
monetary transmission studies. In section 2.3 we proceed in a VAR model selection; 
results are presented in section 2.4. 
2.2. VAR analysis and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
There is a long tradition of VAR analysis in macroeconomics. The starting point was 
the seminal work "Macroeconomics and Reality" by Sims (1980) and its 
dissatisfaction with the then existing econometric models. The article is a stepping 
stone of the unrestricted VAR analysis or "atheoretical macroeconomics" (Cooley 
and LeRoy, 1985). The Sims critique was first related to the Coweles Commission 
practise in estimating large, simultaneous equations models - particularly the 
economy-scale macroeconometric models enabled by the Keynesian revolution in 
economics. To overcome the "incredible' restrictions, he proposed a model based on 
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unrestricted reduced-form equation, where all the variables can be treated as 
endogenous. Canova (1995, p. 78-79) summarise Sims's research program in three 
points: 
"First, the identifying restrictions employed by model builders were 
deemed as "incredible" in the sense that economic theory is weak in 
deciding what variables should enter a reduced form model and 
exclusion restrictions were routinely imposed with little attention with to 
the underlying economic structure. [ ... ] Second, many variables were taken to be exogenous with respect to the system by default rather than 
as a result of solid economic or statistical arguments. Finally, because 
the outcomes of traditional macroeconometric models are typically 
amended by their users withjudgmeptal ex post decisions, the results of 
policy exercises are both non- reproducible and hard to compare with 
those of other researchers even when they employ the same type of 
models. " 
There is, however, a further point that needs to be stressed. This approach is very 
useful in monetary policy analysis since it can give the researcher the possibility to 
isolate thefeedback rule (response of the monetary policy to a non-monetary variable 
movement) from the exogenous monetary policy (effects of the policy action per se, 
i. e. shock)44. In other words the principal idea underlying the VAR methodology is to 
decompose movements in some observed time series into the parts that are due to 
unobserved underlying shocks which are structural, in the sense that they can be 
given economic interpretation. In the next section we will see this concept in more 
detail. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) try to shed light on the US "Black Box", analysing the 
response to different macroeconomic data. Christiano et al. (1994) summarise the 
major findings for the US 45 .A tightening of monetary policy causes an 
increase of the 
short-term interest rate, manufacturing inventories and unemployment. The price 
level starts decreasing after four quarters. Output, monetary aggregates, profits and 
retail sales volume decrease after one year. Finally, firms increase their level of 
44 Christiano et al. (1996) 
45 Results for the UK are much more uncertain and there is not a unique view. 
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borrowing for roughly a semester after the shock. Gerlach and Smets (1994) provide 
evidence of the monetary transmission mechanism in the G-7 countrieS46. Their 
results suggest that the effect of a monetary contraction has similar effect in all the 
countries. 
For the UK the most influential study using this methodology is undertaken by Dale 
and Haldane (1993). They use the same identification procedure to test whether 
monetary policy shocks (intended as unexpected movement in interest rate) have 
some effects on exchange rates, stock market, bank lending and banks deposits for the 
personal and the corporate sectorS47 . Three important results are reported: one 
standard deviation positive shock in interest rate causes 1) a slower downward 
movement of output and prices for the corporate sector than for the personal secto? 8 
2) bank lending for the personal sector decreases immediately and its level remains 
constantly below the pre-shock value. The corporate lending evolution follows a 
different pattern: it increases for the first 18 months, moving rapidly towards the 
negative area afterwards 49. The behaviour of banks deposits is reversed. The 
corporate sector reduces deposits due to a shortage of cash, while the personal sector 
increases its deposits for roughly two years 50 ; 3) the price level increases for more 
than three years. They justify this result arguing that monetary policy acts first on the 
level of output and then on the price level, through a non-vertical Phillips curve. This 
however might be seen as a misspecification of the VAR. This type of result is 
usually referred as the price puzzle. Sims (1992) examines the possibility that this 
could be the result of a missing element in the reaction function of the Central Bank. 
46 They use a three variable VAR: real GDP growth, rate of inflation and nominal short term interest 
rate. 
47 Following Sims's work the interest rate is ordered first in the VAR. He assumes that monetary 
policy is unaffected by other non-policy variables. 
'8 This result is quite surprising. It is in sharp contrast with the major results of the credit view, (see for 
instance, Gertler and Gilchrist (1991)) where small economic units react more rapidly then big 
economic units to change in interest rate. Dale and Heldane (1993) justify their result in the following 
way: "for sectors whom assets/liability substitutability is low, official interest rate changes may be a 
less good guide to the overall change in monetary faced by agents. Hence the effects of change in 
interest rates are felt less strongly and/or more slowly by these agents. " 
49 Here we should notice that their estimated impulse response function is not significant since the 
error bands include zeros. 
50 This increase in deposit corresponds to an increase in saving. 
61 
He argues that the puzzle can be solved if a commodity price index is included as a 
leading indicator for domestic inflation This extra variable could be thought of as a 
signal of inflation expectations. In this case, Central Bank can promptly react to 
commodity price raising (signal of inflation expectation), modifying the interest rate. 
2.3. The identification of UK monetary policy shocks. 
In the last thirty years the LJK has exhibited a variety of different monetary policy 
strategies. Following Nelson (2000) we can identify seven of ttern 51 : 
1. July 1972-June 1976: from the first full month of floating exchange rates to the 
end of the pre-monetary targeting period. 
2. July 1976- April 1979: from the beginning of EM3 of monetary target to the last 
month prior the election of the Conservative gowrnment. 
3. May 1979-February 1987: period beginning with the election of the Thatcher 
govermnent. Durmg this period (1980-1985) was adopted a Medium Term 
Financial Strategy (MTFS), but this was heavily revisited during 1982. 
4. March 1987-September 1990: informal linking of the Pound to the Deutsche 
Mark. 
5. October 1990-1992: membership of the ERM. 
6. October 1992-April 1997: period of inflation targeting prior to the Bank of 
England independence. 
7. May 1997 - present: Central Bank independence. 
The consequence of the above is that there is a problem of which variables should be 
included in the VAR: in fact the inclusion or exclusion of one or more variables can 
result in an incorrect identification of the monetary policy shocks. We acknowledge 
that the best strategy to identify which variables should be included in the policy set 
and therefore identifying the optimal monetary policy rule can be obtained observing 
51 Nelson (2000) does not report the last policy regime since its data sample ranges from 1972: 6 to 
1997: 5. We believe that May 1997 can clearly be considered a change in the Bank of England 
monetary policy procedure. 
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the objectives of policý 2 
We decided not to include Central Bank intermediate targets (i. e. monetary 
aggregates) since they are not consistent within the specified periods and their 
inclusion could violate the Lucas critique of parameters instability53. This does not 
misinterpret UK monetary policy since the ultimate target of the Bank of England has 
always been the control of inflation; although, as presented above, different strategies 
were adopted along the years, they were implemented to achieve this aim. Martin and 
Salmon (1999, p. 22) state that "intermediate targets were set consistently with the 
final objective of monetary policy". This implies that the impact of monetary policy 
should be captured by the policy final objective. 
We decide to specify the vector of rimpolicy and policy variables as follows 54 : 
X, =[ GDPD, INF,, IA7, I' 
The first variable entered in our model is the UK real output. The variable has been 
detrended with a Hodrick- Prescott Filter. As we explain later this makes the 
systematic part of the vector consistent with the actual non-policy variables. This is 
justified by the fact that Central Banks regards output deviation from its trend or, 
more generally, output gap as undesirable because of the adverse consequences on 
unemployment and on the stability of the financial system. 
The second variable included is the fourth difference of the natural logarithm of the 
quarter RP155. We use annual, rather than quarterly, changes for retail prices, because 
52 An alternative strategy would be to divide the sample in six sub-samples. Such an identification 
scheme is not applicable in our case. The main reason is due to the frequency of our observation, with 
quarterly data this would result is a loss of efficiency in our estimators. 
5Y Later we will review this critique in a context of monetary policy and we will propose some 
solutions. 
54 Definition of the variables is provided in the appendix. 
55 The RPI was considered instead of the RPIX since the availability of the latter is limited from 
1975: Q2. We do not regard this as a misspecification given the extremely high correlation between the 
two measures of inflation. 
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as Goodhart and Hofinann (200 1) argue, year on year changes on these variables are 
much more relevant for monetary policy decisions 56 . Inflation is not entered as 
deviation from the target as in the original Taylor rule specification since there is no 
evidence that the Bank of England was following an inflation target approach during 
that period. Some authors (Salmon and Martin 1999) gefer to specify an explicit 
target. They regress inflation 57 on a time trend for the period 1976: Q2-1992: Q3; the 
fitted values are then considered as the inflation target. We find this approach weak in 
two ways: 
1) the period under investigation is clearly irifluenced by the high inflation during 
the 70s and early 80s, and the overshoot in the 90s. If a longer period of time was 
considered then a completely different inflation target path would have been 
found. Fig. 2 gives an example. The negative sloped line is the inflation trend 
identified by Martin and Salmon (1999), while the line with positive gradient is 
obtained using the Martin and Salmon specification but considering the period 
1970: Q2-1992: Ql. 
2) There is a second reason why Martin and Sahnon and other authors that follow 
this approach might be incorrect. For them, in order to be able to identify 
correctly the monetary policy rules "we have to define the objectives of policy" 
(p. 23). However, as Nelson (2000) illustrates, there is no evidence that the Bank 
of England had had an explicit inflation target. 
Last we order the policy instrument. As in the Taylor rule -type analysis we consider 
the nominal short term interest rate as the variable directly controlled by the monetary 
authorities. Ordering the mcmetary policy last we assume that the Central Bank reacts 
to movements (i. e. deviations) in output and inflation within the quarter. 
This VAR model has two advantages: 1) it is consistent with the economic theory. 
The ultimate goals of the monetary authorities have always been those of price and 
56 They analyse the impact of monetary policy shocks on a set of asset prices. The test in conduced on 
the G7 countries: the vector employed is ordered in the following way: Detrended output, annual CPI 
inflation, real house prices, real exchange rate, real interest rate and real share prices. Real exchange 
rates and interest rate have a reverse order for Non-Continental European countries. 
57 Here we use quarterly inflation rather then annual inflation. 
64 
financial stability (identifiable as output volatility). This specification could be 
interpreted as a small empirical version of a standard macroeconomic model, 
comprising IS-schedule, a Phillips curve and a monetary policy reaction function 
specified as a Taylor rule. 2) It satisfies the criteria of parsimony. Following Thomas 
(1997, p. 363) a simple explanation of the data should always be preferred to a 
more complicate explanation". 
2.3.1 The econometric approach 
We are interested in studying the dynamic behaviour of an nxl vector of economic 
variables, X, . Our modelling strategy 
is to estimate a structural VAR(p) model of X, : 
4X, =g+A (L) X, -, + 17, 
(2.2) 
where 77, is a nx] vector of i. i. d (0,0) structural shocks; p is a vector containing all 
the deterministic components (if any); and A(L) is a nxn matrix polynomial in the 
lag operator L. 
The estimation of a structural VAR requires 2 steps. The first step consists of 
estimating by OLS the reduced-form representation of X, where X, is regressed on 
lags of itself: 
ju'+ B(L) X, (2.3) 
where B(L) - B, + BL +... + Bp LP` and B, is a nxn matrix, u, is a reduced fonn VAR 
innovation vector and yI is a nxl vector of deterministic components. 
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In the second step, the VAR innovations (u, ) are Lsed to estimate the A. matrix and 
to recover the structural shocks. Equating equations (2.2) and (2.3) imply the 
following relationship between the reduced- form innovations (u, ) and the structural 
shocks (77, ): 
Ao u, -:.,: i7f (2.4) 
In order for A. and 77, to be identified, AO must contain at least n(n- 1)/2 zero 
restrictions. A,, is the key matrix, since it tells us how the endogenous variables are 
contemporaneously linked to each other and the identification of A,, allows us to 
understand the relation between the reduced and the structural form VAR. The 
problem is that 4, is unknown and it cannot be derived directly from the estimate B- 
The matrix AO is modelled so that we can define Q= ADA', where 0 is a real 
symmetric positive definite matrix 58 1, D is diagonal of unique coefficients and A is a 
lower triangular matrix. This implies that only the structural shocks are uncorrelated 
with its past value, and past value ofX, but also that the reduced forms innovations 
are uncorrelated with each other. In our model we have: 
UY'l 00 77Y 
ay Y, U'r, l 
0 77)r 
_ay 
Y,, 
a32UYr, 
t 
Ui, 
l L771 
-J 
(2.5) 
As the structure of the restrictions implies the last shock ( 77, ) is given by the 
conposition of al, Uy,, + a32U)r, f + u,,, . 
This is an important assumption since the 
ordering of the variables determines the magnitude of the shock. 
" See Hamilton (1994, p. 87-92). 
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Once A, and the 77, s have been estimated, the remaining structural parameters are 
calculated by observing that Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) also imply Ai = Aý'B, (i= I ... p). The 
structural model can then be used to study the time-series properties of the data in a 
number of ways. An important feature of the VAR analysis is that it allows 
researchers to study the impact of an unexpected change in one of the variables in the 
vectorX,. To study such a response we need to invert the VAP, yielding the Vector 
Moving Average (V`MA) representation otherwise known as Wold's decomposition. 
X, = [AO - A(L)]-'g + [AO - A(L)]-'17, (2.6) 
Or in more compact fon-n: 
=A If+ C(L)i7l (2.6') 
The process to move from Eq. (2.2) to (2.6) is not straight forward since we require 
that the process is covariance stationary. We require that the eigenvalues (, ý ) of the C 
matrix all lie inside the unit circle. In other words we need that the eigenvalues of the 
C matrix have the following property: 
I"ll P- CIAP ..... cpl= o (2.7) 
When 1ý <0 the VAR can approximated as a MA model. When this condition is 
satisfied we can calculate the impulse response function (IRF) of X, to a particular 
structural shock. So the response of the x,,,,, variable to 7? j,, shock is the appropriate 
element of C(L). This can be interpreted as the first derivative of the left-hand side 
variable ( x, ) with respect to the shock: 
axi", 
= Co (2.8) a 77j " 
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So the impulse response function is the plot of the sequence of the response of x,,, to 
a unit shock in i7j,,. Since this valuable tool can be thought as a "dynamic multiplier", 
the IRF provides a forecast of the value of X, when new information about the value 
of u, is available. Thus in we can write: 
aE(x, 
+s 
I Ij 
= IRF 
axil 
(29) 
where I, is the information set available at time t. Furthermore from Eq. (6') we can 
give an interpretation to y 11 ; it can be thought of like an unconditional mean or long 
run value toward which the variable has to converge. 
Frequently VAR experiments of the monetary transmission mechanism are conducted 
considering the level of the variables. Bagliano and Favero, for example, (1998, p. 
10) write that "some of the variables display a possibly nonstationary behaviour. 
Nevertheless, we estimate the system with six lags and all variables in level, with no 
imposition of cointegration relations. In so doing we avoid a long-run identification 
problem, which may be in principle difficult to solve". The problem with such a 
statement is that possible trends cause instability in the impulse response function. 
Indeed stability is a necessary condition for the VAR specification since we are 
interested in the magnitude of the response to a shock, but when the VAR is unstable 
its dynamic is meaningless. We illustrated previously that an AR(n) process can be 
transformed into a moving average (MA) representation, but this requires that the 
complementary function collapses to zero as the number of iterations goes to infinity. 
Therefore, entering the variables in levels when a clear trend exists in the data causes 
instability in the VAR and the impulse response function cannot have a direct 
interpretation. Furthermore, if the VAR is unstable impulse response standard errors 
might result invalid. 
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2.3.2 Some Problems and proposed Solutions to this approach 
VAR analyses which describe the monetary transmission mechanism have the 
advantage of being easy to set up and to interpret. However, such analysis can be 
subject to some criticism. The first type of critique refers to Lucas (1976) and it is 
usually referred to as the policy-noninvariance propositions. This states that the 
coefficient estimates are without real interpretation since they would change as policy 
regimes change (i. e. when the rule of systemic monetary policy changes). Bagliano 
and Favero (1998) find support to the issue of parameter instability. However, their 
final conclusion is that the basic results of the VAR literature do not change. 
Another problem associated with VAR models is that when the short ten-n nominal 
interest rate is used as the policy variable the response of certain macroeconomic 
variables (in particular price level) is difficult to interpret. To overcome this problem 
many authors have suggested the use of parsimoniously restricted models (see 
Gordon and Leeper (1994), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), Bernanke and 
Mihov (1998), Uhlig (1999)). In this literature, the monetary policy shocks are 
identified imposing exclusion restrictions on the matrix of the contemporaneous 
impact based on economic models. However, following Canova and Pina (1999, 
p. 24), these models produce impact dynamics which are not consistent with the 
restrictions imposed by the identification scheme, since they tend to be 
"econometrically underidentified". They state that "imposing false restrictions 
implies an omitted variables bias and [ ... ] the non-zero restriction will capture, to a 
large extent, the effect of omitted variables. [ ... ] Misspecification (both in terms of 
sign and magnitude) of the impact coefficients may translate into distorted estimates 
of the dynamics, since the matrix of contemporaneous effects enters the matrices of 
estimated structural lagged coefficients". 
According to some authors, (see Hoover and Jordk 2001 and Bagliano and Favero, 
1998) VAR analysis itself suffers from the Sims critique 59. According to Hoover and 
59 Sims (1980) 
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JordA (200 1, p. 9) the ordering of the variables might require "as much justification as 
many other identifying assumptions if it not to be incredible". Bagliano and Favero 
(1998) explain that this critique relates to how the monetary policy is entered into the 
analysis, and how it can be bypassed considering restrictions related to the 
institutional context. Measuring systemic monetary policy with a VAR methodology 
must consider restrictions on the monetary block in order to reflect operational 
procedures implemented by the monetary policy makers. In other words, the wrong 
choice of the policy instrument and the ordering of the VAR can lead the researcher 
to misleading conclusions. If, as Sims does, we assume that monetary policy 
variables are unaffected by contemporaneous innovations to the other variables, we 
will order the monetary instrument first; if, instead, we assume that Central Bank 
follows a Taylor rule type of policy then the interest rate has to be ordered after 
inflation and output. This approach generates completely different monetary policy 
disturbances: in the latter case it will be a composition cf three different shocks, 
having a much bigger magnitude than the former case. 
Rudebusch (1998) casts some doubt on the ability of VARs models capturing the real 
dynamics of monetary policy. The infort-nation set is typically too small to validate 
the results 60 . Furthermore, the 
data employed are final data and not real timedata, 
while the true reaction function can only include preliminary data. This might lead to 
inconsistency of the estimator. In fact we can estimate the reaction function as: 
m, = bz, + u, (2.10) 
but the true reaction function is: 
m, = birl + V, (2.11) 
60 Canova and Pina (1999) conduct two experiments in order to verify this hypothesis. They conclude 
that their results do not show any qualitative change. 
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where m, is the money stock and 01 is the inflation and the superscript F and P denote 
respectively final and preliminary data. We consider the final data as the sum of the 
forecasted value plus an error term: 
7r F= 7r p+E (2.12) 111 
Combining the three equations we get: 
m, = birl' + u, where u, = bEl +v, 
This means that if the forecaster produces inefficient estimates, then u, and 7r P are 
correlated, making the estimator "b " inconsistent. 
There is another point that is hardly emphasised in the prevalent literature. In VAR 
studies, the focus is primarily on the monetary policy shocks and much less attention 
is paid to the systematic part of the system. We will refer to this as an economic 
misspeciflication. According to McCallum (1999, p. 3) "emphasis on the shock 
component has been overdone", because "qualitatively the unsystematic portion of 
policy instrument variability is quite small in relation to the variability of the 
systematic component". This implies that more attention should be placed on the set 
of non-policy variables ordered before the monetary policy instrument. Consider, for 
instance, the following equation as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), which 
represents the monetary policy behaviour in its more general form: 
nir ny 
* Ir*) +I +E Eok(lrt+l-k 
., 
ýYl+l-k 
1+1 
k=O k=O 
(2.14) 
where r* is the long term nominal interest rate, ir * is the inflation target and y is 
the output gap; et is the exogenous monetary policy shock (i. e. unsystematic 
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component). Following Christiano et al. (1997, p. 8), Eq. (2.14) can be written in the 
more general forrn: 
+ ae. (2.15) 
S is the instrument of monetary policy, 0 is the information set, andfo is assumed to 
be a linear function that relates Q and S. The monetary policy shock is the error 
term Es, 9 which 
is considered orthogonal to the infon-nation set, while f(f2d is the 
feedback rule and a is a positive number. 
The problem emerges when we look at the information set considered in ft). 
Christiano et al. (1997) and the prominent literature that follows include the VAR 
variables in their log levels, assuming, consequently, that monetary authorities 
respond to the level of GPD and CPf'. What emerges is that the way in which the 
variables are entered in the VAR makes the result economically misspecifted. In order 
to explain why we believe fts2d is not correctly determined, we need to analyse how 
Eq. (2.15) originates. The monetary policy instrument S (i. e. optimal monetary 
policy) is derived from a stochastic control problem. 'Ihe Central Bank chooses an 
infinite sequence of controls to minimise the expected discounted value of the 
intertemporal quadratic loss function: 
00 
min I E, +a yt'+, 
( (p, ) tý= 02 
(2.16) 
subject to some constrains, typically an Aggregate Demand and an Aggregate Supply 
equations; vhere Et denotes the expectation operator given the set of information 
available at time t; P' is a discount factor; is the deviation of output from the 
61 Angeloni and Kashyap and Mojon and Terlizzese (2002), Peersman and Smets (2001) analyse the 
impact of monetary shocks in the Euro Area. Their non-policy variables in their vectors are log of CPI 
and real GDP. They justify this specification allowing for implicit long-run cointegration among the 
variables. 
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trend (output of full employment), and 7r, +, 
is the deviation of inflation from the 
target. The parameter a is the relative weight attached by the Central Bank on output 
gap stabilisation 62 . When a tends to infinity the policy- maker cares only about output, 
and when a tends to zero (s)he cares only about inflation What it is important to 
notice here is that the loss function of the policy-maker (i. e. the function that the 
authority tries to minimise) is composed of variables expressed as a deviation from a 
trend or expressed as a variance. In other words, what counts is the volatility of the 
gap of the two variables; the focus of the policyrnakers is not on the level of the 
variables. In our view this is a fundamental point that might cast some doubt on the 
identification exercises which have been undertaken so far. The logical conclusion is, 
therefore, that f(S2d in Eq. (2.15) should incorporate the idea that "polic34 makers 
want to minimise squared deviations of output from trend and inflation from the 
target" (Martin and Salmon, 1999 p. 23)63 . Therefore, failing to consider the true 
systematic component may result in an incorrect specification of the monetary policy 
innovations. 
Before proceeding to estimate our model, a few more words are required about the 
use of VAR analysis. We believe that this is a valuable tool since it allows us to 
distinguish between that part of monetary policy which is fully anticipated by the 
market agents and the unanticipated component (i. e. shock). One important 
requirement is that the "systematic componenf' is correctly specified; otherwise the 
system would generate false innovations. In such regard, since the true monetary 
transmission mechanism is in many parts unknown, two aspects need to be 
underlined: 1) few variables should be preferred to vectors with many variables 
whose ordering is questionable; 2) structural VARs incur the risk of imposing "false 
restrictions", making the system overidentified and leading the researcher to generate 
wrong results and thus reach wrong conclusions. Hence, the VAR that we set up in 
62 The parameter is defined as a ý! 0 
" in the same spirit as Batini and Nelson (2000). McCallum goes a step further. He argues that VAR 
specifications should include some indicator of financial crisis. This might be a serious issue since 
excluding some variables changes the fitted residuals and the pattern of the impulse response function. 
However, the main concern here is that there is no agreement whether the Central Bank should control 
asset prices - 
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E-q-- (1-1) overcomes the economic critique presented above since it takes into 
consideration the true Central Bank policy objective function. Furthermore, it is a 
macroeconomic model based on a system of three equations which does not suffer the 
possibility of imposing false restrictions. 
2.4. Empirical Results 
In this g-. ction we present the response of output and inflation to unexpected 
movements in the monetary policy instrument. Furthennore, we highlight how these 
shocks are transmitted to the monetary policy target variables. 
2.4.1 The Response of output and inflation to monetary policy shocks 
Eq. (1.1) is estimated for the period 1970: Q I- 1992: Q3 64 . The sample period is chosen 
taking into consideration that from October 1992 the Bank of England adopted an 
explicit inflation target strategy. This imposes a "policy structural break" in inflation. 
The objective function of the Central Bank would now be to consider a different 
specification for inflation. Using the sole inflation level would not be appropriate. 
Two lag lengths of each of the variables is chosen following the Akaike Information 
Criterion, the results of which are presented in Table 2.165. 
It is constructed as AIC =21 +2 
k, 
where I is the log- likelihood, n is the number of 
nn 
observations and k the number of parameters to be estimated. The log-likelihood is 
64 We include ai exogenous constant and time trend to take into consideration a possible inflation 
trend. We tested for the inclusion of a dummy variable corresponding to the ERM period. It did not 
appear to be significant so it is not considered in our final specification. Following previous works by 
Sims(1992) and Christiano et al (1994), we estimated a VAR model including a commodity price 
index and another vector where we included a monetary aggregate and the pound[Dmark exchange 
rate. All the diagnostic tests indicate a poor specification or a specification that was not sensibly 
superior to the one employed here. When the commodity price index was included, the estimates did 
not change the response of inflation to monetary policy shocks. 
65 Tables and Figures are reported in Appendix. 
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calculated as 1TI k(I + log27r)- logIC-1,11, where I C21 is the determinant of the 
2 
residual covariance matrix. It is given by det t, E' / n) , t, is the p vectors of 
residuals. 
The Portmanteau Autocorrelation Test and the LM test reported in Table 2.2 and 2.3 
respectively, do not detect serial correlation. All the four specifications fail the 
normality test (not reported here). However, following Hamilton (1994, p. 298) this 
should not pose any serious problems conceming consistency in our estimators. We 
report the table (Table 2.4) and the graph (Fig. 2.1) of the inverse root of the 
characteristic polynomial as in Lfltkepohl (1991). None of the values lie outside the 
unit circle, implying that the VAR is stable (i. e. stationary) and that the impulse 
response standard error will not be misspecified. 
We compute the impulse response function of Eq. (2.1) using a lower triangular 
Choleski factorisation as in Eq. (2.4). The pattern of the response is the effect of a one 
standard deviation orthogonalized shock in the interest rate, holding all other shocks 
at all dates constant. The restrictions imposed imply that the output and inflation 
affect monetary policy stance within the quarter, while interest rate has no 
instantaneous effect on the non-policy variables. The standard errors are computed 
via a Monte Carlo procedure: at each repetition we draw a random sample from the 
asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficients 66 , and from the simulated coefficients 
we compute the impulse response functions. After repeating the process 1000 times, 
we construct the 95% confidence interval by the percentile method. 
In the estimated pattern response in Fig. 2.7, a contraction in monetary policy causes 
an almost immediate reduction in the level of output. It reaches the lowest point after 
two years, then it slowly starts to increase, regaining the pre-shock value only at the 
14th quarter. This supports the idea that money is neutral in the long-run, and that 
monetary policy shocks do not have a permanent effect on the level of output. On the 
66 Hamilton (1994). 
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contrary, inflation is initially positively affected by policy shocks and it declines after 
the seventh quarter, and taking a longer time (more than twenty quarters) to return to 
its pre-shock value. This result is consistent with that obtained by Dale and Heldane 
(1993). The major difference is in the time inflation takes to revert to its pre-shock 
value. In their analysis, inflation increases for approximately four years, sixteen 
quarters longer than what we find. The most likely explanation is due to the different 
VAR specification. They order the policy variable first and prices and real output 
after a series of monetary transmission indicators. Output shows the same dynamics: 
it reacts faster than inflation to a monetary policy shock. 
It is of great interest that the combination of output and inflation moves in opposite 
directions for more than a year after a policy shock and that inflation drops below its 
steady state value only when it has reached its minimum point. This suggests that in 
the short run inflation is not affected by short run variation in demand. Only when 
monetary policy has exerted all its effect on output; will it start to fight inflation. 
Are these results inconsistent? Does our VAR suffer from the prize puzzle? Why does 
inflation not decrease immediately with tighter monetary policy? The answer to the 
first question is no; the results are not inconsistent and the inflation dynamic is not an 
indication of a misspecification. In factý "any factor tending to raise the money costs 
has the potential to cause an increase in the general price level" (Smithin 2003, 
p. 186). At a first glance the response in Fig. 2.6 suggests a cost-push inflation. To see 
whether this is effectively the case, in the next section we examine the responses of 
all those intermediate variables that interact to determine the value and response of 
output and prices. 
2.4.2 The monetary transmission mechanism 
In the previous section we illustrated that a one standard deviation shock in interest 
rate causes inflation to increase for more than a year. In this section we try to provide 
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an economic interpretation of this behaviour. To explain this dynamic we need to 
concede the possibility that monetary policy shocks are transmitted not only via the 
demand channel (mainly price stickiness), but also via the supply channel (working 
capital). Both channels call for a decrease in the level of output following a monetary 
tightening. On the other hand, the effect on the price level is mixed. The demand 
channel indicates that prices should decrease following a redLution in aggregate 
demand; on the contrary, the supply channel suggests that unexpected innovation in 
monetary policy increases tir pr ice level due to an increase the firms marginal costs. 
In order to investigate if monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the real economy 
via the supply or the demand channel, we test the impact of policy innovations on 
different flow of funds of hdustrial & Commercial Companies as well as on other 
variables that are important in describing the monetary transmission mechanism 
(MTM)67. We call these variables ZAffm ,j 
We proceed by constructing a series of vectors where the policy shock is recovered as 
in Eq. 2.1, and the MTM variable (ZAffmj) is then added after the short ten-n interest 
rate; wherej indicates the variable of interest. The vector used is given by: 
[Shock, ZmTmil' (2.17) 
Each time the system is estimated replacing ZAffmj with the variable of interest. The 
fact that ZmTmj is ordered last implies that it reacts within the quarter when the 
monetary policy shock occurs. 
The results are presented in Figs. 2.5 through 2.28. We begin by examining the 
impact of a monetary policy shock on the long term interest rate (Fig. 224), the 
companies real investment (INVR), Fig 2.8. The estimated impulse response 
67 The ICCs variables included are (in real terms): total income, profits, total funds, internal funds, net 
borrowing requirement, total external funds, bank borrowing, interest rate payment, coverage ratio and 
investment. These are collected by DATASTREAM and correspond to Table 10.6 C of the ONS 
Report. The other monetary transmission mechanism variables are: long term nominal interest rate and 
return to bank loan. 
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functions show that there is an immediate increase in the fon-ner and a slow decrease 
in latter. This result is consistent with standard economic theory. The level of 
investment is a negative function of the interest rate. Only after five years does 
investment return to its pre-shock level, although the long term interest rate reverts 
much faster". It takes 3 years to revert to its steady-state value. 
The responses of companies total income (Fig. 2.9) and profits (Fig2.10) have quite a 
different pattern. The immediate response is a positive but not a significant 
movement; only after six quarters do the responses of the two variables turn negative 
and significant. The peak is reached by the gh quarter: just one period after the 
minimum output level. The fact that companies profits do not react immediately is 
not surprising and does not contradict economic theory: they are associated with the 
level of realised sales that are in turn linked with the level of interest rates and output 
at the previous period or four periods (one year) earlier. Furthermore, it is noticeable 
that the level of inventories does not have any reaction for the first five quarters. 
Afterwards, it sharply declines around the fifth quarter after the shock. This supports 
the idea that their negative level is a strong component in a situation of declining 
economic activity as suggested by Blinder and Maccini (199 1). These results do not 
seem to support the fact that following a monetary shock finns start to Cýpile- up" 
inventories 69 
. 
Looking at the results from the flow of funds impulse response functions we notice 
that a positive monetary policy shock generates an immediate decrease in total funds 
available (Fig. 2.11). This decrease seems to be associated with a strong fall in 
internal funds. This reduction of internally generated finance is evident considering 
the level and proportion of the total funds available and as a ratio of the GDP (Fig. 
2.14). At the same time we register an increase in Net Borrowing Requirements 
(NBR). This reflects the need for capital from Industrial and Commercial companies. 
The response of external funds to monetary policy shocks supports the finding that 
68 For each vector we calculate the inverse of the characteristic polynomial (not reported here). There 
show that the different VAR specification are stable over the estimation period. 
69 Bernake and Gertler (1995). 
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there is a need for funds and this is fulfilled by contracting debt. The plots tell us, in 
fact that the majority of NBR is financed using bank loans. The results confirm the 
findings of Christiano et al. (1994). They run a similar experiment and conclude that 
the business sector in the US responds to a contraction in monetary policy with an 
increase in net funds which is mainly the result of the contraction of short term debt, 
namely commercial papers, bank and other loans. Furthermore, this behaviour can be 
explained recalling the ftndings of Corbett and Jenkinson (1996,1997): UK firms 
rely heavily on internal sources of finance (i. e. internal fundS)70 ; during a monetary 
policy tightening their amount is decreased by a lower level of sales and further, their 
discounted value decreases, forcing the firrn to rely on external capital. There is a 
significant change in the portfolio composition of firrns financial instruments. 
At the same time we see that the coverage ratio (Fig. 2.22), which according to 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) has the power to measure the financial wealtO, 
responds to shocks with a highly significant and persistent increase. It is only at the 
12'h quarter that it returns to its steady-state value. The response of interest rate 
payments has the same pattern. The liquidity premium (LIQ), Fig. 2.23, shows a steep 
increase for the first two quarters, returning to its starting level after one year, roughly 
one period earlier than the short term interest rate. Considering that LIQ is the extra 
amount required by banks to provide loanS72 , its sharp 
increase after a monetary 
policy contraction seems to suggest that the lending channel is at least partially 
verified. It is evident that the liquidity premium increases when there is an 
unexpected change in the risk-free interest rate. However, it was observed previously 
that this does not induce a decrease in bank loans. Rather, it shows that banks 
increase their provision of loans. 
70 It is indicative that the total internal funds and INVR have the same dynamic. It seems straight 
forward to derive that the two aggregates are highly correlated. There is a high degree of sensitivity of 
INVR to cash flow. Although the causality is not addressed here, we believe that the low cash is the 
cause, rather then the resultof, lower investment following a monetary policy contraction. 
71 it is the ratio of interest payment over interest payments plus profits. It can be thought of both as a 
premium on top of interest rates that firms have to pay and a measure of the availability of cash flow 
that firms can use to finance their investments. 
72 Davis and loannidis (2002) 
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Given that LIQ is negatively associated with the entrepreneurs demand for bank 
loans, are the two findings inconsistent? Is this perverse increase in loans inconsistent 
with the bank lending channel? Not necessarily. A first interpretation could be 
provided by following Bernanke and Blinder (1992, p. 919): "loans are quasin 
contractual commitments whose stock is difficult to change quickly", and furthermore 
"lines of credit" are important determinants of the pattern of the response of bank 
loans to shocks or, more generally, in changed business conditions 73 . There is rot an 
expectation of an immediate decrease in bank borrowing. The standard bank-credit 
channel tells us nothing more than that after a monetary contractio4 firms borrow 
less than what they would have done in a complete market environment. Furthermore, 
considering that Profit and Net Income do not seem to be negatively affected by the 
monetary policy shock for at least one year after monetary policy tightening, this 
provides a less necessary sudden adjustment in bank loans. It is only afterwards that 
borrowings start to decrease. The idea is supported by the analysis of firms liquidity 
ratio (Fig. 2.25), defined as the ratio of assets on liabilities. It shows an immediate 
decline and it reverts to its pre-shock value after four quarters. Afterwards, it shows a 
positive trend (although not significant). This dynamic is the combination of 
increased liabilities and reduced levels of real assets; the latter seems to be more 
important in terrn of magnitude in explaining the behaviour of the ICCs liquidity. 
Looking at ICCs assets and liabilities, Fig. 2.26 and Fig. 2.27 respectively, we see 
that after a monetary policy shock we have a significant negative response of the 
liabilities. An interesting point to note is that assets reach the negative peak after six 
quarters, exactly at the same point when real output reaches its minimum level. This 
is consistent with the standard theories: a worsening level of economic activity 
corresponds to a lowering of the level of profits, and a bigger need for external 
finance in order to face the shortfall in cash flow. Moreover, liabilities increase as the 
result of the increased level of interest payments and the increased level of 
borrowing. 
73 Morgan (1991,1992b). 
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We now compare the behaviour of total external finance, the response of bank 
lending and the behaviour of the response of the ratio of the level of bank borrowing 
on the total level of funds available. In a situation of no credit market imperfection 
we would expect that firms can switch from bank loans to other forms of finance, 
with a resulting decrease in the above ratio. This, however, does not appear to be the 
case. The ratio follolAs closely the pattern of the volume of bank loans. Although it is 
not clear if the shock has a larger effect on the demand or in the supply of loans we 
can assert with reasonable certainty that the fact that firms lower their level of 
investment and borrowing supports the idea that they are financially constrained. 
All the results presented shows that an increase in the monetary policy instrument has 
a supply side effect on real variables. This confirins the hypothesis that monetary 
policy shocks can be considered as cost shocks. The importance of such a channel is 
presented by Barth and Ramey (2000, p. 1). They point out that "supply-side channels 
are powerful collaborators in transmitting the real effect of monetary policy shifts in 
the short-run". There are some important reasons to consider this channel: first of all 
"just as interest rates and credit conditions affect firms' long-run ability to produce 
(by investing in fixed capital), they can also be expected to affect firms' short-run 
ability to produce (by investing in working capital). The value of investment in 
working capital is substantial". A second reason for the importance of the supply 
channel is given by the fact that considering the demand-only view of monetary 
transmission mechanism does not provide enough explanation of the big impact of 
shocks to output. Furthen-nore, we need to stress that investing in working capital is 
required given important downward rigidities in wages and salaries. If investment can 
instantaneously decrease following an increase in the cost of capital, the adjustment is 
quite slow in the labour market. If we think of the inflation generation process in a 
New-Keynesian framewo rk 74 then it is the rise in the real marginal cost of capital 
induced by an increase in the cost of capital which causes the firms to raise their 
74 The New-Keynesian Phillips curve incorporate forward looking behaviour by rational agents and 
profit- max imising firms. It typically assumes the following form: 
ir, = X(rmc, ) + aE, [7r, +j 
where rmc is the real marginal cost. 
81 
prices. Indeed, rental cost of capital and interest rate (along with wages) are the major 
components of firms costs. 
We believe that the supply channel is not enough to explain the marked decline in 
output and price response. The credit channel theory provides evidence that the 
increase in interest rates can have perverse consequences. This theory suggests that 
monetary shocks that are initially propagated via aggregate demand can, in a second 
period, be amplified by the supply channel. As our results suggest, we have an 
immediate decline in firms internal finance, since its opportunity cost increases 
directly with an increase in the nominal interest rate. This has a positive impact on the 
marginal financial cost due to the existence of asymmetric information between the 
borrowers and the lenders. The fact that the response of the variable LIQ offsets the 
jump in interest rates is an indication that the broad credit channel is in operation. 
our results provide an explanation for Central Bank's adversity to large changes in 
interest rate. Given that monetary authorities have an important impact on the 
portfolio composition of firms financing sources, financial stability problems might 
arise if the movement in the nominal interest rate has not been completely anticipated 
by the firms and require external capital to carry on their activities. At the same time 
a sequence of increases in interest rates without any immediate downsize effect on 
prices could correspond to a weakening of the companies balance sheets. We cannot 
exclude the possibility that there is a positive relationship between interest rates, 
moral hazard and financial Ponzi schemes 75 : the consequence being that an increase 
in the level of the interest rate could undermine the long-ten-n growth and stability of 
the entire economic system 76 . 
Finally we would like to point out that long-run money neutrality is not unden-nined 
here. There is strong evidence suggesting that the real effect of monetary policy has 
only a short-run dimension. The explanation of such a channel can be found in the 
75 This expression is borrowed from Minsky. 
76 This point is highlighted by Borio and Lowe (200 1) who stress that even monetary stability does not 
necessarily guarantee financial stability. 
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short run rigidities in which firms operate. As time evolves, fin-ns have more 
flexibility to reduce investment and working capital. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter examined how monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the UK real 
economy. We argued that VAR models are a valuable tool in order to decompose the 
policy into the systematic and unsystematic components. However we have shown 
that the misspecification of "non-policy" variables which are not part of the Central 
Bank information set could lead to a incorrect identification of the shocks. 
In our VAF, the shocks were identified by allowing the interest rate to respond to the 
output gap and the retail price index inflation. We find that inflation increased after a 
one standard deviation positive shock in interest rates. The aim of the second part of 
the chapter, therefore, was to find an economic, rather than econometric, explanation 
of the price puzzle. 
We analysed the responses of the flow of funds of industrial and commercial 
companies and other variables which we regard as important to describe the monetary 
transmission mechanism to monetary policy shocks. These variables were modelled 
last, assuming that they responded within the quarter after the shock occurs. We 
found that after the shock, output and inflation return to their steady-state values, 
supporting the idea that money is neutral in the long run. One of the major results was 
the stickiness of the credit aggregate. Real investment showed a steady decline: this 
dynamic matched the path of the total funds raised internally. However, this fall in 
real investment was not matched by a decrease in the level of external funds 
available; in fact, they showed a positive response. We have found that the majority 
of this increase in external finance is due to bank loans. We argued that the dynamic 
of our result is not incompatible with the credit channel since credit variables seem to 
be an important vehicle in transmitting the monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, we 
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have found that the high coverage ratio and the interest rate payment were induced by 
the fact that firms need to borrow at a higher level of interest. Our results suggest that 
monetary impulses which are unanticipated by the market participants increase fin-ns 
marginal costs and therefore the price level. We concluded that the prize puzzle is just 
the result of the supply side effect of the monetary policy 
One final word should be spent on the sample of our investigation. Our investigation 
has a limited time dimension for two reasons: first, monetary policy has a structural 
break in October 1992 with the adoption of inflation targeting. Second the flow of 
fund data as used to explain the prize puzzle has been subject to revision with the 
1998. Although these are serious problems to overcome to obtain a reliable 
econometric estimate, there is not reason to believe that our main conclusions would 
not hold for the inflation targeting period. 
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Appendix 
All financial data are from the, Office of National Statistics (ONS, and refer to 
section 10.6B and 10.6C. All data are in real terms: their value has been divided by 
the price level. 
GDP, INT, EX are collected from DATASTREAM and correspond to the data 
published by the ONS. 
Real GDP (GDPD) was detrended using the Hodrick and Prescott filter with a 
smoothing parameter equal to 1600. It consists of solving the following sum of 
squares: 
TT 
(I / T) (yj _ ý11 
)2 
+(X1T)L[(y1+j -yj-(jul -ytj] 
2 
where y is the real GDP, Vt is the trend component and X is the smoothing 
parameter. 
Annual Inflation Rate (INFA). It is calculated as an index from the first difference 
of the natural logarithm of the Retail Price Index (RPI): 
[Ln(RPI, ) - Ln(RPIt-, 2)1*100 - 
Interest rate (INT). It coincides with the official interest rate. Up to II th of March 
1982 it corresponds to the Minimum Lending Rate. Between 1982Q2 and 1996Q4 
it is the Band One "Stop" Rate. Afterwards (1997Q I) the Repo Rate. 
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Table 2.1: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag Log-Likelihood Akaike information criterion 
0 -463.1922 12.34716 
1 -305.5864 8.436485 
2 -288.9281 8.234951 
3 -285.4685 8.380749 
4 -282.5164 8.539906 
5 -273.2474 8.532827 
Table 2.2: VAR Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations 
Lags Q-Stat Prob. Adj Q-Stat Prob. l df 
3 10.28302 0.3281 10.57684 0.3058 1 9 
14u: no resiciuai autocorreiations up to iag n 
Table 23: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Lags LM-Stat Prob 
1 4.890559 0.8437 
2 8.575251 0.4774 
3 4.173977 0.8996 
8 3.527877 0.9397 
10 4.975163 0.8365 
12 4.770161 0.8539 
Probability from chi-square with 9 df 
Table 2.4: Root of the characteristic polynomial 
Root Modulus 
0.749667 - 0.282682i 0.801192 
0.749667 + 0.282682i 0.801192 
0.695868 0.695868 
0.666914 0.666914 
0.035859 - 0.195497i 0.198759 
0.035859 + 0.195497i 0.198759 
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Chapter 3 
Financing the UK investment: 
A flow of funds analysis 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the last twenty years, a great strand of literature has investigated the relation 
between internal and external finance in non-financial companies. The main result 
is that external financing is not a perfect substitute for internal funds; such 
imperfection is the result of asymmetric information resulting in moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems. These create a risk premium which is a direct 
function on the level of firms indebtedness and the level of risk free interest rate 
(Hubbard, 1997). The higher either of these two indicators, the higher is the cost 
of capital that firms have to face if they want to finance their investment with 
external capitals. 
To test the importance of internal and external funds, two methods have been 
applied in the existing literature. The first is to use a panel data in order to 
examine how different classes of firms react to some macroeconomic shocks, 
typically interest rate shocks: Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), FHP 
hereafter. The main result is that large firms are less constrained than small firms. 
The second methodology is to employ time series data at a country level. This 
successful line of research starting from Mayer (1988) has employed flow of 
funds data. Mayer (1988), and after him, Corbett and Jenkinson (1997), using 
national income data, reach the conclusion that, by far, internal finance is the most 
important source of finance for firms in Germany Japan, United kingdom and the 
United States. At the same time, with the exception of the USA, bank loans are 
the most common type of external finance. 
It is generally found that investment is highly sensitive to cash flow, particularly 
for firms that are financially constrained and for countries with a more market- 
oriented financial system. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of internal and external finance in 
the last thirty years of the UK business cycle. To do so, we investigate the 
Industrial and Commercial companies sources and uses of funds. One of the main 
conclusions that we reach is that the 1988 financial liberalisation produced an 
unsustainable credit growth which, with the help of economic agents' perception 
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of the economy could be considered the root of the early nineties recession. This 
accelerated growth of credit and the "euphoric economV' finds an explanation in 
Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis; in Minsky's economic theory, in fact, 
expectations and financial system dynamics endogenously determine the 
movement of the economy from being robust to being susceptible to Fischer-type 
debt deflation 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview 
of Mayers and CJ's work; we present the reason that brought CJ to state that the 
dichotomy between bank-based and capital market-based economies is incorrect, 
and highlight the reasons why internal finance is so important for firms 
investment. In Section 3 we provide a model of financial accelerator mechanism 
which describes the interrelation between investment and the cost of capital. We 
describe its macroeconomic implications and we point out tiat the financial 
accelerator model can cause financial instability similar to Minsky's financial 
instability hypothesis; we argue that such a hypothesis can be tested via the 
Kalman Filter technique. Section 3.4 is devoted to the presentation of the data. 
Estimates are in Section 3.5, and conclusions follow. 
3.2. How is investment financed? 
There is a large branch of literature that investigates the role played by financial 
factors in firms investment decisions. Thus, he purpose of this srction is to 
highlight the firms most used source of finance for real investment. There are two 
methods by which to investigate this issue: the first is to use a firm-level panel 
data in which firms can be grouped in to two categories: 'large firms' with 
associated low information costs and 'small firms' with high information costs. 
The seminal work is by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988,1996)77 . FHP use a 
cross section analysis with 421 manufacturing firms over the period 1970-1984, 
where internal finance is approximated by the firm's cash flow. They reach the 
conclusion that "a priori grouping of 'constrained' and 'unconstrained' firms have 
different determinants of investment, with internal funds being an important 
77 Hubbard (1997) provides an overview of the literature. 
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explanatory variables only for the fon-ner group" (FHP, 1996 p. 6). Bond and 
Meghir (1997) investigating a panel of UK firms find that cash flow is highly 
correlated with current investment 78 . In a different study, Bond et al. (1997) test 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow across four different European 
countrieS79 ; In all the three models employed, namely acceleration model of 
investment, error correction specification and Euler equation, they find that cash 
flow is statistically significant in all countries, where the UK fin-ns have the 
highest sensitivity. The availability of internal finance seems to be an important 
constraint for investment. 
The second methodology is through the examination of time series data in which 
reduction in net worth reduces the level of investment. An interesting prospective 
is taken by Mayer (1988). He focused his analysis on national income data, and 
more specifically, on flow of funds data. The justification is that this dataset does 
not depend upon accounting rules and conventions; furthermore, flows of funds 
data cover all firms in the economy, and intra-sectoral flov6 are almost entirely 
eliminated. The two main results were that internal finance was by far the most 
important source of financing in all the countries considered, and secondly that 
the different countries's financial patterns did not seem to differ substantially. A 
natural consequence was the breaking down of the usual dichotomy between 
bank- and capital market- dominated financial systems 80 . Corbett and Jenkinson 
(CJ, 1996,1997) brought supporting evidence to Mayer's findings. Tables I and 2 
summarise some of their results. 
Table 3.1: Sources of Funds (1970-1994) 
Internal Funds Bank Loans Bonds New Equity 
UK 93.3% 14.6% 4.2% -4.6% 
us 96.1 % 11.1 % 15.4% -7.6% 
Germany 78.9% 11.9% -1.0% 0.1 % 
Japan 69.9% 26.7% 4.0% 3.5 % 
Source: CJ (1996), 'I'ables 3,4, ý, b 
Notes: Negative figures for 'New Equity' are associated with high level of merger and acquIsItlion. 
Figures in percentage of physical investment. 
78 They show that the results are robust even after controlling for imperfect competition and 
bankruptcy costs. 
79 UK, Germany, Belgium and France. 
80 Hackethal and Smidth (2003) talks about a 'Mayer puzzle' since there is not correspondence 
between financial pattern and corporate governance practice. 
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Table 3.2: Source of Finance (Figures in Percentage) 
1970-74 1975-79 1 1980-84 1 1985-89 T - 1990-94 
United Kingdom 
Internal Finance 98.1 102.3 115.4 81.2 81.2 
Bank Finance 26.2 6.8 12.4 29.8 0.2 
Bonds 3.3 -1.3 2.0 8.8 6.3 
New Equity -7.3 -3.3 -7.6 -2*. 4 12.4 
United States 
Internal Finance 74.5 91.5 89.6 103.7 109.8 
Bank Finance 26.6 14.1 12.9 15 4.5 
Bonds 15.7 14.9 10.9 24.8 10.4 
New Equity 7.3 0.7 -4.8 -29.6 -4.2 
Germany 
Internal Finance 68.6 82.8 79.7 Q'I 89.3 71.8 
Bank Finance 15.7 8.4 11.2 7.9 16.9 
Bonds 1.9 -2.8 -2.1 0.6 -2.8 
New Equity 0.7 0.5 -0.5 2.3 -3.1 
Japan 
Internal Finance 59.1 70.8 74.6 70.5 71.2 
Bank Finance 42.7 33.9 31.7 23 19.6 
Bonds 2.7 2.5 0.6 9.1 2.1 
New Equity 2.5 3.3 3.6 4.4 3.1 
Source: CJ (1996), Tables 3,4,5,6 
Notes: Figures in percentage of physical investment. 
T CPI, T pt 
The data was aggregating using I-ZI- where CPI, and P, 
I=T 
CP, 
1985 
I 
t=T 
I P1985 
represent the consumer price index and the "capital goods price respectively in 
year t" (CJ, 1996, p. 77). The numerator represents the net financing (i, ') from any 
sources of financing (internal funds, banks, bonds, equity, trade credit, capital 
transfer and other) and the denominator (1) is the total amount of gross investment 
in plant, machinery and other fixed assets and net addition of working capital in 
year t. The aggregation of the series is made in such a way that figures do not add 
up to 100. The reason can be easily explained with an example. During year t 
firms retain profits equal to 150, and these are then used for new investment and 
to reduce debt. If 100 is the level of new investment and 50 is the debt paid back, 
then this will show as investment funded by 150% internal funds and -50% by 
debt. 
Some of the figures exhibit a negative sign, following CJ (1997, p. 75). This is the 
result of two factors: 1) merger and acquisition activities: "a firm that uses its cash 
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flow to buy the equity of another company [ ... ] and issue no additional equity, 
will produce a negative net source of finance figure for equity"; 2) Restructuring 
of firms balance sheets. In the recent years many firms have substituted equity 
with debt finance. 
Table 3.1 presents the net sources of finance for the period 1970-1994. The 
figures are quite striking. The level of internal finance dominates all other sources 
of finance. The results brought (CJ) to write in their conclusion (1997, p85) "the 
celebrated distinction between the 'market-based' financial pattern of the UK and 
the US and the 'bank-based' pattern of Germany and Japan is inaccurate". They 
noted, in fact, that in the late eighties the contribution of bank financing was over 
a half of the net sources of finance. Davis (2001) brings support to this theory. He 
finds that in the UK real loans are 2.90% of GDP, a figure that increases to 2.96% 
for the period after 1985. On the other hand, real debt securities are only 0.67 of 
GDP and 1.20 after 1985. The bank borrowing as a percentage of GDP is the 
leading external source of finance even in Japan and Canada, although its 
importance seems to decline. Only in the US do corporate bonds seem to count 
more (as a fraction of real output) than real bank loans. 
One important point that we would expect is that with the liberalisation of capital 
markets, equity and bonds would have increased in importance relative to bank 
borrowing and internal finance. The figures presented in Table 3.2 seem to 
suggest that the different sources of finance do not have a particular trend. The 
only two series that do not conform are bank finance in Japan and internal finance 
in the UK. The former is the result of the "fact that companies were actually 
repaying loans [ ... ] at the same time as they were 
increasing deposits at banks" 
(CJ, 1997 p. 80). The UK result is quite interesting since, as will be shown later in 
the text, it could be the basis of the early nineties recession. 
Although the dichotomy between market- and bank-based systems is not 
supported, it should not be a surprise that internal finance plays a central role in 
investment financing. There are two distinct theories which provide such an 
explanation. The first relates to Jensen (1986): agency costs and free cash flow. 
Free cash flow is the difference between the firm's cash receipts and cash 
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disbursements (mainly payment to equity-holders and debt-holders). In an 
environment with efficient capital markets, if a firm has no new investment 
opportunities and some cash flow left over, then the funds should be redistributed 
to the owners so that they can reinvest it in more profitable projects. Conversely, 
when agency costs are present, the conflict between managers and shareholders 
could bring the former to overuse internally generated funds due to the principal's 
inability to control and discipline management 81 . 
While Jensen's theory has been recognised as an important part of corporate 
finance, overinvestment of internally generated funds is not easy to quantify and 
measure since the results are usually open to different interpretations and therefore 
are quite inconclusive. One of the most important and convincing studies on this 
issue is a work by Lamont (1997) on US oil companies with subsidiaries in 
unrelated industries. He finds that when the price of crude oil halved, oil 
companies had less internal funds available, so they cut back investment, usually 
regardless of individual project Net Present Value. This brings him to the 
conclusion that internally- funded projects are less subject to stringent scrutiny 
than those financed externally. 
Another important hypothesis of the overuse of internal financing is that external 
finance is more expensive. As shown in Chapter 1, the Broad Credit Channel 
advocates that the two forrns of finance are not a perfect substitute. This 
imperfection arises from the asymmetric information between lender and 
borrower. This creates an external finance premium which makes firm investment 
financially constrained. In the next section we present a model of how this 
mechanism, usually referred as the broad credit channel, works. 
81 Buffett refers to the Principal-Agent problem as the 'Institutional Imperative'. He says that "just 
as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialise to soak up 
available funds" (p. 84) 
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3.3 Internal Vs. External finance 
In this section we develop the idea of the broad credit channel and we analyse the 
role of the level of borrowing and of the level of internal funds on the investment 
decision. 
As we highlighted in the previous chapter the idea underneath the broad credit 
channel is that markets are not efficient since they are dominated by asymmetric 
information between lenders and borrowers. This creates a spread between the 
cost of investment generated with retained earnings and the cost generated via 
external finance. When investment is financed only via internal funds the cost is 
represented by the risk free interest rate and it is constant. After this point, firms 
require external capital to finance their investment. It is here that the risk premium 
enters into play: it is the return that the lender requires to finance entrepreneurs' 
investment. 
There are two factors that make the asymmetric information problem more severe 
and therefore increase the risk premium: the level of the interest rate set by the 
Central Bank r, and the level of indebtedness B. We can write the cost of capital 
as: 
r+ cexp(r, B) 1 
where i is the cost of capital and c(r, B) is the risk premium 82 . At a 
macroeconomic level, c can be seen as an average of the different risk premia and 
we can interpret this as the economy systemic risk. c is an increasing function in 
terms of r and B. This implies that: 
1. The higher the level of borrowing, the higher is the risk premium. As B 
increasing so does moral hazard because the borrower would have an 
incentive to take higher risks so that the return on invested capital is higher 
that the interest due on the loan, thus increaseing the probability of default. 
82 For an entrepreneur we should add another term to the risk premium, 
ý which represents the 
risk adjustment appropriate for the firm. Therefore even if the free interest rate is almost zero there 
will always be positive risk adjustment associated with the firm. For simplicity of the analysis we 
assume Q=0. This does not imply any loss of generality in the main results. 
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2. Monetary policy contractions (i. e. increase in the level of the risk free 
interest rate) increase the cost of external finance relative to internal funds. 
In other words, monetary tightening increases the individual default risk 
and contributes to economic instability. As shown in Gertler and Hubbard 
(1988) and Oliner and Rudebush (1996), an increase in the risk-free rate 
reduces the value of the borrowers' collateral, therefore increasing the 
moral hazard problem. This point has great importance since it tells us that 
credit market imperfections magnify an increase in the free- interest rate by 
the Central Bank. This magnification effect is known as "Financial 
Accelerator". ' Later on, we will discuss its macroeconomic implications. 
To see more formally how the risk premium affects the level of investment, let's 
consider a following set of equations: 
Investment Supply: i= Tr +c (B, Tr) :: ý i=T+ c7rB (3.1 b) 
I 
Investment Demand: I=I,, - #I i => i (I - 10) (3.2) 
where I is the level of investment, Io is autonomous investment 83 1i is the user cost 
of capital and 0, >0. Investment supply is provided by Eq. 0 . 1a)84 . Here we 
define B as the difference between the Total Investment and the Internal Funds. 
The parameter c (i. e. risk premium) depends positively on the risk free interest 
rate and B and has the following property: c>0. Fig I plots the supply and 
demand for funds. What characterises this investment demand-supply framework 
is the s hape of the supply function. 
83 Investment independent of the level of interest rate and income. It can be affected by changes in 
factors others than interest rate and in the "animal spirits" of entrepreneurs. It is shown by a 
arallel shift in the aggregate demand schedule. F44 
Previously we define the risk premium as an exponential function. The formulation that we 
adopt here, for simplicity of analysis, 
does not affect the final results. 
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Fig. 3.1: The Supply and Demand of Funds 
Cost of 
capital 
r 
Substituting Eq. (3.1b) into Eq. (3.2) we get: 
I= I(, - P, (rF + c-FB) (3.3) 
From Eq. (3.3) we notice that in equilibrium the level of investment is a negative 
function not only of the risk free interest rate bLt also of the level of the total 
indebtedness. We can see that the equilibria all lie on the demand equation; they 
depend on the level of TF, B and c. From Eq. (3.3) we deduce the following 
results: 
Resuft 1: The risk free interest rate and the risk premium affect the level of 
investmentfinanced via externalfunds. 
Taking the first derivative of the equilibrium level of investment with respect to 
the level of borrowing we obtain: 
ai 
= -ß, c-r aB 
This tells us that the change in extemal financing on the total level of investment 
is affected not only by the 'traditional' sensitivity of Ito i, P, , but also directly by 
the risk free interest rate (F) and the risk premium parameter (c), as the level of 
borrowing increases, the level of investment decreases. 
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1* 1 
Result 2: The change in interest rate changes the level of total investment by an 
amount equal to the sensitivity of the demand of investment (A) augmented by 
the risk premium coefficient and the amount borrowed (B) 
ai 
= -P, (I + cB) a-r 
The implication of this result can be seen in Fig. 2.2. We plot the traditional 
investment schedule and the "new" investment demand curve (1). The latter is 
much steeper than the traditional investment schedule. The higher is the level of 
risk premium and/or the level of external borrowing, the higher is the sensitivity 
of firms investment to change in the nominal risk free interest rate: in other words, 
the steeper I' becomes. On the other hand, when c and/or B tends towards zero, 
the I' converges to the traditional equation. In the case of no external borrowing 
then changes in investment decisions, following a movement in risk free interest 
rate, would depend only upon the level of 0, . 
Fig. 2.2 Old and New Investment Schedule 
I New Investment curve 
ai 
-=-0, (1 + CB aF 
Traditional Inve s timent curve 
I: aI =-A 
r 
Considering now that I =F +B, where F is the level of internal funds used by 
firms to finance investment, we can rewrite Eq. (3.1b) as: 
j= T+c-r(I- F) 
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And substituting in Eq. (3.2) we obtain the level of Investment of equilibrium: 
I_ 
I - ß, [T - cF] 
1+ß, c-r 
(3.4) 
Result 3: The greater is the fisk premium the greater is the investmentfinanced 
via internalfUnds. 
Taking the first derivative of I with respect to F we get: 
T 
ai crß, 
> 
(V 1+ß, cr 
where T represents the sensitivity of investment to internal funds; the ratio is 
always positive. One interesting result derives from the derivative of 0 with 
respect to r 
aT P, C >0 
0 -T (I + P, cr-)' 
This is the financial accelerator or the magnification effect deriving from an 
imperfect capital market: every increase in the risk free interest rate increases the 
cost of borrowing more than proportionally. 
Fig. 3.3: The impact of an increase in interest rate 
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capital 
AT 
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The result is presented in Fig. 3.3. Given a risk free interest rate (r ), the market 
forces determine E as the equilibrium point. If there is a monetary policy 
tightening (i. e. r- increases), then the new equilibrium point would be E'. The 
movement of the supply curve from S1 to S2 instead of S', is the result of the 
Financial Accelerator. Since the higher cost of capital increases the possibility of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, lenders require a higher rate of return on the 
loans. This determines a lower amount (Bi) of capital borrowed. 
Resuft 4: Every movement in the risk free interest rate determines a more than 
proportional increase in the user cost of capital. 
This result is obtained substituting Eq. (3.1b) into Eq. (3.2) and taking the 
derivative of the user cost of capital with respect to F: 
ai 
=1+ 
c(I, - F) 
-1-+ 
c(I - F) 
a-r (1 + c-rß, 
) 2 (1 + (ýr-ý, Y (1 + cirß, )2 
Two implications are derived: (i) at any change in F the user cost of capital 
increases more than proportionally; (ii) the sign of the relation between changes in 
user cost of capital and change in the monetary policy instrument depends upon 
the availability of internal generated ftinds. When F>I +I,, the first derivative 
C 
assumes a negative value, implying that the risk premium decreases. This, in turn, 
would produce an increase in the demand for investment. 
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Result 5: There is a negative relation between internal and externalfinance. 
Substituting I=F+B into Eq. (3.3). We obtain: 
F=0, - P, -r -B 
(I + Pc-r) (3.5a) 
This relation can be better represented considering: 
85 In this case F can be thought of as collateral. In other words, the risk premia will not increase 
only if firms increase internal funds of an amount at least equal to that part of 
investment 
independent to movements in the cost of capital plus a 'systemic risk ratio', i. e. I/c. 
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-F + Io - AT <:: > F (I + Bc) + (I, - B) (3.5b) + P, cr- 
The result is presented in the Fig. 3.4. In the y-axis we plot the level of internal 
funds while on the --axis we plot the risk-free interest rate. After an increase in B 
the internal finance schedule is on a lower position and has a steeper slope. This 
implies that changes in interest rate have a higher impact when the level of 
external finance (B) is high. When the firm is heavily indebted, a change in 
r would cause a more pronounced decrease in F. In the diagram, a change AF 
would cause a decrease in internal funds equal to AF1 in the more indebted firm 
compared to AF of a less indebted one. 
Fig. 3.4: Risk-free interest rate and internal finance 
F 
AF 
AF, 
3.3.1 Macroeconomic Implications 
In the previous Tction we presented a model that highlights how the financial 
"accelerator" works. When the above analysis is applied to micro studies, the 
conclusion is usually that shocks (typically monetary shocks) have a smaller 
impact on big firms than on small firms since the level of internal funds and the 
collateral of the former is much higher. The explanation is provided by the fact 
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that asymmetric information plays a key role in determining the cost of capital. 
One implication deriving from macroeconomic modeIS86 which incorporate 
asymmetric information is that the dynamics of the cycle are intrinsically non 
linear. In other words, the financial accelerator (i. e. the more than proportional 
increase in i following a change in r- and B) effects are stronger the deeper the 
economy is in the recession, but also the higher the level of indebtedness, and the 
higher the level of risk free interest rate. This characteristic arises from the fact 
that the agency costs faced by a firm become very small, as the share of internal 
finance become large. Firms with high cash flow (net worth) are expected to be 
able to meet their debt payment, so most financial shocks will not affect them. 
Therefore, they have a very elastic demand for external finance. The lower the 
cash flow, the more often a firm fails to meet its financial commitments and the 
more often a cash shortfall requires that debt be rolled over. Consequently, in an 
economy with sufficient internal finance, the financial propagation mechanism 
disappears or becomes very small. There is a dependence of firms investment to 
cash flow. 
Although models of financial accelerator help to explain the magnitude of the 
fluctuation, the financial system is seen only as a propagation mechanism of some 
economic shocks. However, asymmetric information is a fundamental 
characteristic of a decentralised economy, because decentralization inevitably 
leads to information differences. It can be argued that information is asymmetric 
by the very nature of the system because of the division of labour: ihose who 
specialise in certain activities will know more about them compared to others. 
Fazzari (1992, p. 129) writes: "if an entrepreneur seeks funds from an intermediary 
to finance an investment project, the natural starting assumption to make is that 
the entrepreneur has more information about the project's prospects than the 
banker. The banker may be able to obtain some information from independent 
sources, but this activity is costly. [ ... ] To 
become fully informed would require 
that the banker becomes an entrepreneur". Thus, asymmetric information relates 
to lender perceptions of the adequacy of borrower balance sheets; these 
perceptions or creditworthiness fluctuate because expectation of future 
86 Bernanke and Gertler (1989,1990), Calorimirs and Hubbard (1990) provide such evidence. 
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profitability is closely linked to the business cycles conditions. Minsky argues that 
these expectations are pro-cyclical, which implies that the cost of capital, and its 
availability, are pro-cyclical as well. Asymmetric information is, therefore, 
endogenously determined in the system. Accepting this notion brings us to say 
that the finance- expenditure link not only propagates shocks, and creates 
instability, but is itself a source of instability. This type of instability could be 
associated with Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis. 
There are various factors that, according to Minsky, bring the system from a 
tranquil (though fragile) state to a crisis; the first is that expectations of future 
profitability depend on the market mood, on leveraging and credit condition and 
the outlook of the sales and production into the future. During the expansionary 
period of the business cycle, expectations rise, reducing tender and borrower risk. 
The reverse occurs at the inception of the crisis, when lender and borrower risk 
shoot up, thus reducing investment. The second determinant of a crisis is an 
endogenous rise in interest rate (i. e. cost of capital). Paraphrasing Minsky, as 
interest rates rise, IoNNLsafety margin units find it harder to continue operating. A 
more inelastic demand for credit meets a steeped supply of credit, making safety 
margins contract even faster. 
The financial structure of a dynamic capitalist economy, therefore, endogenously 
evolves from being robust to being fragile, and that once there is a sufficient mix 
of financially fragile institutions, the economy becomes susceptible to Fischer- 
type debt deflation. This occurs because the economy moves from hedge to ponzi 
finance. In Minsky's words the latter occurs when "the cash flow from operations 
is not sufficient to fulfil either the repayment of principle or the interest due to 
outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations" (1995, p. 7). The 
emergence ofponzi financiers is the result (among other factors) of an interest rate 
-and debts- insensitive demand. This 
is the result of a euphoric economy where 
the expectations are self-fulfilling. Declining risk aversion sets off increases in 
investment, and this determines that the economy groNNs faster. Asset prices rise, 
making speculation on assets profitable. Increased willingness to lend increases 
money supply; this enables riskier investments and validates asset speculation. 
But eventually, rising interest rates make many once- conservative projects 
106 
speculative, and forces non-Ponzi investors to attempt to sell assets to service 
debts. The entry of new sellers floods the asset market determining a reverse in 
asset prices. 
The consequences are: firstly, there is the bankruptcy of ponzi financiers since 
they cannot sell assets for a profit and debt servicing on assets far exceeds cash 
flows. Secondly, asset prices collapse increasing the debt/equity ratios. Third, 
investment evaporates, causing a slowdown or a reverse of economic growth. 
Finally, the economy enters a debt-induced recession (i. e. a Fisher's debt- 
deflation crisis). 
Following the above arguments, to be able to capture the dynamic of a debt-driven 
economic crisis, we need to test that the contribution of external finance to real 
investment and compare it to the contribution of internal funds. Given the fact that 
we are interested in the evolution of the system from a tranquil to a crisis state, we 
need to examine the dynamics and interactions of the different types of source and 
uses of capital. In the next section we will present a statistical analysis of the flow 
of funds along the UK business cycle. 
4.4. Financing the UK: patterns and trends 
The data set used in this section relates to the Sources of Funds and Net 
Borrowing Requirement for Industrial and Commercial companies for the period 
(1970QI-1998QI). The data is from tables 10.6B and 10.6C of the Financial 
Statistics Publications from the ONS (Official National Statistics). They have 
been collected from DATASTREAM. 
Before analysing the time-series data and presenting some descriptive statistics, it 
is worth highlighting the pattern of the UK business cycles in the period under 
examination. We can identify three recession periods 
87 
. The table below gives a 
summary description of the timing and the main causes. 
87 See Dow (1998) for an in depth description and identification of the UK business cycles. 
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Table 3.3: Recession Periods in UK 
Period Main Causes 
1973-75 01"oiI price shock 
0 Tightening of the monetary and fiscal policy to control the 
accelerating inflation 
0 (1974) 3-day working week 
1979-81 02 
nd oil shock 
0 Large increasing in exchange rate 
0 Tight fiscal and monetary policy in order to control broad 
money 
88 
. 
1990-92 Recession not due to real shocks like the previous two. The 
economy experienced a reversal of the over-confidence that has 
been built up in the proceeding boom years. This recession was 
preceded by unsustainable increases in asset prices, property prices 
and equity prices. 
3.4.1 Sources of funds: descriptive statistics 
In this section we present a series of graphs which illustrate the behaviour of the 
source of funds during the UK business cycles. All the series have been converted 
in real terms by dividing them by the consumer price index. 
From a first visual inspection we notice that all three pre-recession periods have 
been characterized by a large increase in total funds, and that the dynamic is 
clearly pro-cyclical. The value of these funds has almost doubled in the last 
recession compared with the previous ones. This does not come as a big surprise 
given the important capital market development in the eighties. In fact this pattern 
is captured by the plot of the total external borrowing (Fig. 3.7 
89). Most of this 
aggregate is represented by bank borrowing; again the same trend is repeated: a 
sharp increase in borrowing during the eighties. A different picture emerges from 
the plot of the total internal ftinds (Fig. 3.6). The two seventies recessions were 
preceded by a large increase in the amount of internal finance, but this did not 
happen during the third recession. After a pronounced increase in the use of these 
88 According to Guariglia (1998. p. 49) "The Thatcher government [ ... ] attached great importance 
to reducing inflation, abandoning the commitment to high employment. [ ... 
] The sharp contraction 
of MO, in both nominal and real terms, as well as high level of real interest rates and the exchange 
rates over the period, show that the policy was tight. " 
89 See Appendix 
108 
funds to finance investment, their employment remained quite -stable during tile 
whole period between the second and the third recession. 
To haw a better picture of the firms financial sources during the business-c,, cle, 
we construct some ratios. 
R I. Internal Funds over Total Funds 
R2. External Funds over Total Tunds 
R3. Bank Loan Funds over Total Funds 
R4. Bank Loan Funds over Total External Funds 
The plot of the first two ratios provides some insightful information. The t%%o 
variables have a strong negative correlation. A first important point is that during 
non- recessionary periods there is a strong tendencý for RI to dominate R-2. 
During a downturn the series converge. This means that in periods identified a, 
tranquil firms prefer to use internal rather than external funds. This behaviour 
changes after 1988: R2 assumes a value higher than RI. The morc plausible 
explanation could be attributed to the financial deepening and financial 
broadening following the capital market liberalisation9o. Progressively, firms havc 
had the possibility of choosing among a larger variety of financing , ourcc,,. 
Interesting information is provided from the plot of R4. Bank loans as a sourco: of 
external finance do no exhibit a decrease until the end of the reccSsion. It i,.., c1car 
that the reduction in the flow of bank loans is quite slow in the period prior to tho: 
crisis. We notice that a sharp decrease of this indicator appears only for the last 
period of the recession. 
We consider another indicator of firms financial balances: the Net Borrowing 
Requirements (NBR)91, which "measure ICCs' need for external borroý% ing, net of 
liquid and certain other financial assets; it reflects the amount by which the 
companies' expenditure on fixed assets, stocks. capital transfer (net), trade 
investment, acquisition of subsidiaries in the united Kingdom, invcstrilcrit abroad 
and net trade credit exceeds the increase in their internal funtA 
92" (ONS, 11)(0 
40 Financial deepening is referred to it-, growth of the monetarisation of an cconofllý 
Financial 
broadening refers to the growth in financial instruments and 
financial in"tittition.. ' %ýIthlrl the 
country. 
91 The data are from Table 10.6 C of the ONS Report. 
92 Emphasis added. 
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p. 176). This indicator seems to be able to capture the dynamics and the pattern of 
all the time series presented above. According to Pettigrew (1978) there are three 
main reasons why this indicator is superior to the conventional net acquisition of 
financial assets (NAFA) and more generally to the other indicators of 
indebtedness 93 : first it includes retained profits of UK affiliates of foreign 
companies; secondly it measures the cash position of the industrial and 
commercial companies, and finally, the definition of investment is more broader, 
as it includes investments in fixed assets and stock outside the UK. The following 
table presents the contributing and financing items to the Net Borrowing 
Requirements. 
Table 3.4: Net Borrowing Requirements 
NET BORROWING REQUIREMENTS 
Contributing Items Financing Items 
Internal Funds (adjusted for unremitted 0 Borrowing from UK banks 
profits and including increase in tax 0 Other borrowing in the form of loans 
balances) and mortgages 
Plus 0 Capital issues in the UK and overseas 
e Imports and other trade credit received 0 Direct investments in UK affiliates by 
Minus foreign parent companies (excluding 
" Exports and other trade credit given unremitted profits) and other net 
" Other accrual adjustments borrowing abroad by UK companies 
" Import deposits Minus 
" Increase in book value of stocks e Acquisition of liquids assets 
" Gross domestic fixed capital formation e Acquisition of other financial assets not 
" Cash expenditure on acquiring included elsewhere. 
subsidiaries and on trade investments in 
the UK 
Direct Investment by UK parent 
companies in overseas affiliates 
(excluding unremitted profits) and 
other investments abroad 
Unidentified transactions. 
(Pettigrew, 1978 p. 115) 
The contributing items can be divided in two categories: i) The amount of internal 
funds generated by the companies trading and investments activities, ii) The 
amount of internal funds available to finance investment and working capital, 
93 See Pettigrew (1978) for a detailed comparison between NAFA and net Borrowing Financial 
Assets. 
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after payments of interest and taxes and distribution to shareholders. The 
financing items are subdivided into: A) The amount of external funds required in 
addition to internally generated funds to finance the chosen level of trading and 
investments by companies, B) The net liquidity of industrial and commercial 
companies. 
Fig. 3.14 plots the NBR for the period 1970QI-1998Q2. From visual inspection 
some striking points appear: 1) NBR has a tendency to increase immediately 
before an economic downturn; this is explained by the fact that NBR is the net of 
internal funds. In proximity of an economic recession, firms income and profits 
start shrinking, inducing, consequently, a reduction in internal funds. Firms, left 
with a lower level of funds available, need to borrow (at least to cover working 
capital) in order to continue their production. External finance appears to be a 
safety net for Industrial and Commercial Companies. 2) The behaviour of the 
series for the period preceding the third xonomic recession (1990-92) in our 
sample is quite different. We observe an exponential dynamics of NBR; as we 
will highlight later, the reason for this can be found in the so-called financial big- 
bang. The major difference is that NBR decreases when the crisis begins, the 
behaviour indicating that banks did not operate as a safety net. This gives us a first 
indication of the nature of the crisis: over- indebtedness was one of the reasons 
underneath the economic crisis and its magnitude. 
3.5. Empirical analysis and discussion of the results 
The statistical evidences presented in the previous section support Mayer's idea 
that internal funds are much more important than the level of borrowing. In this 
section we provide a model to test if the contribution of the different items to the 
real investment has changed during the years and if this contribution follows the 
cyclicality of the business cycle. In order to test this dynamic we write the model 
in a state space fon-n- 
TO, +y, (measurement equation) (3.6) 
0, =FA-, +77, (transition equation) (3.7) 
C 
YI = 
lyt-Ilyi-2'**"ý 
1-n] 
\IC 
Z( 
-n 
ßt 
z: 
[ßt-19ßt-2ý""ßl-] 
will assume the values of investment, and the Z, matrix, of dimension (Txk), 
that contains the financing variables of interest plus a constant. We now have the 
state vector tit, a (kxl) vector that contains all the slope coefficients, which are 
now varying through time. The F matrix, of dimension (kxk), contains the 
autoregressive coefficients of dt. We allow the coefficient tit to follow a random 
walk process. 
The error terms are assumed to be independent white noise 
Var(A) = Q; Var(? I, ) = R; Var(Aij, ) =0 for all t and s. 
Such a representation can, then, be used to compute the estimates of a state vector 
for t=k+], -k+2... T using the Kalman filter. For the purpose of our analysis, this 
algorithm is valuable because it allows us to recover the dynamic of the iteration 
between sources and uses of finance. Furthermore, this econometric technique has 
the strength to be valid even when we suspect structural change during the 
estimation period but are unsure as to when breaks might occur. This recursive 
algorithm, in fact, computes the linear least square of the forecasted state vector 
given data observed at time t. 
The state vector it and its mean squared error are 
recursively estimated by: 
P, I, =FP, I, -, 
+ H, -, 
Z (Z'H I- IZ+ 
Q) -'(y-, - Z'F P, -, , -, 
) 
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and 
HH Z(Z'H, 
1-1 -, 
Z+ 0-'ZH, 
-, 
where: H, = FP, ý orecast of the state vector at time -ýF'+ 
R, and A+ýv is the f 
period t+l, given information available at time t. 
For each endogenous variable in the model it is therefore possible to observe how 
the respective coefficients are changing over time due to the effect of changing in 
the source of financing. If we calculate for every coefficient the first difference 
between, we can quantify the change in the contribution of each of the sources of 
finance to investment. 
A_ t-2 
We start our investigation estimating, for the period 1970: Ql until the 1998: Q3, 
the following two transition equations 94 : 
IN VJý = C,,, + P, ', 
TO TINT, + E, (3.8) 
where INVR is total use of ftinds deflated by the Consumer price index, TOTINT 
is the real flow of total internal funds 
The estimation of Eq. (3.8) should tell us if the behaviour of the flow of funds has 
changed significantly in the last thirty years and if the pattern changes along peaks 
and troughs of the business cycles. The patterns of the coefficients estimated are 
presented in Fig. 3.15. At a first glance we see that internal finance decreases 
along all the period under consideration. This downward process is quite 
pronounced during the eighties. It reaches the lowest level during the phase of the 
last recession. Afterwards the pattern appears to be quite stable. 
94 Footnote n. 94 at page 113 is now: Table 1. All in Appendix 11 reports the estimates of 
Var(77, ) and the corresponding standard error for each single model estimated hereafter. 
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As we saw in the previous paragraph the best measures to capture the lewl of 
external borrowing is given by the Net Borrowing Requirements. Therefore we 
es imate: 
INVR =C2,, + 02, NBR, ji, (3.9) 
This allows us to see how much of the investment was financed through external 
finance, after using internal finance and net of other liquid assets. The first point 
emerging is that the amount of external finance used by Industrial and 
Commercial Companies shows a pronounced increase immediately after the end 
on the 1979-1981 recession. Moreover, the sizable investment spending in the late 
eighties was almost entirely financed through corporate debt. This could be 
attributed to the financial market big-bang that took place during 1986. The 
financial system expanded significantly: deregulation and liberalization lowered 
barriers to new domestic and foreign entrants eliminating interest rate 
regularization and removing restrictions on bank activities. The behaviour of the 
coefficients does not indicate any cyclical pattern. Since no economic theory 
suggests that too much corporate investment could be harmful for the economy, 
the result seems to indicate that a possible cause of the last economic downturn 
was the high level of indebtedness of non-financial companies. Another possible 
interpretation is that the external capital was not used to finance real investment 
but rather used for noný-productive or speculative investment; where by 
speculative investment we mean an amount of money which chases up the price 
of extant assets. A third hypothesis would be that the economy was characterised 
by both an increased propensity to accumulate debt and speculative investment, 
which, in turn, created a crisis a la Minsky. To test this hypothesis, we define 
INVRESID as the difference between the total flow of funds used at each period 
and the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFC. F). We test the impact of NBR for 
each of the two new variables. We estimate: 
INVRESID= C3,, + 
P3 
ý NBRt + ýl 
GFCF =c+ P*, NBR, + 4,1 3 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
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The null hypothesis is that during the late eighties speculative investment 
dominated productive investment; thus, this implies that a, >a, during the late 
eighties. The results are presented in Fig. 3.17; we notice that in the first part of 
our sample the coefficient a2 as a great explanatory power for real investment. 
The opposite is true for the middle of our sample. Indeed the loans made for the 
purchase of companies were a major constituent in the huge expansion of credit 
supply which took place in those years. This acceleration in the availability of 
credit during the period 1988-90 was the result of increased competition among 
banks in order to gain market share; the result was that banks expanded their 
balance sheets. Furthermore another source of competition derived from foreign 
banks. Gardiner (1993, p. 146) recalls that "the increase in credit creation by 
foreign banks was at a rate at least three times greater than the rate of increase on 
the United Kingdom banks' lending". Schinasi and Hargraves (1993) argue that 
this increased competition caused a decline in the special role of banks and a 
lower degree of risk aversion. 
The last equation that we estimate investigates the contribution of bank finance 
and capital market finance to NBR. We estimate: 
NBR = C,,, + P4,, BANK, + 0,,, NONBANK, +A (3.12) 
Where BANK is the flow of bank loans and NONBANK include all capital market 
finance, namely ordinary shares, preference shares and bonds; 6, is the error term. 
We see how the need for external finance has been fmanced along the period 
under consideration. Fig. 3.18 shows that the coefficient of Bank has a tendency 
to decrease or stabilize in the second part of a recession period. This indicate that 
the banking system behaves as a safety net when the crisis begins, but when i 
starts deepening -with a consequent negative impact on the gearing ratio of 
lenders and borrowers- banks begin to cut funds 95 ; this is in line with the results 
emerging in the previous paragraph. The idea is supported by the Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992); according to them adjustment of the stock of loans takes time. In 
order to match a decrease in deposits, banks initially sell liquid securities and only 
95 This implies that both lender and borrower do not know when a recession end. 
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in a second stage do they reduce the amount of loans. In their words "loans are 
quasim contractual commitments whose stock is difficult to change". Furthermore, 
from the estimates is evident that in the last thirty years firms have chosen bank 
loans to other form of external finance. If we exclude possible restrictions 
imposed by market regulations, we think that Diamond's (1991) theory is the 
most appropriate to explain this pattern. He finds that a long-term bank-firm 
relation can help in reducing the cost of monitoring the firm and consequently the 
asymmetric information problem. Petersen and Rajan (1994), emphasize as the 
quantity of credit is positively affected by the bank-firm relation, and indeed our 
results show that the coefficient of BANK remain stable during recessionary 
periods. This seems to suggest that probably banks try to overcome firms' 
financing problems because an immediate cut in lending might correspond with 
bankrupts of the firm and the consequent impossibility to recover the amount 
previously lent. This, however, creates or aggravates the balance sheet's effect. 
Borrowing to overcome the liquidity problem in a period of recession means that 
more debt is created on the already existing debt deepening the financial situation. 
The result is a drastic cut in the bank's source of finance. 
Some other considerations emerge from the estimations. Increasing external 
borrowing did not correspond to an in increase in internal funds and this rising 
debt increased vulnerability to bankruptcy (Davis, 1995). The fact that in that 
period we have a positive relation between interest rates and external friancing, 
has brought some authors (Gardiner, 1993 p. 43) to the conclusion that "why 
corporate borrowers were ready to pay well over asset value of shares, and also to 
pay high rates of interest to borrow the money to do so, seems to be a question for 
psychologists, or even for psychiatrists rather than for economists". However, 
high level of borrowing can find a sensible explanation if we accept the minskian 
notion that lenders and borrowers risks are determined mainly by the perception 
and expectations of economic fundamentals. Some insightful information is 
obtained comparing the pattern of BANK against the behaviour of the detrended 
GDP 96 . 
Expectations were accompanied by strong growth in investment 
expenditure this caused a sharp increase in asset prices and further positive 
96 GDP in Fig. 3.20 has been detrended using a HP Filter. 
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expectation of continued capital gains from the assets' market (particularly in the 
real estate). Nevertheless it is important to underline that this increase willingness 
to borrow was matched by a desire to lend: the increase competitiveness put 
pressures on the banking system and the development of a 'universal' type of 
bank induced wholesale banks to reduce the level of risk aversion. The result of 
this liberalisation was an altered monetary transmission mechanism; the 
expansion of credit via bank's balance sheets made have put the financial 
accelerator into operation and brought the system to a Mynskian fragile state. 
Fig. 3.20 shows a strong positive correlation between BANK, interest rate 
payment and the level of interest rate. While internal funds exhibits a sharp 
decline in correspondence of the maximum point of those two variables, and at the 
97 same time we have a correlation between liquidation and bad loans . Moreover it 
is important to underline that the increase in lending was supported by an increase 
in the asset prices inflation. This stimulated the willingness to borrow money via a 
higher level of collateral regardless of the level of the interest rate. The result was, 
of course, an increase of the credit supply in a period of tight monetary policy. 
The suggestion emerging from the data is, therefore, that prospects of continuing 
economic growth and rising asset prices might have led the financial system to 
have lent more than the safety 'threshold' point 98 . Further the persistent increase 
in the risk free interest rate accelerated the crisis making the cost of external 
capital, on which firms were heavily relying on, more and more expensive. The 
consequences of this artificial growth of credit and persistent cost of financing 
were an exponential increase in the bad-debt charges and of the liquidation rate. 
The result was the 1990-1992 recession". 
3.6. Conclusions 
97 See Fig. 3.21. 
98 In that period national investment was a driving force of the economy, and most of this was 
financed through external borrowing. Indeed, the financial liberalization and increased competition 
rovided the financial system with capital to finance firms' investment. 
9 Gardiner suggests that a more direct form of credit would have prevented this recession. He 
states that the increase in interest rate was just the wrong policy given the level of indebtedness of 
firms and consumer. 
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A number of theories and empirical research link the level of cash- flow with real 
investment. There are two main lines of research, the first rely on panel data 
analysis, the main conclusion that these studies reach is that cash-flow is an 
important determinant of the level of investment. When the sample is split 
between small and big companies, the major results is that the former are more 
vulnerable to external shocks (typically a monetary policy shock) than the latter; 
this is a consequence of the higher cash flow and net worth off big firms. A 
second line of research has been developed by Myers (1988) and Corbett and 
Jenkinson (1996,1997), they employ flow of funds data at a country level. The 
results do not confirm the existence of the classical dichotomy between capital 
market based and bank based system; further they find that internal funds are the 
most important variable to explain real investment. 
We argued that Corbett and Jenkinson (1996,1997) results could be explained by 
the broad credit channel. At the heart of this theory is the proposition that external 
funds are not a perfect substitute for internal funds. This channel arises because of 
asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower; the cost of renting 
capital is therefore a positive function of the level of the indebtedness and on the 
level of the risk free interest rate. An increase in one of the two variables would 
increase the cost of capital in a more than proportionate way. 
One major argument that we put forward is that credit channel theories, and more 
generally all the theories that make use of asymmetric information, not only 
provide an explanation for the magnitude of the business cycles fluctuations, but 
also could generate business cycles a la Minsky. We argue that asymmetric 
information is a characteristic of a capitalistic economy and they are the 
consequence of the division of labour. Since this asymmetry is pro-cyclical, the 
finance- expenditure link not only propagates shocks as in the broad credit 
channel, but also is itself a major source of instability. 
We have suggested that the above statements could be tested with the Kalman 
Filter. We have employed flow of funds of Industrial and Commercial Companies 
in the United Kingdom in the last thirty years. Our results bring support to 
Mayer's (1988) idea that internal funds are the most important source of financing 
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for UK companies. Furthermore we have find that the dynamic of the 1990-92 
recession could be explained in term of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. 
In fact we have found that speculative investment has dominated productive 
investment for the period antecedent the economic downturn. 
Our last result suggests that bank loans dominate capital market sources of real 
investment. We explained that the result that the loans are a sticky aggregate 
given their "quas ý contractual" nature. At the same time we explained that banks 
can be seen as safety net for industrial and commercial companies. 
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Appendix I 
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Fig. 3.10: Internal Funds/Total Funds (RI) 
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Fig. 3.11: External Funds/Total Funds (R2) 
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Fig. 3.14: Net Borrowing Requirement 
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Fig. 3.15: Estimates of the coefficients a, 
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Fig. 3.16: Estimates of the coefficients A2 
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Fig. 3.17: Estimates of the coefficients R3 and A*3 
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Fig. 3.18: Estimates of the coefficients a A5 54 and 
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Fig. 3.19: Estimates of the coefficients A4 and plot of Short term interest rate 
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Fig. 3.20: Estimates of the coefficients A4 and plot of Interest rate Payment 
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tS A Fig. 3.21: Estimates of the coefficien A4 and plot of GDP detrended 
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Fig. 3.22: Liquidation Rate and Bad-Debt Charges 
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Table 1. All: Variance Estimates of the Transition Equations 
Model Coefficient Standard Error 
Eq. (3.8) 
Eq. (3.9) 
0.174 
0.0217 
0.028 
0.017 
Eq. (3.10) 0.015 0.009 
Eq. (3.11) 39.524 9.699 
Eq. (3.12) 0.018 0.0105 
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Chapter 4 
Monetary Policy and Asset Prices in the 
United Kingdom 
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4.1 Introduction 
As Bernanke and Gertler (2001) emphasise, asset market boom and busts have been 
important factors behind macroeconomic volatility in both industrial and developing 
countries. Following the financial deregulation in the early 1980s and the increased 
capital market globalization, industrial economies have witnessed an upward trend in 
asset prices. Alongside this trend, stock land and property prices have undergone 
swings around typical business cycle frequencies ranging from three to ten years. For 
some countries such as Japan and the Scandinavian counties during the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s, these swings had disruptive effects on domestic financial 
systems and contributed to prolonged recessions. In the U. K. case of 1990-92, the 
financial system withstood the asset price collapse but the ensuing recession was 
anyway severe. 
As we saw in the first chapter, many recent theoretical and empirical contributions on 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy imply that equity and property prices 
play an important role via consumption wealth effects and balance sheet effects. For 
example, a rise in stock prices decreases the perceived level of financial distress by 
households which leads to increased consumption spending. The balance sheet 
channel implies a positive relationship between the firms' ability to borrow and their 
net worth which in turn depends on asset valuations. This extra credit can be used to 
purchase goods and services and thus stimulates economic activity (Kyotaky and 
Moore, 1997). 
Since banks and other financial institutions engage heavily in real estate lending, in 
which the value of the real estate acts as collateral, swings in property prices lead to 
increased financial instability. Sinclair (2000) reminds us that the Central Bank by 
setting the interest rate controls an important link between the monetary and financial 
stability. A low degree of policy smoothness may cause an excess volatility in the 
price of financial assets, especially when the policy is delayed. Borio and Lowe 
(2002) point out that while a low and stable inflation environment promotes financial 
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stability, it also raises the likelihood that excess demand pressures will first show up 
in credit aggregates and asset prices rather than in consumer prices. They question the 
idea that Central Banks should focus only on monetary stability, given the fact that 
financial stability is automatically reached as a consequence. 
Goodhart and Hofinann (2001) find that stock price and house price increases raise 
future aggregate demand in many major economies. Monetary policy affects asset 
prices via changes in expected future dividends and/or changes in the discount rate, 
which consequently affect aggregate demand and future inflation through balance 
sheet and wealth effects. Furthermore the evidence presented in the first chapter 
suggests that current asset prices inflation is a good proxy for future inflation. Some 
authors have suggested a pro-active view for monetary policy, claiming that 
macroeconomic performance can be improved by reacting to asset price bubbles, 
even if conventional measure of inflation appears to be under control (Cecchetti et al, 
2000). 
Goodhart and Hoffinan (2001) estimate the potential benefit from including asset 
prices in a model that predicts inflation. By comparing the inflation forecasting 
properties of reduced form equations with and without asset prices they show that, 
particularly at the two-year horizon, house prices are useful indicators for consumer 
price inflation. Goodhart (1999) has recommended that, since asset prices represent 
the current price of claims on future as well as current consumption, policyrnakers 
should consider a broader price measure that includes housing and stock market 
indices 100. 
The main objective of this chapter is to critically discuss the case of monetary policy 
in the context of financial instability; we extend the analysis as presented in 
Kontonikas, Montagnoli (2004). We aim to provide further insight into the interest 
rate setting behavior of the Bank of England (BoE), by estimating reaction functions 
100 The theoretical foundation of this argument lays in pioneering research on the theory of inflation 
measurement by Alchian and Klein (1973). 
128 
that have been augmented to take into account the effect of asset price inflation. We 
depart from the traditional approach that considers the exchange rate as determinant 
of aggregate demand and interest rates, and focus on two other important asset prices, 
equity and house prices. The results indicate that UK monetary policy reacts to asset 
price fluctuations, especially when they originate from the housing market. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss 
the link between monetary and financial stability. In section 4.3 we present the 
properties of the data. In Section 44 we provide some empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of the wealth effects using a small structural model of the UK economy. 
Section 4.5 contains the empirical results from augmented Taylor rules. Section 4.5.1 
accounts for the effect of BoE independence on the inflation-policy rule parameter, 
and Section 4.5.2 compares the historical performance of the benchmark forward- 
looking rule versus the asset augmented rule. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. The financial stability case 
In the last thirty years, there has been a widespread move towards financial 
liberalisation, both within and across national borders. The G7 countries typically 
began partial liberalisations in the mid-1970s, and then pushed such reforms 
considerably further in the 1980s and 1990s. By the early 1990s, their liberalisation 
efforts were virtually complete. 
These developments in the financial markets brought about some changes of direction 
in the goals of central banks, and required some concepts, procedures, and strategies 
to be revised. In particular the concept of financial stability has gained new 
importance due to the introduction of new instruments into the international financial 
system, the exponential growth in the size of financial transactions, and the ever- 
101 increasing costs of financial crises 
10 1 IMF (2000), Bordo et al. (200 1). 
129 
It is generally accepted that monetary policy must pursue two kinds of stability at 
once: monetary stability, and financial stability. The fundamental purpose of the 
former is to protect price stability. Since the early nineties this has become the main 
goal of monetary policies. The implementation of inflation targeting strategies and 
Central Banks' independence has dramatically reduced the variance and the mean of 
inflation. There is little doubt that changing relative prices play a crucial and 
beneficial part in economic adjustment and decision making by individual actors be 
them companies or households. The price index and the optimal horizon over which 
to define price stability, in general the concept is widely accepted and relatively 
straightforward to handle both conceptually and in central banking practice. 
The second objective of Central Banks has been and always will be financial stability. 
The term financial stability encompasses the stability of institutions, markets, and 
payment systems. Financial stability requires close, smooth interaction of all three, 
with each functioning correctly; large swings in asset prices possibly leading to some 
failures of monetary and financial institutions in the aftermath of a large real or 
financial shock could even be a sign of stability and of self-purifying powers of the 
system, as long as an efficient financial intermediation and financing process can be 
maintained. Indeed, many central banks around the world were established in part to 
serve as barriers against chronic episodes of financial istability and the attendant 
adverse consequences for the economy. Regardless of the different approaches used 
in various parts of the world, it is agreed, in principle, that a major goal of all central 
banks is to maintain a close, stable relationship between the financial system and the 
real economy. In fact, as we have presented in the first chapter financial markets play 
a vital intermediary role in the economy; thus, instability in the financial system 
quickly affects the fundamentals of an economy. This causes serious problems at 
once for the real economy, and later on for the social economy as well. For this 
reason, many central banks give the issue of financial stability a permanent place on 
their agendas. That said, some difficult issues may arise at times in judging how 
much weight should be attached to financial stability versus other central bank 
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objectives and also in judging just how "activist" central banks should be in pursuin, g 
their financial stability objectives. 
One important issue concerns the link between the mo central bank's ob jecti%c,,. The 
relevant questions to be answered by academics and polic', makers are. cloc, a trade 
off between monetary and financial stability exist? Does monetary stahilit, % 
necessarily guarantee financial stability? The literature proposes t%%o oprx),, Itc vie%%. 
The first is frequently defined as the -conventional % iew", it denies the e\istcnce ot'a 
trade-off between monetary and financial stability. According to Bordo el al. (200 1. 
p. 27) "the monetary regimes that produces aggregate price stability wIII as a hý- 
product, tend to promote stability of the financial system". The reason i" that inflation 
volatility is the major source of financial instabilitN. This view has, as a central point. 
the fact that misperceptions about future returns are the results of' inflation 
uncertainty. Asymmetric information worsens in an environmcrit charactcriscd bý 
high inflation: moreover a sudden unexpected decrease in inflation has negatiNc 
effects on the borrower since his/her outstanding debt would increase in real term. 
Indeed an environment characterised by high inflation volatilit\ has a high probabilit\ 
to see disruption in the financial markets and, thus, to host some form of financial 
instability. The advocates of this view see the monetarv stabilit\ as a neccssar) an(] 
sufficient condition to overcome financial system instability problems. In practi,.: e a 
separate weight on inflation stability. within a Taylor rule specification of the 
monetary policy, would not be beneficial for tfe overall sNstem (Schwart/. 199. ý). 
less strong view is assumed by Bordo and \Vheelock (1998); they agree that the main 
objective should be price stability. and this, in the long run, will tend to promote 
financial stability. 
A negative implication of ths view is presented by Crockett (2003: italics in om-6na 
44(1)n a monetary regime in which the central bank's orvratlonal object, %e Is 
expressed exclusiveh, in terms of short-term inflation. there maý, be insufficient 
protection against the build up offinancial imbalances that lies at the rtK)t of much of 
the financial instability %Nc observe. This could be so if the on stv, rt-tcrm 
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inflation control meant that the authorities did not tighten monetary policy 
sufficiently pre-emptively to lean against mcessive credit expansion and asset price 
increases. In jargon, if the monetary policy reaction function does not incorporate 
financial imbalances, the monetary anchor may fail to deliver financial stability. " 
Indeed an optimal monetary policy should incorporate the notion that distortions in 
the financial system might be such that deviations from the desired inflation rate 
during short period of time might be accepted. 
A "contrarian view" has recently been presented by Borio and Lowe (2002) and 
Borio, English and Filardo (2003). They argue that fi-nancial imbalances may develop 
even at times when prices are stable and output is close to potential. Borio and Lowe 
(2002, p. 25, emphasis added) writes that "it is the unwinding offinancial imbalances 
that is the major source of financial instability, not an unanticipated decline in 
inflation per se". They argue that the presence of a credible stabilisation program, an 
improved supply side 102 and a credible monetary policy could create favourable 
ground for fmancial instability. High levels of monetary credibility lead to well- 
anchored inflation expectations. And this, in turn, has led to many economic benefits. 
But Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that this is a potential problem here. People can 
come to believe that acentral bank will always be able to guard against swings in 
inflation or downturns in the economy. At the same time investors could believe that 
the central bank would take decisive action to prevent the stock market from falling 
but not from rising (Miller et al, 2001). This is consistent with the view that, the 
central bank does not want to be seen as a "wealth destroyer"; it has been suggested 
as an explanation for the inaction of the Fed to substantially increase interest rates 
during the first stage of the US equity bubble on 1996-97. As Baker (2002) argues, a 
likely explanation Br the Fed's inaction is that Greenspan and his colleagues may 
simply have felt constrained by their public mandate. The Fed, though operationally 
independent of political cortrol, it derives its authority from Congress, which dictates 
the goals it should pursue through legislation. 
102 They are identified as improvements in the technology, labour market reforms, and productivity 
gains. 
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This optimism, deriving from this unconditional trust in the Central Bank, can then 
unduly lower perceptions of risk, leading to higher asset prices and an increased 
willingness for investors to borrow and for creditors to lend-the so-called 
"Greenspan put" (Miller et aL, 2001). Such economic envirorurnent would be 
characterised by a low and stable inflation, but also it could lead to unsustainable 
credit and asset prices expansion created by overoptimistic expectations. Optimism 
about future returns would drive up asset values, prompting private agents to borrow 
in order to finance capital accumulation. Moreover, appreciating asset values raise the 
value of collateral, hence facilitating the accumulation of debt. During the upswing, 
balance sheets may look healthy as the appreciation in asset values offsets the build- 
up of debt. As a result, central banks need to be prepared to take pre-emptive actions 
to prevent potential financial instability even when such policy actions may not be 
fully justified by the outlook for inflation and output. In other words central bank 
should take all those measure which would prevent a financial crisis when the 
investors optimism turn to pessimism, leading to a correction in asset valuations and a 
sharp deterioration in net worth. This imply that monetary authorities should try to 
stop any building up of financial imbalances, and try to smooth the impact of 
eventually already built up imbalances. Even this view is not immune by critiques. 
Issing (2003, p. 7,8) argue that "fragility during periods of disinflation is a transitory 
adjustment problem and would vanish as soon as the economy gets accustomed to the 
new and stable environment. Furthermore, in a broader, longer-term perspective it is 
again high inflation, which causes the problem. Without a preceding period of higher 
inflation, the economy would not have to go through a potentially vulnerable period 
of disinflation and adaptation to a regime of low inflation in the first place". 
Therefore, he concludes we are not in presence of a trade-off or a conflict between 
monetary and financial stability, even in the short run. In fact if asset prices were seen 
as future lewl of economic activity and therefore inflation, central bank would have 
to react in order to keep under control its objective of long run price stability. This 
therefore does not imply financial stability entering into the loss function (and in the 
Taylor rule) as a single argument. 
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In a context of an inflation-targeting rule a conflict might exist when the policy rule, 
which is optimal from the point of view of overall price stability, leads to inflation 
deviations from target in the short-run. Thus the question here is whether a central 
bank only caring for overall price stability, would optimally chose to refrain from 
keeping inflation right at target in the short term in order to stabilise the financial 
system. 
This reflects clearly the current situation in the UK where inflation is low and stable 
which call for low interest rates, but the economy is characterised by an increasing in 
asset prices (mainly house prices 103), which would require a tighter monetary policy. 
In order to identify the optimal mDnetary policy Bordo and Jeanne (2001) construct a 
model in which firms can only borrow against collateral, and when asset prices fall 
there is a possibility of credit crunch. They show that if central bank adopts a 
forward-looking policy, which responds to the increase in financial imbalances and 
initial asset price inflation, this policy would be superior (in ten of output- inflation 
volatility frontier) to a policy which responds only to current inflation and economic 
activity. Their conclusion is that an even richer policy reaction function is desirable in 
a case of inflation targeting. 
The above discussion and the evidence presented in chapter one, suggest that the 
potential role of asset prices is highly important in the context of a monetary policy 
framework like the British one, that is, a regime that targets medium-ten-n prices of 
goods and services. Many authors justify the necessity for Central Banks to control 
for asset prices on the basis that (i) the share in the households' net financial wealth 
04 05 has increased' and (ii) firms have increased the amount of external borrowings' 
Since the mid eighties there as been a sharp increase in the numbers of fin-ns issuing 
103 We will see in the next paragraphs that house prices are more important in the British economy, 
than other assets prices. 
104 See evidence presented in Table I and Table 2 in Chapter 1. 
'05 See evidence in Chapter 3. 
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06 shares; (iii) 59% of U. K. loans is secured by real estate collateral' . Moreover real 
stock prices have rose steadily in the last ten years, but not without dramatic falls. 
This being said we can expect that the balance sheet channel can have severe 
implication in the UK. 
The Bank of England seems to have acknowledged the importance of asset rrices, in 
fact, as reported by Gramlich (2002) the households wealth is a significant 
component of the Bank's model for consumption expenditures. Following this model 
it is estimated that in the long run, a 10 per cent increase real gross housing wealth 
and net financial wealth boost consumer spending by 0.5 per cent and by 0.7 per cent 
respectively. 
Indeed the monetary policy makers seem to have fully captured and incorporated this 
notion. In February 2002 the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee states: 
"persistently rising debt levels potentially increased the probability that any 
adjustment to household balance sheets would be abrupt rather than smooth, with an 
attendant risk of a fall in asset prices and, thus, in the value of collateral". During 
October 2002 the Committee wrote: "an interest rate reduction seemed likely at 
present predominantly to affect house prices, household borrowing and consumption, 
which were already increasing strongly. A further reduction in the repo rate risked 
creating an unsustainable increase in debt which might subsequently unwind sharply. 
This would increase the risk of undershooting the inflation target in the medium 
term". Both statements are clear examples of the emphasis placed on risk factors for 
future economic development 107 . These statements fully incorporate the idea 
expressed by Borio and Lowe (2002) that even in a period of low and stable inflation, 
an economic system can move from a tranquil to an instable state. In a practical ten-n 
the Committee analysis pointed to the build-up of financial imbalances as a factor 
which implied that the interest rate should be kept unchanged rather then reducing it. 
106 Source: Borio (1996) table 12, p. 101 
107 Checchetti (2003) analysing the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) points the finger in the 
same direction. He references the keywords concerning asset market valuations, he finds that "as the 
stock market become a concern in the mid 1990s, the frequency with which it was mentioned rose 
drarnatically", Cecchetti (2003, p. 86) 
135 
Thus, it is a Central Bank role to act in order to prevent a situation of financial 
instability. 
3. Data description 
We employ monthly data on short-term interest rates, industrial production, Retail 
Price Index minus mortgage interest payments (RPIX), stock prices and house prices 
for the United Kingdom from October 1992 to January 2003. All data is obtained 
from Datastream, OECD Historical Statistics series. Our sample period commences 
with the establishment of an explicit inflation targeting regime on October 1992. An 
inflation target of 1-4 % was initially adopted and on June 1995 the target was reset at 
2.5% or less. In addition, on May 1997 the Bank of England was awarded operational 
independence in setting interest rates. 
The (annualised) output gap, ý, , the difference between actual and potential output, 
is calculated via quadratic de-trending of the industrial production series, as in 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), and Nelson (2000). The 3- month Treasury Bill rate, 
Rt, is employed as a measure of the stance of the monetary policyý 08 . The annual 
change in stock prices, 6tsp, house prices, 6P, and retail prices, 6t, is proxied by the 
12thdifference of the natural logarithm of the monthly FTSE All Shares stock index, 
the Halifax house price index, and the (seasonally adjusted) RPIX respectively. We 
used annual, rather than monthly, changes for retail prices, stock prices and house 
prices since year on year changes on these variables are much more relevant for 
monetary policy decisions (Goodhart, 2001). 
108 The actual interest rate used by the Bank of England as its instrument has varied over time, and has 
included Bank Rate (until September 1972), Minimum Lending Rate (1972-81), and the two-week 
Repo Rate (since 1996). The Treasury Bill rate has historically moved close with these instruments, 
and is available for the entire sample period. 
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Fig. 4.1: Annual House Price and Stock Price inflation, 1992: 10-2003: 01. 
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Ac we see in Fig. 4.1 (a) stock prices have been far more volatile as compared to It LO 
house prices. In the aftermath of the burst of the stock market bubble in 2000, the two 
series start diverging significantly, with house price inflation accelerating, while the 
stock market collapsed. The output gap in Fig. 4.1 (b) indicates a post- bubble weaker 
UK economy since it is generally declining after peaking in early 2001. Finally, the 
nominal interest rate is consistently above the strikingly stable (as compared to its 
1970's 'rollercoaster' behaviour) inflation rate. Standard Phillips-Perron (PP) tests 
are employed in order to test for unit roots in our data. The results in Table I clearly 
indicate the rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the usual levels of 
significance. Therefore we employ all the aforementioned variables at their levels. 
Table 4.1: Unit Root tests 
Variables Phillips Perron t-statistic 
R -3.620234 
ap 4.529641 
-4.001144 
-3.803221 
-3.748362 
Note: 1. In order to correct for serial correlation the Phillips Perron (PP) test uses a non-parametric 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. A truncation lag of twelve was employed. An intercept 
and a linear trend term were included in the PP regressions. 
2. The reported t-statistics test the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root. 
3. *, **, *** indicate rejection of the unit root - null at the 0.10,0.05, and 0.01 significance level 
respectively. 
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4.4. Asset Prices and the Real Economy 
As Goodhart and Hofinann (2001) argue, from the early 1990's many countries 
adopted explicit inflation targeting regimes as a response to the instability of the 
money demand function, which made monetary growth rates an unreliable proxy of 
monetary policy and future inflationary pressures. Simplified inflation targeting 
models include an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand equation and are used 
to derive optimal monetary policy reaction functions (see e. g. Svensson, 1997). 
In chapter one, we presented some statistics describing the composition of 
households' wealth. Furthen-nore we presented the channel through which wealth and 
asset prices can affect the real economy. In this section we test the hypothesis that 
lagged asset prices have an effect on the level of the aggregate demand. Due to the 
inconsistencies between purely forward- looking models and actual output data, many 
researchers (see e. g. the references provided in Clarida, Gall and Gertler, 1999) 
suggest the employment of "hybrid" IS-curves, which include both backward- and 
forward- looking elements. Therefore we model the demand-side of the economy as a 
hybrid IS, that is consistent with dynamic optimising behaviour by the agents (micro- 
foundationslo) and also allows for some persistence in output. Thus, our 
specification allows the output gap to be a function of past and expected future 
output, lagged real interest rate, and lagged values of a vector, X, of additional 
explanatory variables. 
+ ýJt-t + I-S + 
l"l-k + vt (4.1) 
12 
is the twelve- month average expost real interest rate. where, 
i=O 
109 Among the others see MaCallurn and Nelson (1999). 
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As we already pointed out there are many channels via which, changes in equity 
prices and house prices affect consumer wealth. Direct effects include the change in 
consumption plans as a response to swings in asset prices (Modigliani, 1971), while 
indirect effects operate mainly via households and firms' balance sheets. There is a 
growing consensus that, apart from the conventional explanatory variables, output is 
also determined by changes in consumption and investment demand induced by 
changes in the level of asset prices. Therefore, the aggregate demand function given 
by Eq. (4.1) is estimated with GMM including house price and stock price inflation. 
HP 0.024 + 0.230ý, -, + 
0.69 --0.464 +0.017zýp +0.0307rt - 31 
1 ý/ 
+3 
11-12 
1 12 12 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (4.2) 
SE = 0.008, J-stat = 0.163 8 [0.8] 
The results indicate that aggregate demand is more affected by its forward-looking 
component (expected future output) since Lý is positive and significant and it has a 
higher magnitude than ý1. The one-year lagged real interest rate is negative and 
strongly significant, as expected. Finally, the magnitude of the wealth effect depends 
among other factors on the share of the respective asset in private sector wealth, with 
housing constituting the most significant asset in the households' portfolio in most 
countries. Indeed, we find that the magnitude of the wealth effect due to stock price 
increases is smaller than the effect due to house price increases. The coefficient of 
stock price inflation is smaller than the coefficient of stock price inflation a result that 
is in line with previous evidence by Goodhart and Hofi-nann (200 1) for the UK. Using 
a panel of 14 developed economies Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001) also find that 
the housing market appears to be more important than the stock market in affecting 
the real economy. Moreover our result is consistent with the IMF results (IMF, 2003) 
that housing wealth has a greater impact than other assets on consumption and 
consequently on output and unemployment. 
Having demonstrated that movements in asset prices affect future aggregate demand 
and consequently also future inflation, in the next section we shall focus on the key 
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empirical question of this chapter, that is, what has been the response of the monetary 
policy instrument to asset price inflation. 
4.5. An Alternative Taylor Rule Specification 
It is generally assumed that the monetary policy interest rate instrument responds 
with fixed, positive weights to deviations of inflation from a pre-specified target and 
deviations of output from its potential level (Taylor, 1993). The past decade has seen 
a vast amount of empirical and theoretical work considering monetary policy reaction 
functions. McCallum and Nelson (1998) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) present 
econometric estimates of the Taylor rule coefficients for the United States. Nelson 
(2000) provides empirical evidence for the United Kingdom under alternative 
monetary policy regimes, over the period 1972-97, prior to the Bank of England 
(BoE) operational independence' 10. Focusing on the inflation, -targeting period 1992- 
1997, Nelson's results suggest that a forward- looking looking Taylor rule 
outperforms a backward looking Taylor rule. His results contradict those of Kuttner 
and Posen (KP) (1999). In contrast with Nelson, who used quarterly data, KP 
employed monthly data over the period October 1992-December 1997 and found a 
coefficient of zero on inflation. Other important differences with the Nelson study 
include the use of the unemployment rate, instead of the real GDP for the 
construction of the output gap proxy, and the employment of the annualised month- 
to-month rather than annual inflation rate. As Nelson argues though, the use of annual 
inflation in the estimated rule is crucial for the results since the BoE's inflation target 
has always been eNpressed in terms of the annual (year-ended), rather than the 
monthly inflation rate. 
Following Clarida et aL (1998) we assume that the Central Bank has an operating 
target for the nominal short term interest rate that is based upon the state of the 
economy. In the benchmark model the state of the economy is characterised by the 
110 See Section 2.3 
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evolution of the output gap and expected inflation. This forward looking behaviour is 
consistent with a central bank that operates in the context of an inflation targeting 
regime (Kent and Lowe, 1997). In each period, the actual interest rate partially 
adjusts towards the target value. Svensson (1997) justifies the partial adjustment 
mechanism by including the change in interest rates in the Central Bank's loss 
function. Combining the target rule with the partial adjustment mechanism we obtain 
the empirical form of the monetary policy reaction function: 
a++ yE, -, 
++u, (4.2) 
I 
where (p, e [0, I] measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing, 6* is the inflation 
target (2.5 0/6), and a= r*- ad* , with r* denoting the long-run equilibrium nominal 
interest rate. Due to the fact that monetary policyrnakers cannot observe y, when 
setting & we replace the actual value of the output gap with its expected level, 
EI-Jýj ; see McCallum and Nelson, 1999, and Orphanides et al., 2000 for a further 
discussion of the uncertainties faced by the policyrnaker with respect to output. The 
error term, ut, represents a white noise monetary policy shock. We consider an 
inflation forecast horizon of one year, therefore we set n equal to 12 in our monthly 
sample. 
In order to estimate the model, unknown expected future variables are replaced with 
their ex post realised values. This leads us to Eq. (4.3): 
II 
(p, 
) 
ja + (pj)ý -i + 
0), (4.3) 
The disturbance ten-n in Eq. (4.3) is a linear combination of the inflation and output 
gap forecast errors and the exogenous monetary policy shock q: 
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Cot -E, [7r, +j+y(ý, -E, -, 
U, ])I+u, 
Eq. (4.3) implies the following set of orthogonality conditions: 
(4.4) 
E ja+p(ir, z =0 (4.5) +n -7r + Yýt + (Pijý -i t 
where Z, represents all the variables in the Central Bank's information set available at 
time t when the interest rate is chosen. Z, is a vector of variables that are orthogonal to 
ul. These instruments are lagged variables that help forecasting inflation and output, 
and contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the exogenous monetary 
policy shock, ut. The benchmark reaction function given by Eq. 0.3) is estimated 
using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The instruments employed in the 
estimation include a constant and six lags of the nominal short-term interest rate, 
inflation, output gap, and a world commodity price index (agricultural raw materials). 
Since the number of instruments is greater than the number of elements of the 
parameter vector [6i, a, d, d], we test for the validity of the over- identifying 
restrictions using the J-statistic. As pointed out by Clarida et al. (1998), failure to 
reject orthogonality implies that the Central Bank considers lagged variables in its 
reaction function, only to the extent that they forecast future inflation or output. 
The GMM estimation results in Table 42, column 2, indicate that the benchmark 
specification satisfies the dynamic stability criterion since the estimated inflation 
coefficient is greater than one (1.02). If a was smaller than the stability threshold 
of one, then this would imply a positively sloped aggregated demand, with output 
decreasing in response to an inflation shock (Taylor, 1999). The output gap 
coefficient, d, is positive and statistically significant at the I% level, although quite 
modest in magnitude (0.03). Its estimate implies that, holding expected inflation 
constant one-percent increase in the level of output gap induces the BoE to raise 
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interest rates by 3 basis points. This result is consistent with those reported by Martin 
and Milas (2001) who employed quarterly LJK data. Therefore, during the inflationý- 
targeting period that we consider, U. K. monetary policy has put more weight on price 
stability than output stabilisation, The sum of the interest rate smoothing parameters 
is close to one (0.92) indicating a high level of persistence in short term interest rates. 
Finally, the J-statistic indicates that the over- identifying restrictions of the benchmark 
model are not rejected. 
Table 41: GMM Estimates of Forward Looking Taylor Rule, 1992: 10-2003: 1 
Benchmark 
Model 
X, X, = 14P I, X, 
a 2.59 * 
1.02 * 
4.00 
1.60 
2.51 
1.01 
4.56 
1.82 
(p, 
0.03 
0.92 
0.04 
0.91 
0.08 
0.91 
0.02 
0.83 
el 0.15 *** - 0.12 *** 
02 - - 0.06 *** 0.07 *** 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0023 0.0022 0.023 0.0030 
J- Stat. 14.10 17.38 21.19 15.51 
QO) 1.7358 1.5502 0.0333 0.1292 
% 12) 19.482 17.897 14.613 17.555 
r Q'(l) - F-0.4496 1.52346 0.1851 1.4029 
As pointed out in the previous section, asset prices contain important information 
about future aggregate demand and consequently inflation pressures. Also, there are 
theoretical arguments in favour of including asset price inflation in the reaction 
function of the Central Bank. Cecchetti et al. (2000) find that, on the basis of 
simulations, it would be desirable to include asset inflation in the Taylor rule. 
Therefore, we proceed by considering alternatives to our benchmark specification, by 
allowing asset prices to enter in the Taylor rule. The augmented reaction functions we 
consider are of the fonn: 
1-2: 9i +2ýg, R, -i EI 
(4.6) 
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where X, -= [x, ... xj, ]', and E=[ 01 ... ej]' 
denote the vector of j-additional 
explanatory variables, and the relevant coefficient vector respectively. In the cases 
that we will examine, Xt contains contemporaneous house price and/or stock price 
inflation. We use contemporaneous, and not expected, asset price inflation due to the 
well known difficulties involved in forecasting asset price moven7ents. Also, weak 
form efficiency implies that the current asset price reflects all past history, thus there 
is no need to incorporate lags. 
First, we allow annual house price inflation to enter the reaction function. The results 
are presented in Table 4.2, column 3. The house inflation coefficient, el, is positive 
and highly significant. Monetary policy tightens in response to increases in house 
prices: a one percent rise in house prices increases interest rates by 15 basis points. 
The response to expected inflation is stronger than in the benchmark case, with a 
smaller standard error. The estimated inflation coefficient is 1.6 close to the 
theoretical value of 1.5, as suggested by Taylor (1993), thus ensuring that real rates 
increase in response to inflationary pressures. Second, we add stock price changes in 
the benchmark model. The estimated coefficient e2, (Table 2, column 3) is still 
positive and statistically significant but its value (0.06) is much smaller as compared 
to house price coefficient. When both asset returns are included (Table 2, column 4), 
the magnitude of the coefficients confirms that hDuse prices enter more significantly 
the monetary policy reaction function, since ei>eý. As in the benchmark specification, 
the J-statistic cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions. 
4.5.1. Accounting for independence 
There is a wide consensus among academics and practitioners that central bank 
independence produces lower average inflation (Cukierman, 1992). Spiegel (1998) 
finds that the BoE independence on May 1997 had a significant negative impact on 
agents' inflationary expectations. In order to account for the change in the underlying 
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regime and preferences we allow the expected inflation coefficient to be different 
post- independence. We therefore introduce a multiplicative dummy variable, D, in 
the reaction function, where Dt =0 prior to independence and I onwards: 
ja ++ yD, )(E, [ir -7r*) + yE, 
I 
PA I+n +I] c -, +V, 
(4.7) 
We would expect the dummy coefficient, i, to be positive and significant indicating 
that the BoE becomes more inflation, -averse, which leads to lower inflation 
expectations. 
Table 43: Estimates adjusted for the Effect of Bank of England Independence, 
Benchmark 
Model 
X, X, Irsp x [Ir IN, Sp 
, 
7r, 
a 4.53 5.85 3.27 5.62 
1.81 2.35 1.30 2.25 
0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 
JU 0.41 0.47 0.61 0.40 
Y- (pi 
1=1 
0.92 0.88 0.89 0.87 
01 0.12 *** - 0.13 *** 
02 - - 0.04 *** 0.03* 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0022 0.0024 0.0022 0.0025 
J- Stat. 13.30 15.76 23.18 15.78 
QO) 1.5358 1.5502 0.533 0.373 
Q(12) 16.482 15.897 14.613 15.405 
Q"(l) 0.357 1.435 0.211 1.009 
Note: 1. Es timates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(I 2) autocorrelation. Two - 
stage least squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal weighting 
matrix. 
2. In the benchmark model the instruments used are a constant and lags I to 6 of the nominal short 
term interest rate, inflation, output gap, and a world commodity price index (agricultural raw 
materials). In the models that include asset price inflation, lags I to 6 of the relevant asset price 
inflation variable are also included. 
3. J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 
4. *, **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
5. Q(n) and Q2(l) are the Q-stats. Derived from the correlogram of the residuals. 
The results in Table 4.3 confirrn our predictions. In the benchmark model, i is equal 
to 0.41 suggesting that post- independence the BoE reacts to one percent increase in 
expected inflation by raising interest rates by an additional 41 basis points. Even 
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when we control for the effect of asset prices, the dummy remains positive and 
significant, reaffirming a higher degree of inflation aversion as a result of 
independence. We notice that the magnitude of the estimated asset inflation 
coefficients does not change. The monetary policy response to house prices is always 
stronger than the one with respect to stock prices. For instance, in the case of both 
assets entering the reaction function, ei is equal to 0.13 and significant at the 1% 
level, while e2 is equal to 003 and significant at the 10%. The coefficient of house 
price inflation in particular is almost double the coefficient of stock price inflation. 
This supports the findings in the previous section where we reported a strong link 
between house price inflation and aggregate demand which induces policy makers to 
track more closely developments in the housing market. 
4.5.2. Historical Performance 
In this section we examine the historical performance of our estimated Taylor rules 
against the actual policy setting of the BoE. In Fig. 4.2, we plot the implied target 
rates from the dummy augmented model. versus the actual short term interest rate. As 
Clarida et aL (1998) point out employment of the target rate as opposed to the fitted 
rate, that includes the lagged interest rate, allows for a better comparison of the 
alternative specifications. Fig. 42(a) uses the target interest rate implied by ihe 
benchmark model, while Fig. 42(b) uses the target rate implied by the asset price 
augmented policy rule"'. 
The target interest rate in Fig. 4.1 (b) has been constructed considering both house price and stock 
price inflation. 
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týiy, -. N, 
Fig. 4.2: Actual and Target interest rate, 1992: 10-2002: 01. 
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It is clear that the benchmark target rate underperforms in capturing actual 
Central Bank behaviour. With the exception of two short periods at the beginning 
and the end of our sample, actual interest rates were consistently higher than the 
rule predicted value. Thus, the BoE was far tighter than the simple benchmark 
forward looking model would predict. When asset prices are allowed to be one of 
the state variables monitored by the Certral Bank, the picture becomes clearer. 
As we notice in Fig. 4.2(b), the target rate tracks the general trend of the actual 
interest rate for most of the period under investigation. Indeed, summary statistics 
presented in Table 44 indicate that when asset prices are not considered, the 
target interest rate is on average more than I% lower than the actual rate. Thus, 
the benchmark Taylor rule does not seem to explain well interest rate setting in 
the UK. The alternative specification produces a target rate which is much closer 
to the actual behaviour in terms of both mean and variability. 
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics of Actual and Taylor Rule Target Interest Rate, 
1992: 10-2002: 1. 
Actual 
Target 
Benchmark 
Target with Asset 
Prices 
Mean 5.83 4.42 5.92 
Median 5.87 4.57 6.03 
Maximum 7.46 6.04 8.24 
Minimum 3.78 2.25 4.11 
Std. Dev. 1 0.82 0.77 1 0.85 
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During the period of strong stock market performance prior to the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, actual monetary policy was looser than the model would predict; 
and then it was somewhat tighter during the first years of independence. One 
possible interpretation of these findings is that the BoE was trying to signal its 
commitment to keep inflation on track, even though some would argue that the 
falling stock market required lower interest rates. A notable divergence of the 
target from the actual occurs after 2001, when the large increases in house prices 
call for much tighter policy than the one followed. 
4.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the empirical reaction of monetary policy to asset prices 
using forward- looking Taylor rule models of interest rates. The intuition for monetary 
policy to consider asset prices lays on the fact that consumption wealth effects and 
investment balance sheet effects may destabilise aggregate demand and inflation, the 
two main variables of interest for the monetary authority. Furthermore, we argued 
that Central Bank as the objective to control financial stability along with monetary 
stability, where the achievement of the latter does not guarantee that the system 
would not move to a fragile state. 
Changes in property prices and stock prices have significant impact on households' 
consumption and firms' investment; this could have severe consequences or the 
stability of the financial system. Using UK data over the period October 1992 to 
January 2003 we showed that movements in asset prices, especially house prices, 
have a significant positive impact on aggregate demand. Demand pressures feed into 
higher future inflation, thus there is scope for an inflation targeting Central Bank to 
consider a model of the economy which includes the direct and indirect effect wealth 
effects deriving from the asset markets. 
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The main contribution of this chapter is to find that policyrnakers in the UK appear to 
take into account both stock price inflation and house price inflation when setting 
interest rates, with the results suggesting that they are more concerned about 
developments in the property market. When the standard forward- looking Taylor rule 
is augmented by house prices and stock prices, the estimated coefficient of house 
price changes is always greater. The benchmark Taylor rule conditions short term 
interest rates upon expected inflation and the output gap and fails to provide an 
accurate characterisation of actual policy. When asset prices are included in the 
reaction function, the implied target rate describes the general trends of the actual 
interest rate much better. In addition, we model the effect of Central Bank 
independence on the policy preferences towards expected inflation. We find that the 
relationship between asset price inflationand interest rates is robust, and that inflation 
aversion increased post- independence. 
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Chapter 5 
The Wealth Effect and the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy 
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5.1 Introduction 
The role of asset prices in the monetary transmission mechanism has been the subject 
of a growing debate in recent literature. As we highlighted in the first chapter, broad 
money channel and troad credit view attribute a great role to asset prices in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. In chapter four we explained that one important 
question arising is that the achievement of price stability in the last ten years is not a 
sufficient guarantee of financial stability. An environment characterized by low 
inflation does not automatically preclude the build up of financial imbalances. This, 
of course, is an issue that has to be addressed by monetary authorities; wnsequently, 
a highly important question for central bankers and economists is if and eventually 
how monetary policy should respond to movements in asset prices. We showed 112 
that interest rate settings by the Bank of England can be better explained by a rule 
which incorporates asset prices. 
In fact, asset prices may serve as part of the objectives that monetary policyrnakers 
pursue, or as part of the information set that they employ (Vickers, 1999). The 
dominant view is that changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to 
the extent that they affect the central bank's forecast of inflation. Some authors favor 
a pro-active monetary policy response to asset price bubbles. Cecchetti et al (2000) 
suggest that the central bank can reduce long term inflation and output volatility by 
adjusting interest rates in response to asset price misalignments even when inflation 
remains on track. Filardo (2000) shows that if monetary policy ignores asset price 
inflation, both consumer price inflation and output becomes less stable. Other authors 
ho, ýwver take a contrarian view: asset prices are too volatile relative to their 
information content and any attempt to include them in a feedback rule for interest 
rates would worsen economic outcomes. Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) allow for 
noný- deterministic bubble processes and suggest that a too aggressive interest rate 
response increases inflation volatility. 
112 See Chapter 4. 
151 
It is often argued that the forward- looking nature of asset prices makes them good 
proxies for the information left out of conventional inflation measures. Goodhart 
(2001) stresses that asset price inflation developments are closely associated with 
general inflation trends. Goodhart and Hoffinan (2000) derive fmancial conditions 
indices that employ assets such as stocks and property in their calculation, and show 
that they are a useful indicator for future consumer price inflation. In any case, as 
Backstr6m (2000, p. 1) argues, "in a regime that explicitly targets inflation, asset 
prices are taken into account via the effects on aggregate demand. Rising share prices 
increase household wealth and that would raise consumption for a given level of 
income if these increases in wealth are considered to be of a permanent nature". Thus, 
the link between asset prices and aggregate demand is crucial in the (Dntext of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Expansionary monetary policy boosts 
asset prices leading to an increase in aggregate demand which feeds into future 
inflationary pressures. 
This chapter examines the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy in 
the context of optimal policy rules. Monetary policy rules have been widely discussed 
in theoretical and empirical literature following the seminal work by Taylor (1993). 
The majority of previous studies use calibrated models to measure the effects on the 
variance of inflation and output from a direct response of monetary policy to asset 
prices. In essence asset prices are considered as one of the elements of the monetary 
authorities' reaction function. Departing from this line of iesearch, we examine the 
case where asset prices enter indirectly the optimal policy rule. This chapter present a 
structural macro model where changes in asset prices affect future inflation indirectly, 
through wealth effects on aggregate demand. In this model asset prices are 
determined exclusively by the fundamentals. The optimal rule is obtained by 
optimizing intertemporally a loss function which includes inflation and output 
variance. The derived optimal rule conditions the current nominal interest rate 
instrument upon concurrent inflation and output, with the weight on inflation being 
lower than in the traditional case of no demand-wealth effect. 
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We extend our model the model to include a more realistic asset price dynamic. We 
allow asset prices to be positively influenced by their past rate of change allowing for 
potential bubble build-up, along with standard revision to ftindamentals. Our results 
suggest that optimal monetary policy should respond to asset price misalignments 
from their fundamental value, with the aggressiveness of the response being a 
positive function of the impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. This result has 
important implications for the conduct of monetary policy and contributes crucially to 
the existing literature, as existing work on optimal rules considering asset prices, 
either fails to find a role for asset prices (Bean, 2003), or obtains complex, non linear 
rules (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002). 
The chapter is organised as follows: in the next section we provide the theoretbal 
background relating asset frices and real economy. Section 5.3 discusses different 
monetary policy approaches which incorporate asset prices. Section 5.4 and 5.4.1 are 
devoted to the construction of the structural macro model and its solution. In section 
5.4.2 we derive the optimal monetary policy rule using stochastic control, while in 
Section 5.4.3 we discuss the results. Section 5.5 extends the model in order to account 
for momentum trading and revision towards the fundamentals in the asset prices, 
Section 5.5.1 show the solution to the model, discussion of the results are in Section 
5.5 2. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.6. 
5.2. The wealth effect and the real economy 
In the last decade or so, it has been recognised that asset prices play an important role 
in determining business cycles conditions. Such a significant impact can be found in 
the role that capital markets play in the modem economic environment they are not 
only the intermediary between surplus and deficit units but they are also creators of 
wealth. 
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In Chapter I we reviewed the role of asset prices in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. First of all, we showed how 1hey can have a positive impact on firms' 
investment level via the Tobin's q theory of investment. Expansionary nonetary 
policy which lowers interest rates makes bonds less attractive relative to stocks and 
results in increased demands for stocks that bids up their price. Combining this with 
the fact that higher stock prices will lead to higher investment spending via Tobin's q 
effect and via lower cost of capital we expect a positive relationship between real 
stock returns and aggregate spending. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) review five 
main theories conceming the causal direction of the underlying positive relationship 
between stock returns and the investment component of output growth. Empirical 
evidence also indicates that the impact of changes in stock prices on investment 
appears to have been particularly strong (see Barro (1990) for the US). Second, the 
higher the asset price level, the higher would be the investors' capital gains. Thus, 
expansionary monetary policy which raises stock prices, increases the value of 
household wealth, thereby increasing the lifetime resources of consumers which 
causes consumption spending to rise. Goodhart and Hoffman (2000) offer empirical 
evidence from 17 developed countries over the period 1972-98 indicating that it is 
important to control for the effect of changes in real stock prices on the aggregate 
demand equation in order to find a significant monetary policy effect 113 . Moreover, 
if 
we accept that the stock market influences real activity, then investor sentiment' 14 
such as fads and fashions that cause stock prices to diverge from their fundamental 
values could also indirectly affect real activity. There is extensive empirical evidence 
that asset price changes tend to lead output growth in industrial countries. Various 
empirical studies have found a positive correlation between lagged stock market 
returns and current output growth. Most of the studies in this area have employed 
U. S. data; see for instance Barro (1990), Fama (1990). Similar evidence was 
presented by Mullins and Wadhwani (1989) for Japan, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, by Choi et al (1999) for the G-7 countries, and by Asprem (1989) for 
several other European countries. Mauro (2000) employed a panel of emerging 
113 For a more general discussion see Poterba (2000). 114 The term investor sentiment refers to beliefs held by some investors that cannot be rationally jusfified. Shiller 
(1984,1987) was among the first to suggest that fads and fashions, as well as ftindamentals, influence asset prices. 
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market economies and advanced economies. He finds, that the correlation is as strong 
in emerging market economies as in advanced economies. 
The third pc)int is frequently referred to as the balance-sheet channel' 15 . When the 
level of asset prices is low, firms have to sustain a risk premium if they want to 
recruit funds in the capital market. These premia depend decisively upon enterprises' 
balance sheet position. The lower the level of the net worth and collateral, the higher 
will be the asymmetric information problems (i. e. moral hazard and agency problem) 
and the corresponding risk premia. In such a framework, monetary policy may affect 
a firms' balance sheet in several ways. For instance, monetary tightening increases 
the interest payment for fmns, reducing the level of cash flow and the net worth. 
Bank lending towards the firms then decreases, resulting in lower investment and 
116 aggregate spending 
Finally another mechanism linking the stock market with aggregate demand is the 
household liquidity effect: expansionary monetary policy boosts returns on stocks and 
leads to a decrease in the perceived level of financial distress of households which in 
tum increases consumption spending. Ludwig and Slok (2001) provide empirical 
evidence supporting a positive link between changes in stock prices-house prices and 
consumption for both market-based and bank-based econc)mies. 
Although the forecasting power of asset prices with respect to output is not clear 117 
the above analysis and the discussion in the first three chapters points in the direction 
of an increased importance of asset prices in the economic decision making process 
of households and firms. Both because an increasing part of households' wealth is 
locked into the stock market and at the same time the amount of firms' external 
financing is increased as never before 118 . With such a central role 
for asset prices, it is 
115 The Balanco-sheet channel or broad credit view channel was extensively revised in Chapter 1. A 
theoretical model was presented in Chapter 3. 
116 Bordo (2000, p. 2) speaks of collateral trap: 'following an asset market crash the economy may fall into a 
collateral trap where firms cannot increase labor and output because they are collateral constrained'. 
111 See for example Stock and Watson (200 1) and Goodhart and Hofirnann (2000). 
118 See Table 1.1 and 1.2 and Table 3.1 and 3.2 
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essential for monetary authorities that pursue an inflation target to take them into 
consideration. This does not assert that the Central Bank should target asset prices, 
but it rather implies that they should be considered for their effect on the aggregate 
demand. The next paragraph presents a review of the main studying relating asset 
prices and monetary policy. 
5.3. Monetary Policy and Asset Markets 
Following the extraordinary expansion of credit markets during the eighties and the 
boom and burst in asset prices in almost all economies, researchers have turned their 
attention to fmancial markets and their development. The broad credit channel and 
the asset price channel provide plausible explanations of how monetary policies 
propagate to the economy. Both channels emphasize that assets prices are likely to 
play an important role in how monetary policy is conducted. According to Bernanke 
and Gertler (2001) "assets booms and busts have been important factors in 
macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries". 
Tbe major debate is not on the role of asset prices in the economy, but rather if and 
eventually how policy makers (i. e. Central Banks) should take into consideration 
information deriving from the asset market. In the literature we can identify three 
views: the irst states that assets prices should be considered but only as one of the 
variables used to forecast inflation. Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that when 
monetary policy operate within a logic of flexible inflation target, it should ignore 
movements in asset prices that do not appear to be generating inflationary or 
deflationary pressures. Changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to 
the extent that they affect the central bank's forecast of inflation; once the predictive 
content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for, there should be no 
additional response of monetary policy to asset-price fluctuations. By focusing on the 
inflationary or deflationary pressures generated by asset price movements, a central 
bank effectively responds to the "toxic" side of asset booms and busts without getting 
156 
into the business of deciding what a fundamental is and what is not. Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999,2001) argue that the potential costs of responding to asset price can be 
quite large because asset prices can be too volatile relative to their information 
content. In fact, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) show that a too-aggressive response to a 
stock price bubble can create significant harm in the economy. Batini and Nelson 
(2000) find an analogous result for bubbles in the real exchange rate. 
A second view is expressed by Goodhart (1999)119. He believes that the Central Bank 
should target a broader price index one that includes asset prices. This measure has 
the potential to improve macroeconomic performance if asset prices reliably predict 
future consumer price inflation. He explicitly writes: "My dictionary defines inflation 
as a fall in the value of money, not a rise in consumer price index. If I spend my 
money now on obtaining a claim on future housing services by buying a house, or on 
future dividends by buying an equity, and the price of that claim on housing or on 
dividends goes up, why is that not just as much inflation as when the price of current 
gods and services rises? " (Goodhart, 2001, p. 3). The theoretical foundation of 
Goodhart's recommendation is based on the pioneering research on the theory of 
inflation measurement by Alchian and Klein (1973). They argue that since asset 
prices represent the current money prices of claims on future, as well as current, 
consumption, an accurate measure of inflation should include asset prices. They also 
argued that asset prices can serve as good proxies for the inflation information left out 
of conventional measures. Using a VAR methodology they find that the Financial 
Condition Index is a useful instrument to forecast in-sample future inflation120. If a 
central bank were to follow Goodhart's recommendation and use this broader 
measure of inflation, an increase in asset price inflation could prompt tig1ter 
monetary policy even if conventionally measured inflation were low and stable. As 
Filardo (2000) argued though, this policy implication depends on the strong 
"9 Goodhart (200 1) writes: "So long as asset price changes are not incorporated in the measure of 
inflation which the authorities are required to stabilize, the authorities are likely to eTress audible 
worries about 'exuberance' and 'sustainability', but in practice 
find themselves largely incapable of 
any (pre-emptive) action in response to asset price change themselves 
in advance of any 
consequential) effects coming through onto current goods and services prices, paralysed 
in practice". 
20 Out-of sample results do not seem to provide satisfactory results. 
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assumption that asset price inflation accurately reflects future consumer price 
inflation. 
The third view is that asset prices should be made an integral part of monetary policy, 
policy makers should try to act to stabilize their value around the fundamentals. 
Cecchetti, et al. (1999) argue that a central bank concerned in stabilizing inflation 
about a specific target level is likely to achieve superior perfon-nance by adjusting its 
policy instruments not only in response to its forecast of future inflation and the 
output gap as the traditional Taylor rule would suggest but to asset prices as well. 
They demonstrate that monetary policyrnakers should react to perceived 
misalignments in asset prices to reduce the likelihood of asset price bubbles forming. 
More generally Cecchetti (2000, p. 24) analyzing objectives and rule of monetary 
policy makers reach the conclusion that a complex rule is always more advisable than 
a simple Taylor rule. He states that "there is no reason to believe that information on 
output and inflation is always capable of adequately summarizing what policy needs 
to do to respond to the shocks hitting the economy". Bernanke and Gertler (200 1) are 
very critical of the methodology used by Cecchetti et al. (1999). They argue that if 
Cecchetti et al. had accounted for stochastic, instead of deterministic, asset price 
bubbles, and also if they allow for the possibility that shocks other than a bubble may 
be driving asset prices, they would have found no useftil role for asset prices beyond 
that which is reflected in expectations for future inflationl2l. Filardo (2001) shows 
that while there are benefits for the monetary authority to respond to asset price 
changes even when it cannot distinguish between the "bubble" and the "fundamental" 
part of the asset price inflation, the monetary authority's desire to respond to asset 
prices falls dramatically as its preference to smooth interest rates rises. He argues that 
even though asset prices contain useful infori-nation about inflation and output, the 
cost in terms of interest rate volatility can be so high as to cause the monetary 
authority to largely disregard the information. This result is consistent with Bernanke 
121 Cecchetti et al. "optimize" the policy rule with respect to a single scenario, a bubble shock lasting 
precisely five periods, rather than with respect to the entire probability distribution of shocks, 
including shocks other than bubble shocks. Effectively, their procedure yields a truly optimal policy 
only if the central bank knows with certainty that the stock market boom is driven by non- 
fundamentals and knows exactly when the bubble will burst, both highly unlikely conditions. 
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and Gertler's conclusion that by responding to stock prices, a central bank could 
worsen economic outcomes. In another paper Filardo (2000) concludes that a 
monetary authority generally benefits from responding to asset prices only as long as 
there is no uncertainty about the macroeconomic role of asset prices. If monetary 
authority is uncertain about whether asset prices have an independent role in the 
context of a macro-model or simply reflecting other economic fundamentals, then the 
expected costs in terrns of economic volatility of responding to asset prices may 
exceed the expected benefits. The INW (2000) also warns that since asset markets 
place greater reliance on information and are generally more competitive than some 
goods and labour markets, macroeconomic policy authorities should be extra cautious 
when pitting their judgment against those of the market. Another argument against 
asset price inflation targeting is that all asset pricing models empirical predictions are 
subject to wide margins of error, and they involve the modelling of noný-directly 
observable expectations on the underlying determinants of asset prices. 
To shed some light on the above discussion, in the next section we construct a 
structural dynamic model where macroeconomic aggregate demand is driven by asset 
prices. We extend and modify the model first presented in Kontonikas and 
Montagnoli (2003). We consider two distinct cases: in the first we allow the asset 
market to be exclusively driven by ftindamentals. In the second we include the idea 
that asset markets are volatile and prices do not always reflect the value of the 
fundamentals; thus we model asset prices as dependent from their past rate of change 
and on the deviation from fundamental. 
5.4. The Theoretical Framework 
We use a structural model of the economy that allows for the effect of changes in 
asset prices on aggregate demand. The model is given by the following equations: 
7r, 
11 -:: 
)Tt Ol yl +1 
+ El I (5.1) 
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q, + yI+l 
Ply/ 
-0201 -Et[7ý1+1 
1) + 03 
-E,, 1[7rt+21) +72Y I+ I +Ul+ I 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
where yj is the deviation of (log) output from its stead), Lstate level (output gap), 
ir, = p, - p, is the inflation rate (strictly, the deviation from target), pt is (log) price 
level, it is the monetary policy instrument (one-period nominal interest rate), qt 
denotes (log) real asset prices. Different interpretations of q, are possible (e. g. house 
prices, stock prices or the value of a portfolio containing both housing and equity 
investment), in what follows though we mainly treat it is an equity index. ij,, E,, u, 
represent exogenous random shocks to aggregate demand, inflation, and asset price 
fundamentals. For simplicity, we assume that they are mutually uncorrelated ild 
processes with zero means and constant variances. The structural parameters can be 
interpreted as partial elasticises with the following properties: 0<P, <1; a, P, y, 
, y,; 0,0 0. Similar specification has been used by Svensson (1997) and Rudesbusch 
and Svensson (1999), with the difference that their model exhibits a two -periods 
control lag for inflation. This allows us to compare our results with a model which is 
standard in the literature. Furthermore the adoption of a backward- looking model 
instead of a forward-looking one gives us the possibility to solve the model 
analytically. 
Eq. (5.1) is an accelerationist (or backward- looking NAIRU type) Phillips Curve 
where the change in inflation is a positive function of the current output gap and the 
inflation shock. The presence of inflation inertia in the inflation equation implies that 
disinflations will be costly in tenns of output losses, thus there is a short-run trade-off 
between inflation and output. However, since lagged inflation enters Eq. (5.1) with 
unity coefficient, this specification implies a vertical long-run Phillips curve. Eq. 
(5.1) posits no role for expected future inflation in the inflation adjustment 
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equation 122 . Fuhrer (1997) employed US inflation data and argued that 
forward 
looking expectations are unimportant empirically. The parameter a is a positive 
constant which measures the sensitivity of inflation to excess demand. 
The demand side, as given by Eq. (5.2), is consistent with the specification employed 
by Walsh (1998), Ball (1997), and Svensson (1997), Wth one important difference: 
aggregate demand depends positively on the past level of asset prices via 
consumption wealth effects and investment balance sheet effects. For example, a 
persistent increase in the level of asset prices decreases the perceived level of 
households' financial distress causing a boost in consumption spending. The balance 
sheet channel implies a positive relationship between the firms' ability to borrow and 
their net worth which in turn depends on asset valuations. There is a vast amount of 
empirical evidence indicating that stock and house price movements are strongly 
correlated with aggregate demand in most major economies 123 . Parameter d3 in the 
aggregate demand equation is of crucial interest since it indicates the magnitude of 
wealth effects. If there are no wealth effects then d3= 0 and Eq. (5.2) resembles a 
traditional dynamic IS curve. In our model, the central bank takes into account the 
effect of wealth on aggregate demand; that is, it is fully aware of the effect of q, on 
y,,, and its magnitude. 
The third equation describes the behaviour of the stock market. Fundamental real 
equity returns are negatively related to current real interest rate and positively to 
current output. This is supported by the majority of empirical studies examining the 
effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market 124 . Financial theory posits that 
stock prices equal the expected present value of futtre net cash floWS125 . Holding 
everything else equal, higher interest rates are associated with lower stock prices, 
given the higher discount rate for the expected stream of cash flows. The 
122 Rudebusch (2002) considers the hybrid Phillips curve: 7r, +, +(I -y, 
)Ejir,, j+ay, +, +E, +,, and 
points out that the accelerationist Phillips curve Co 11 1) can be derived from well-known models of 
price-setting behavior (see e. g. Roberts, 1995). 
123 See the estimate of Eq. 4.1. 
124 See among others Fama (198 1), Conover Jensen and Johnson (1999). 
121 It is assumed that capital gains in the stock market are positively related to expected future dividends which are 
themselves proportional to current output. 
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conventional view suggests that a restrictive monetary policy environment serves as 
bad news for the stock as it is generally associated with higher future interest rates 
and lower level of economic activity. In contrast, an expansive monetary environment 
signals higher average real equity returns, as these periods are usually associated with 
lower future interest rates and increases in economic activity The stochastic error 
term, q, , represents the non fundamental component of stock returns. Here, for 
simplicity, it is assumed to be zero mean and constant variance, 6,, 2. In other words, in 
the context of this study we do not allow for asset price bubbles. 
The structure of the model implies that monetary policy affects the stock market 
contemporaneously, and inflation and output with one period lag. At time t the certral 
bank chooses the optimal i, which affects current period's real returns and next 
period's inflation and output; contemporaneous inflation and output, 0, , y, are 
predetermined. 
5.4.1 Solution of the model with perfect capital market 
Substituting fDr lagged real stock returns, R, in the aggregate demand Eq. (5.2) and 
using the expectational version of Eq. (5.1) to eliminate E, [irl, I] we get: 
7r, - a, Ej y, j) Yt+l (A + ß3Y2)yt - 
02 + ß3'YI)('( 
where Vl+l :::::: 
AUI + 171+1 
Taking expectations on both sides, conditional upon time t information, gives: 
(5.4) 
01 + 03Y2 02 + 03YI 
E, [yl+l I =61YI -32 (it -Irl) where 6, =-1 
62 = 
1- al(02 + 03Y) 1- al (P 2+ 
03)'1) 
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Using the above expression to eliminate E, [y,,, ] from Eq. (5.4) and rearranging, 
yields: 
101 + 0372) + (02 + 03yda, b, ]y, (02 + P3y, Xl+ a, 152)(, - 1r) + Vl, l 
Following Walsh (1998), since 61 , y, are predetermined when it is chosen we can 
define bt as the control variable of the central bank, where 6t is given by: 
(PI = NA + ß3Y2 )+ 02 + ß3y, )a, 8, IYI - 
02 + ß3y, )('+a, 82)(, -7Q (5.5) 
Using the definition of bt the Phillips Curve and the AD Eq s. (5.1) and (5.2) can be 
re-written as: 
yl, I= 91 + VI+ 1 (5. F) 
7rt +1 --.,: 7r, a, ýo, + (o, , 
where o),,, = E,,, +av,,, 
5.4.2 Optimal interest rate rule 
The central bank objective is to solve the following stochastic control problem: 
choose an infinite sequence of controls to minimise the expected discounted value of 
the intertemporal quadratic loss function: 
1 00 
min- Ej P'Firt+i (T)+ Ay, +i 
(ýp)] 
for,, 2 i=l - 
subject to the transition Eq. s (4.1 ') and (5.2 1) 
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where i :,: - 0 is the relative weight attached by the central bank on output stabilisation 
for notational simplicity, we assume zero to be the target values of inflation and the 
output gap. a is the discount factor, 0<a <1. It is evident from (52) that at time t, 
when the interest rate (and consequently 6t) is chosen the only state variable is J, 
Therefore, the value function is defined in terms of 0, only. 
1 00 
min - E, + y, ' 2, 
(ýp)] (5.6) 
Bellman's dynamic programming principle then implies that: 
V(ir, )= min E, [-yI(7r, +, +py, 
'+, )+ OV(7r, 
+, 
)] 
vt 
If we substitute the 2 constraints (5.1 ') and (5.2') in (5.7) we get: 
(5.7) 
V(ir, )-- min Ejl[(ir, +a, q +(t), +, 
)'+y((p, +v, +, 
)'] +PV(ir, +a, (p, +(o, +, )l 2 (Pt 
(5.8) 
The first order condition that yields the optimal response is: 
a 
V(ir (a, ' + y) ýo, + a, ir, +0 aE, V'(ir,,, ) =0 (5.9) 
Employing the envelope theorem and re-arranging we o tain 126 : 
+ y)(p, + a, lip E, [(p, +, 
10<:: > (PI =-2 
al Irl +2 
(a, 
+ ju 
(a, 
126 See Appendix A. I for more details. 
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Since we have aI inear- quadratic structure in the stochastic control problem the 
optimal policy rule will be of the form 
Or I (5.11) 
Thus the optimal control will be linear function of the state variable. Updating one 
period ahead and taking expectations at time t of (5.11) yields: 
E, [(p, 
+, 
]=cE, [7r,,, ]=cE, [ir, +a, (p, +(t), +, 
]=c(ir, +Lýg, )=g, +cL-ýg, 
+ ca, )(p, (5.12) 
Substitution of ý. Il) and 0.12) in (5.10) yields the following quadratic whose 
solution gives the optimal c value: 
(iloa, )C2 + (/Ip _aJ2 _4)C _ 0ý = (5.13) 
The solution we accept has to filfil the inflation process stability criterion. This 
condition implies that only the negative croot is accepted 127 Yinally, we obtain the 
optimal interest rate, it, by using Eq. (5.5) and Eq. (5.11), and substituting for iji and (12 
iI= f")r, + fyy, 
where: 
c+ 
ca and f =A+ 
03Y2 
02+0371 1y P2+ A'r, 
(5.14) 
Eq. (5.14) resembles a conventional Taylor rule where the nominal interest rate is a 
linear function of inflation and output gap. 
"' See Appendix A. 2 for more details. 
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5.4.3. Discussion of the results 
In the standard case of the no wealth effects, 0, is equal to zero in Eq. (5.2) and the 
system would be formed by a typical AS/AD model. In such specification the optimal 
weights on inflation and output would be: 
c +ca, and f*--A 02 y 02 
Comparing the standard case with our results, we notice that the optimal response of 
monetary policy to inflation should be smaller f6 < J*j since c< 0). The intuition 
underneath is that the negative effect on inflation from a monetary tightening would 
be more amplified when the there are significant wealth effects. With respect to the 
output coefficient we notice that the final result depends upon the relative effects of 
real interest rates and output on the stock market (respectivelyy, and y, ). If yý > y, 
andA> P, then f, < fl* ; This implies a weight on output lower than the benchmark 
,; 
When the asset prices case. On the other hand, if y, < y, and A< P, therif >f 
are more sensitive to output rather than interest rates, the model suggests that the 
central bank should adopt more aggressive interest policy with respect to output. 
We now examine the effect of the underlying structure of the model on the policy 
parameters, by calculating he partial derivatives of f, and f, with respect to 
YI; 72; 03 
Table 5.1. Partial Derivatives 
71 72 03 
fir 
C 03 
<0 
(02 + 03'yl )2 
0 
cy, 
- <0 02 + 03Y] )2 
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+0 
)0 0 
72 Ol + P372 VI 
fy 372 3<0 (A 
(02 + 03) t1 )2 
3 
02 + 93 YFI 
0 )2 A+ 03YI) A+ 03 YI 
The results presented in Table 5.1 lead to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: The higher the elasticity of asset prices to real interest rate, y, , the 
smaller is the optimal interest rate weight on both inflation and output. 
This result can be interpreted on the basis that Central Bank actions exert a double 
effect on real economy. This happens because an increase in interest rates not only 
will have a direct negative impact on the fmns' level of investment but will also 
depress consumption via a reduction in realised capital gains, leading to a greater- 
than-before decrease in aggregate demand and inflation. 
Proposition 2: The higher the response ofassetprices to output, 72 , the 
higher is the 
weight that the Central Bank attaches to output. 
The intuition behind is that, according to the model, output expansion is associated 
with asset price increases that feed into even higher future output. Therefore, when 
asset prices are strongly pro-cyclical a stronger response is required by the Central 
Bank in order to achieve output stabilisation. 
Proposition 3: The stronger the wealth effect, 0, the smaller the optimal weight on 
inflation. 
Therefore, when the role of capital markets as creator of wealth and collateral is taken 
into account, the magnitude of the interest rate adjustment should be smaller. This 
does not imply that the Central Bank intervenes less frequently. In fact, if the true 
data generation process for output is given by the augmented IS (Eq. 5.2), then 
monetary policy may have to be more frequently readjusted. Proposition 3 suggests 
that a too aggressive interest rate change might be beneficial in the short-run, but as 
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wealth effects build up, this policy may threaten the mediumý- long run objective of 
stable prices' 28 
128 On the other hand no clear result emerges on the weight attached on output since afy >0 
if 02Y2 > 0171 and 
aA, 
afy. <0 if 92'Y2 < Plyl 
1303 
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5.5 Accounting for misalignments in asset prices 
The specification adopted above in Eq. (53) was a process derived from standard 
dividend theory. The approach is appealing for it straightforwardness, but its practical 
application is quite limited, in fact asset prices do seem to be characterised by high 
129 periods of volatility and "iriationality" 
In this section we account for potential bubble build-up in the dynamic of the asset 
prices. The model would be then given by the following equation: 
7r, +, :: -- ir, + ay, +, + E, +, (5.15) 
yl+l ' (5.16) -: ": 
0YI- 02 Ot 
-Et 
[7t+l 1) + 03 + 77,1 
bAq, (q, 
-, - q; 
) 
1 
E, [ir, 
-, I])+ 
62E, [y,, 1] + u, (5.18) 
Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16) describe the aggregate supply and demand and are identical to 
Eqs. (5 1) and (5.2). As before the structural parameters can be interpreted as partial 
elasticises with the following properties: 0<0, <; a, 
PI 
1 
615 62 
1b>0; 
03 0 0' 
The main contribution of this section lies within Eqs. (5.17). With Eq. (5.18) it 
represents the dynamic evolution of asset prices and their underlying fundamentals, 
respectively. We assume a partial adjustment mechanism of actual asset prices 
towards their fundamental value that allows for the appearance of a bubble build-up. 
As Eq. (5.17) indicates, if asset prices have increased in the past (Xq,, l > 0) there is a 
positive 'momentum' effect on their current level (b > 0). In essence, investors bid up 
the demand for asset holdings in expectation that past capital gains will persist in the 
future. The higher the value of b, the stronger the effect from past asset price changes 
and therefore q, can diverge significantly from its fundamental value, qt*, albeit not 
129 See Chapter 3 for a brief description of the irrationality underlining the asset market boom and 
crash in the UK in late eighties early nineties. 
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permanently 13 0. But once asset prices revert, at an unknown future date, the 
downward effect on aggregate demand could be large. We allow fir reversion to 
fundamentals since if there is an decrease in the fundamentals (qt* < qt-I ) there is a 
negative pressure on qj. 
As before Eq. 0.18) describes fundamental asset prices in line with the standard 
dividend model of asset pricing. There is a positive effect from expected future 
dividends (assumed to depend on expected output) and a negative effect from real 
interest rates. This is supported by the majority of empirical studies examining the 
131 
effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market 
5.5.1. Optimal interest rate rule with asset prices misalignments 
Substituting for fundamentals, q, *, in Eq. (5.17) we get an alternative expression for 
real asset prices: 
q, = bAq, -, -Iq, -1 
+ (5ý (i, - E, [ir, ]) - 82E, Lv,,, ]-u, I (5.19) 
Then, following the same methodology applied in Section 5.4.1, we obtain the 
following solutions: 
7r, +1 ::::::: 
7r, aý, a), 
+ 
where a), ::::::: El, + av, +, and V, +, 
:::::: 
03 ul + ý1+1 * 
The control variable, 6,, is now: 
(5.15') 
(5.16') 
130 We do not regard the divergence of q, from q, 
* as an explicit bubble because we do not assign any 
probabilistic structure to its evolution. 
1 See among others Fama (198 1). 
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ý, =ýy, - /ý (i, - ir, ) +, ý (bAq, -, - q, -, 
) 
where: 
1-[a( 
A 
03151 + P2 + 03 452 
03 
-[a(0345, +02)+03321 
P3451 + P2 
[a(P345, 
+ P2 )+ P3452 
(5.20) 
Again we define the central bank loss function in terms of inflation and output 
volatility, what changes here are the constrains that the authorities have to face: 
00 
min - Et lv, r, 2 j=1 
dpi 
subject to the transition Eqs. (5.15') and (5.16'). 
32 Solving the dynamic optimisation problem' , using Eq. ý. 20), substituting for 
,ý, ý, and re- arranging we obtain the optimal path for the interest rate: 
c[I-A] 
7r, + 
ol 
Y, +A (bAq, 
-, - q, -, 
) 
03151+02 P3451+02 03451+ 02 
where A= a(P, 6, + P, ) + P, 6, 
(5.21) 
The solution that we accept should satisfy the inflation process stability criterion. 
133 This condition implies that only the negative c-root is accepted 
Eq. (5.21) can be transformed into a more intuitive expression by recalling that 
according to the asset price Eq. (5.17): 
q, = bAq, -, - q, -, 
+ q, * <: z> bAq, -1 - q, -, = q, - qt* 
132 We apply the same methodology as presented in Section 5.4.2. 
133 See Appendix A. 2 for more details. 
(5.22) 
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Hence, via Eq. (5.2), the final expression for the optimal interest rate rule is: 
i 
-f [q, -q, ' f: 7r7ýl+fYyl+fq-q* 
I 
(5.23) 
where fr 
c[l- A] 
9 fy =-A . >O 
f*= 
03 
> 0, are the respective 03451 +A P331 +A q-q P3151 + 92 
interest rate weights on inflation, output and asset price misalignments from 
fundamentals. The 'Taylor principle' implies that the inflation coefficient, f should 
exceed the value of one, to ensure a real interest rate response that will lead to lower 
inflationý 34 
. 
5.5.2 Discussion of the results 
The rule for adjusting nominal interest rates shown in Eq. (5.23), signifies a 
fundamental new result in the interest rates rules literature, since we show that the 
central bank should not only take into consideration inflation and output when setting 
interest rates, but should also react to asset price misalignments. Bean (2003) also 
assumes that the aggregate demand is augmented by wealth effects, but the results 
that he obtains for optimal policy differ significantly from the ones presented in this 
section. In particular, he finds no role for asset prices in the commitment and 
discretionary equilibrium. Bean's optimality conditions contain neither the policy 
instrument, nor anything to do with the demand side of the economy. 
In our results, the aggressiveness of the reaction to asset price misalignments depends 
upon the impact of wealth effects in aggregate demand. If there are significant wealth 
effects, P, > 0, then the central bank should raise interest rates in response to 
increasing asset price misalignments (f .> 0). 
Such a pro-active response has also q-q 
134 As we show in Appendix A. 3, this condition is consistent withA < 1. 
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been advocated by Cecchetti et al (2000) using the Bernake and Gertler (1999) new 
Keynesian sticky wages - financial accelerator model. 
A common feature in the aforementioned studies is that they assume, rather than 
derive, a rule for interest rate setting and then examine the effects on macroeconomic 
volatility forn reacting or not reacting to asset prices. Our main focus however, was 
to show that in the context of optimal central bank behaviour, asset price 
misalignments should be an element in the monetary authority's feedback rule. 
Hence, this chapter extends tie literature that obtains analytical expressions for 
interest rates based upon optimization of the central banks' objectives. The 
augmented Taylor rule depicted by Eq. (5.23) points out explicitly that the financial 
instability associated with growing financial imbalances should not be tolerated by 
the central bank. 
It is easy to show that the standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) can be obtained as a 
special case of our augmented rule. In the absence of a link between aggregate 
demand and asset prices, i. e. 0, =0, there is no scope for monetary policy to react to 
asset prices 
(fq-q* 
: -- 0 ), and the feedback rule which implements the optimal policy 
takes the fonn of a Taylor rule with interest rates being an increasing function of 
inflation and the output gap. 
i, = f* Z, + f, * 
(5.24) 
c 
where the inflation and output gap weights are given by: f-+ ca, f, 02 02 
In order to examine the impact of asset prices on the interest rate setting behaviour of 
the central bank, we calculate the partial derivative of the reaction coefficients in Eq. 
(5.23) with respect to the magnitude of wealth effect, P, The results, presented in 
Table 52, lead to Propositions 4 to 6. 
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Table 51: Partial derivatives of interest rate reaction coefficients with respect to 
wealth effect parameter, A* 
f f, fil ý 
* 
-q 
aflaP3 
COA + 31) 
<0 
2 
A 61 
<0 
P2 
> 
(03451 +02 ) (03151 + P2 )2 (9361 + P2 )2 
Proposition 4: The stronger the wealth effect, 0, the smaller is the optimal interest 
rate weight on inflation. 
Proof: Since 6,1 (0361+02 )2 >0 and c<0 it is implied that: Of, lap, <0. 
Proposition 5: The stronger the wealth effect, P,, the smaller is the optimal interest 
rate weight on output gap. 
Proof. Since P,, 31, ( P3(51 + P2 )2 > 0, it is implied that: afylaP3 <0' 
Thus, when the role of capital markets as creator of wealth and collateral is taken into 
account, the magnitude of the inflation related- interest rate adjustment should be 
smaller. This does not imply that the Central Bank intervenes less frequently. In fact, 
if the true data generation process for aggregate demand is gven by the augmented 
IS, Eq. (5.16), then monetary policy may have to be more frequently adjusted. 
Proposition I suggests that as wealth effects build up, a too aggressive interest rate 
response to inflation will lead to recession and will threaten the price stability 
ob ective. In addition Proposition 5 calls for a less pronounced response to the output j9 
gap in the presence of significant correlation between asset prices and aggregate 
demand. 
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Proposition 6: The stronger the wealth effect, 0, the larger is the optimal interest 
rate weight on assetprice misalignmentsfrom fundamentals. 
Proofi. Since 02 9 (03051 + 
02 )2 >0, it is implied that: af . q-q 
laP3 > 0' 
The intuition and policy implications of Propositions 4 and 5 become clearer when 
considered h combination with Proposition 6 In essence, if aggregate demand is 
affected by the evolution of asset prices then monetary authorities should include 
asset price misalignments in their optimal feedback rule and there should be a change 
in the distribution of the relevant interest rate weights. Particularly, the interest rate 
weight on inflation and output decreases while the weight attached to asset price 
misaligm-nents increases. This allows asset prices to be considered as an element of 
the authorities' reaction function without necessarily implying overall fighter, than 
before, policy since the response to inflation and output will be less aggressive. In 
other words, our optimal analysis results imply that first, asset price misalignments 
should have an independent role and not only be considered as instruments to help 
forecast output and inflation; and second, there should be a shift in the magnitude of 
reaction, away from the traditional variables, i. e. inflation and the output gap, and 
towards a direct response to financial imbalances. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Although there is no agreement among economists whether central banks should 
target asset price inflation, there is a vast consensus that the asset prices channel plays 
an important role in the transmission of the monetary policy. Starting from these 
considerations, in the first part of this chapter we builds a backward looking structural 
macro model where capital gains have an impact on aggregate demand and 
consequently on inflation. Here the level of asset prices is determined entirely 
by the 
level of the fundamental, namely current real interest rate and current output. The 
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central bank solves a stochastic control problem in order to minimise intertemporally 
the variance of output and inflation. Comparing our results with the standard Taylor 
rule, we find fiat the optimal policy in the presence of wealth effects attaches less 
weight on inflation in setting interest rate. Furthermore, the higher the sensitivity of 
asset markets to interest rates, the lower should be the monetary authorities' response 
to deviations of output and inflation from their long ten-n trends. This is believed to 
be the result of the double effect of monetary policy on the real economy. In essence, 
along with the traditional interest rate channel, monetary policy affects aggregate 
spending via changes in asset prices. In the optimal interest rate feedback rule, the 
inflation coefficient is negatively related to the magnitude of the wealth effects and to 
the preference for output stabilisation. 
In the second part of the chapter we extend the model to account for momentum 
treading and revision toward the fundamentals to affect asset prices. The derived 
optimal policy rule conditions the monetary policy instrument not only on inflation 
and demand pressures, as standard in the Taylor rule literature, but also on financial 
imbalances, as represented by asset price misalignments from fundamentals. The 
magnitude of the interest rate reaction depends, among other factors, on the relative 
importance of wealth effects for aggregate demand. The response to asset price 
deviations from fundamentals becomes more aggressive as wealth effects build up, 
hence when the risk of financial instability increases, while the reaction to inflation 
and the output gap becomes less pronounced. Thus, our main contribition is to 
extend the optimal monetary policy literature towards recognizing that, in the 
presence of wealth effects, monetary authorities should grant an independent role to 
asset price misalignments and not only regard them as instruments to forecast 
inflation and output. Future work should consider an open economy model, where the 
firms' financing and the households' capital gains derive not only from domestic but 
also from foreign Capital markets. 
In the end we recognize that our result could be criticized by those who do not 
believe that Central Banks have superior advantage in identifying a bubble in the 
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financial markets and equilibrium asset value are difficult to estimate. This, however. 
should not stop monetary authorities to try to identify misalignment in asset prices. 
Equilibrium levels in other variables (i. e. GDP) are also difficult to estimate, and 
inflation forecasts are notoriously imprecise, but they are constantly check and 
estimated by Central Banks. 
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Appendix Al 
We employ the envelope theorem in order to derive an expression for E, V'(z,, 
-, 
) in 
Eq. (8): 
dV(ir, ) = E, 
(jr/2 
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. )] 
Using (2)' we obtain: 
E, V'(ir, 
-, ý) 
Multiplying (Al. 1) by a, and adding it to (8) we get: 
a, V . K) = -P(pl - (A 1.2) 
If we multiply this expression by d lead it by one period and take expectations based 
in information at time t we get: PaE, V'(7r, +, 
) = -ppE, [Tl+l ]. 
Thus, (8) can be re-written as: 
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Appendix A2 
The quadratic equation whose solution gives the optimal c value is: 
(,, pal )C2 + (YO _aJ2 _p)C _ Cý =0 
The two roots of (A2.1) are given by 
c= -go 
+a, ' +p± 
4go +2 goct 12 -2 g 
2p +a 14 +2 al2g + g2 
2ppa, 
Recalling that according to Eq. (2)' inflation is given by: 
,jtA+ cOt+i -:::::: 
7r, + LI (c7r, )+ (t), <z> 7r, + a, c)7r, + 0), +, K =:: Ir + q( 
Therefore, stability of the inflation process requires that 
(A2.1) 
(A2.2) 
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jl+týc I< I <z> -I <1+ac<1<---> 
-2 <c< 
Lý 
Since al >0 it implies that only the negative 
e cýroot is accepted. 
Appendix A3 
(A2.3) 
The inflation parameter in the interest rate reaction function, f has to be greater 
than one in order to satisfy the stability condition that real rates increase in response 
to inflation, with higher values implying a more aggressive response: 
c[I-A] 
>I (A3.1) P3451 + P2 
This condition can be re-expressed as: 
c[I-A] 
<0 (A3.2) 03451 +02 
As we showed in Appendix A2, only negative values of parameter c are accepted. 
Since p, 6, + P, > 0, it is implied that: 
I-A >0 <=>A <1 (A3.3) 
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Conclusion 
Given the recent expansion in financial markets and new dewlopments in 
macroeconomic analysis, the purpose of the thesis was twofold: 
" First we wanted to explore the role of Industrial and Commercial Companies 
flow of funds in the monetary transmission mechanism and in the business 
cycles. 
" Second we wanted to investigate the link between asset prices and monetary 
policy. 
We now present a synopsis of our findings and the main contributions of the thesis. In 
Chapter 2 we investigated if firms' external funds are important in determining the 
short-run response or inflation following a monetary policy shock. In order to identify 
the unexpected change in the monetary policy instrument we define a vector of three 
variables: the non-policy variables were Retail Price index and Real GDP defined as 
difference from its long-run trend. We underline that the inclusion of these variables 
in levels would have not produced the correct policy innovation since the Central 
Bank loss function is defined in term of deviation from a trend (when it exists) and 
this specification should be preserved when a VAR study is employed. The short term 
interest rate was the monetary policy instrument. This ordering of the variables 
implied that the Central Bank instrument reacts within the quarter to the non, -policy 
variables while it does affect output and inflation only in the following quarter. We 
ordered last a variable identifying the monetary transmission mechanism. The main 
result and contribution to the existing literature is that monetary policy has not only an 
effect on the demand side of the economy but also on the supply side. This suggests 
that an increase in the short term interest rate has an immediate positive impact on the 
level of inflation; the reason for this is not, as frequently referred to in the literature as 
a puzzle or the tesult of a misspecification, but rather the result of a squeeze in the 
amount of internal funds available to Industrial and Commercial Companies. They, 
therefore, need to borrow in order to carry on production; this, in turn, increases 
firms' marginal costs and consequently the price level. This result is quite striking, 
although not entirely surprising, and can have important policy 
implications. The first 
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is that the financial stability of the whole economy could be at risk in the presence of 
prolonged unexpected rises in interest rates. In fact our results suggest that a positive 
shock in the monetary instrument weaken the firms' balance sheets reducing the 
assets and increasing the liabilities, via an increase in the cost of capital. This creates 
in the short-run a cost-push inflation, which persists for roughly a year after the shock 
occurs. 
In Chapter 3 we suggested that in the presence of asymmetric information capital 
markets are themselves a source of financial instability. We made use of the Kalman 
Filter technique to estimate the contribution of firms' external finance to investment. 
Data of flow of funds of Industrial and Commercial Companies in the United 
Kingdom in the last thirty years were employed. Our results support Mayer's (1988) 
idea that interrial funds are the most important source of financing for UK companies. 
The most important result emerging from the analysis is that Minsky's financial 
instability hypothesis could explain the dynamic of the 1990-92 recession. In fact we 
have found that most of the external capital was used to finance "speculative" 
investment rather than "productive" investment for the period antecedent (to) the 
economic downturn. 
The objective of the second part of the thesis was to find a relation between asset 
prices and interest rate settings. Such a relation is important since wealth deriving 
from return in the asset market could be an important factor of households demand 
and firms' investment, which in turn might create pressures on output and inflation. 
We approached the analysis from two different perspectives. In Chapter 4 we 
empirically test the link between asset markets and monetary policy reaction. We start 
testing the relation between returns in the financial markets and output; this is an 
essential preliminary test, because a positive relation would signify the presence of 
wealth effect in the economy. Indeed our results indicate that in the United Kingdom 
wealth is an important determinant of the national output. We then proceed examining 
the policy-makers reactions to movements in the asset markets. 
We employed forward 
looking Taylor rules to test if the Bank of England has taken into consideration 
movements in the housing market and in the stock market over the period 
1992: 10- 
2003: 1; other studies have focused their attention on other variables, namely exchange 
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rate and monetary aggregates, but none addressed this specific point. The results 
support the hypothesis that policyrnakers in the UK appear to have taken into 
consideration both stock price inflation and house price inflation when setting interest 
rates. When the Taylor rule was augmented by house price inflation and asset price 
inflation, we found a positive and highly significant response of these two indicators, 
with- the former showing a coefficient always greater than the latter. This result was 
robust even when Central Bank independence was taken into consideration; 
furthermore we showed that after the independence monetary authorities have become 
more inflation adverse. We pointed out that the positive impact of asset returns on the 
risk free interest rate should be attributed to the fact that Central Bank not only has the 
objective of price stability, but also of financial stability; where the latter is not 
necessarily guaranteed with the achievement of the former. 
Chapter 5 started from the result obtained in Chapter 4 that the aggregate demand 
equation is positively affected by changes in the asset market (wealth effect). We 
developed a macroeconomic model given by three equations: a Fhillips Curve, an 
augmented IS and an equation describing the behaviour of the asset market. This 
particular theoretical framework departed from the traditional analysis. A dynamic 
optimization problem was then solved to identify the optimal interest rate. We derived 
an augmented Taylor rule where the monetary policy instrument reacts not only to 
squared deviations of output and inflation, but also to asset prices misalignments. The 
results deriving from the analytical solution suggested that the weight on inflation and 
output in the optimal level of interest rate decreases while the weight attached to asset 
price misalignments increases. An important point from these results is that financial 
imbalances should have a separate role in the formulation of the optimal interest rate. 
Finally one important policy implication emerges from the thesis: financial markets 
matters. They appear to be important because: 1) they determine how a monetary 
policy shock is transmitted to the economy; 2) financial markets can be a source of 
financial instability and consequently a cause of an economic downturn; 3) they 
contribute to the consumers' and firms' wealth therefore they have a direct effect on 
the level of the aggregate demand. 
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There are two issues which will more than likely be considered by researchers in 
future years. Firstly not to only consider reflecting sustainable movements in the 
underlying economic fundamentals, but to consider how to measure credit expansion 
and increases in asset prices which are determined by the developments of underlying 
imbalances which is prone to future corrections. Secondly, improving our 
understanding of how monetary authorities should react in presence of a wealth effect 
which is not the result of an increasing in the economy fundamentals but rather of a 
period characterized by financial markets euphoria. Of particular interest would be 
the case where the real side of the economic system and the financial side call for 
different monetary policy actions. 
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